TABLE OF CONTENTS

iv

After-Action Report
Table of Contents   *Louisiana*
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR
For Official Use Only – Draft

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In early 2006 the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) put forth an initiative to conduct exercises to validate hurricane response plans and identify additional immediate coordination and preparedness improvements in areas with high hurricane risk before this year's hurricane season begins. The program was launched with the intention of increasing coordination among Federal response agencies, States, local jurisdictions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the private sector, and constituents to identify best practices from previous hurricane incidents. The Louisiana Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Functional Exercise/Communications Full-Scale Exercise (FSE) provided an opportunity for the Louisiana Governor's Office of Homeland Security (GOHSEP), East Baton Rouge Parish, and the city of New Orleans to identify planning and policy improvements and provided a forum to exercise lessons learned from Federal and State After-Action Reports (AARs). In addition, Baton Rouge participated in the Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan (TICP) Validation FSE, while the city of New Orleans evaluated its current communication capabilities.

The Louisiana EOC Functional Exercise/Communications FSE was conducted on May 23 and 24, 2006. The exercise involved a Category 3 hurricane that makes landfall in Louisiana near New Orleans. The hurricane was significant enough to cause damage to critical infrastructure and force local response actions. State and local EOCs in Baton Rouge and New Orleans each responded to the hurricane just before and after landfall. The exercise was cosponsored by the DHS Preparedness Directorate's Office of Grants and Training (G&T) and the Louisiana GOHSEP with the input, advice, and assistance of the Exercise Planning Team.

The Louisiana EOC Functional Exercise/Communications FSE was designed to achieve the following:

♦ Address key issues and lessons learned from all related AARs and conferences
♦ Exercise key issues to determine what needs to be addressed in an Improvement Plan
♦ Increase collaboration and communication among Federal, State, and local partners

The recommendations and improvement actions in this report were vetted by the Exercise Planning Team and key players at all levels. Each agency reviewing this report should consider the recommendations and determine the most appropriate actions and resources needed (e.g., time, staff, funding) for implementation. These items should be regarded as recommendations only. In some cases, agencies or organizations may determine that the benefits of implementation do not outweigh the costs. In other cases, agencies may identify alternative solutions that are more effective or efficient.

During the exercise, participants identified the following key strengths:

♦ The personnel involved in the response to a catastrophic incident were experienced.

♦ The National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS) were used throughout the State of Louisiana.

♦ Volunteer and faith-based organizations were willing to provide assistance.

♦ The private sector was willing to offer goods, services, and supplies

♦ Emergency response plans and the planning process, including integration, training, and exercising of plans, were recognized.

In addition, several successes should be recognized, including the following:

♦ Federal, State, local, NGO, and private-sector agencies and organizations participated, and professional relationships exist among these entities.

♦ Achievable action items to increase preparedness were identified.

♦ Lessons learned and best practices from the Region VI Hurricane Preparedness Tabletop Exercise (TTX), which was conducted 1 week earlier in New Orleans, LA, were incorporated.

Throughout the exercise, several opportunities for improvement in the Federal, State, and local capabilities to mitigate and respond to a Category 3 hurricane were identified. Major recommendations include the following:

♦ Continue training on communication systems and software, especially those used to make and track resource requests at EOCs throughout the State.

♦ Integrate and coordinate Federal, State, local, and private-sector responses.

Additional exercises in the State of Louisiana should test specific improvements instituted as a result of this exercise and should include a focus on working collaboratively, within the Incident Command System (ICS) structure, to manage a catastrophic incident.

Homeland security preparedness involves a cycle of outreach, planning, capability development, training, exercising, evaluation, and improvement. Successful exercises lead to an ongoing program of process improvements. This report is intended to assist agencies striving for preparedness excellence by analyzing exercise results and doing the following:

♦ Identifying strengths upon which to build
♦ Identifying potential areas for improvement
♦ Recommending exercise followup actions

Follow-on exercises should test specific improvements instituted as a result of this exercise and should continue to focus on refining existing plans and procedures.

PART 1: EXERCISE OVERVIEW

EXERCISE NAME

Louisiana Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Functional Exercise/Communications Full-Scale Exercise (FSE)

LOCATIONS

Ascension Parish EOC, Ascension Parish, LA

City of Baker EOC, Baker, LA

City of Baker Municipal Center, Baker, LA

East Baton Rouge Parish EOC, Baton Rouge, LA

East Feliciana Parish EOC, East Feliciana Parish, LA

Ernest N. Morial Convention Center, New Orleans, LA

Governor's Office for Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP) Emergency Operations Center (EOC), Baton Rouge, LA

Leland College, Baker, LA

Livingston Parish EOC, Livingston Parish, LA

Louisiana National Guard Joint Operations Center (JOC)

Louisiana National Guard Tactical Operations Center (TOC)

Louisiana State Department of Transportation and Development (Emergency Support Functions [ESFs] #1 and #3) EOC

Louisiana State Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) Headquarters

Louisiana State Region 4 EOC

Louisiana State Region 5 EOC

Louisiana State Region 6 EOC

Louisiana State Region 8 EOC

Martin Luther King, Jr. Elementary School, New Orleans, LA

New Orleans EOC

New Orleans Union Passenger Terminal, New Orleans, LA

3

Pointe Coupee Parish EOC, Pointe Coupee Parish, LA

River Bend Nuclear Power Reactor EOC, Baton Rouge, LA

West Baton Rouge Parish EOC, West Baton Rouge Parish, LA

West Feliciana Parish EOC, West Feliciana Parish, LA

SCENARIO

Category 3 hurricane

TYPE OF EXERCISE

Functional Exercise/FSE

FOCUS

Mitigation and response

EXERCISE DATE

May 23 and 24, 2006

PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS

Cosponsors

Federal Agencies

♦ U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Preparedness Directorate's Office of Grants and Training (G&T)

State Agencies

♦ Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP)

PARTICIPANTS

Local Participants

♦ Acadian Ambulance
♦ Ascension Parish Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
♦ Baker Department of Public Works
♦ Baker Fire Department
♦ Baker Mayor's Office
♦ Baker Municipal Center
♦ Baker Police Department
♦ Baker School Board
♦ Baton Rouge Area Mutual-Aid System
♦ Baton Rouge Emergency Medical Services (EMS)
♦ Baton Rouge Fire Department
♦ Baton Rouge Metropolitan Airport
♦ Baton Rouge Office of Public Information

- Baton Rouge Police Department
- Bethany World Prayer Center
- Capital Area Transportation System
- City of Baker
- City of Central
- City of Zachary
- Designated Regional Medical Coordinator
- East Baton Rouge Parish Animal Control
- East Baton Rouge Parish Communications District
- East Baton Rouge Parish Constable's Office
- East Baton Rouge Parish Cooperative Extension Service
- East Baton Rouge Parish Coroner's Office
- East Baton Rouge Parish Fire Departments
- East Baton Rouge Parish Health Unit
- East Baton Rouge Parish Office of Family Services
- East Baton Rouge Parish Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (OHSEP) EOC
- East Baton Rouge Parish Office of the Mayor-President
- East Baton Rouge Parish Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES)
- East Baton Rouge Parish School Board
- East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Office
- East Baton Rouge Parish Special Assistance Team (SAT)
- East Feliciana Parish EOC
- East Feliciana Parish Sheriff's Office
- Entergy
- Keta Management Company
- Livingston Parish EOC
- Livingston Parish Fire Department
- Louisiana Capital Area Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD)
- Louisiana State Police (LSP)
- Miracle Place Church
- New Orleans Department of Health
- New Orleans Department of Transportation
- New Orleans EMS
- New Orleans Fire Department
- New Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP)
- New Orleans Office of Homeland Security and Public Safety (OHSPS)
- New Orleans Police Department
- Pointe Coupee Parish EOC
- Pointe Coupee Parish Sheriff's Office
- Port Allen Fire Department
- Renaissance Village Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Mobile Trailer Park

- ♦ Volunteers
- ♦ West Baton Rouge Parish OHSEP EOC
- ♦ West Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Office
- ♦ West Feliciana Parish EOC
- ♦ West Feliciana Parish Fire Department
- ♦ West Feliciana Parish Sheriff's Office
- ♦ Zachary Fire Department
- ♦ Zachary Police Department

State Participants

- ♦ Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP)
- ♦ Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH)
- ♦ Louisiana Department of Social Services
- ♦ Louisiana State University (LSU)

Federal Participants

- ♦ Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
- ♦ U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Preparedness Directorate's Office of Grants and Training (G&T)

Private Sector Participants

- ♦ American Red Cross
- ♦ Southern University

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS

- ♦ Participants: 120
- ♦ Observers: 30
- ♦ Facilitators: None
- ♦ Exercise support: 21

FUNDING SOURCE

DHS G&T

PROGRAM

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), State and Local Direct Support

CLASSIFICATION

For Official Use Only (FOUO)

FEDERAL SPONSORING AGENCY/DEPARTMENT POINT OF CONTACT (POC)

Rob Schweitzer, DHS G&T Exercise Manager

FEDERAL EXERCISE PROJECT OFFICER

Rob Schweitzer, DHS G&T Exercise Manager

EXERCISE OVERVIEW

The Louisiana EOC Functional Exercise/Communications FSE provided participants an opportunity to evaluate current concepts, plans, and capabilities for mitigation and response to a Category 3 hurricane near New Orleans, LA. The exercise focused on planning strengths and weaknesses and interagency cooperation. It was designed to foster an increased understanding of potential hurricane hazards with an emphasis on integrating capabilities and identifying and coordinating additional resources needed before and after landfall of a Category 3 hurricane.

The exercise was an "evaluated practice," a format that allowed players to test their plans and procedures in a no-fault learning environment. At the same time, evaluators collected information to assess the performance of target capabilities during exercise play.

Functional Exercise. The functional exercise was a multi-media, Simulation Cell (SIMCELL)-facilitated exercise that required collaboration among personnel from Federal, State, and local agencies. Participants coordinated mitigation and response to a Category 3 hurricane.

Participants from each agency were located at EOCs, the GOHSEP, East Baton Rouge's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (OHSEP), and the New Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP). Emergency response and emergency management participants were located in the EOCs and at various field locations within the city of Baker in East Baton Rouge Parish. Players were strongly encouraged to coordinate with each other and other agencies to share information and answer questions as necessary. At the end of each day, controllers and evaluators presented actions taken and critical issues during a brief-back session with the Exercise Directors.

FSE. The FSE was a SIMCELL-facilitated field exercise that required interoperable communications among personnel from Federal, State, and local agencies. Participants coordinated mitigation and response to a Category 3 hurricane.

Participants from State and local agencies were located at EOCs, the GOHSEP, the East Baton Rouge OHSEP, and the New Orleans OHSPS. Field activities occurred at various locations in the city of Baker and surrounding cities, East Baton Rouge Parish, and the city of New Orleans. Players were encouraged to communicate with each other and with other agencies when there was a need to coordinate efforts, share information, or ask questions. At each exercise location, participants were asked to complete critique forms, assessing the exercise and actions taken.

Hot Wash. A Hot Wash was conducted immediately after exercise play at each location. Participants discussed strengths identified during the exercise, areas for improvement, and immediate changes that should be made.

Exercise Evaluation. Participants identified strengths, areas for improvement, and future training needs by assessing capabilities.

Facilitators were positioned at each exercise location to capture notes of key actions and issues identified during exercise play, and they attended Hot Washes to listen to participants present their organizations' strengths and areas for improvement. Following the Hot Washes, all participants were asked to complete critique forms, which allowed them to provide observations on their mitigation and response as well as the exercise design.

In keeping with the no-fault nature of this exercise, the evaluation embodied in this report examines the plans, procedures, and response systems used during this exercise. Agency performances were also observed and documented to make recommendations for future improvements. Facilitator observations focused primarily on overall agency actions and interaction between agencies, rather than on individual players.

8

After-Action Report
Part 1: Exercise Overview   *Louisiana*
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR
For Official Use Only – Draft

PART 2: EXERCISE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The Exercise Planning Team established the following exercise objectives:

1. **Citizen Protection.** Assess the ability to make citizen protection decisions specific to evacuation and sheltering-in-place.

2. **Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution.** Assess the ability to locate, mobilize, and manage critical resources (personnel and materials).

3. **Emergency Public Information.** Assess the ability to coordinate and disseminate accurate and timely information to the public.

4. **Mass Care.** Assess the ability to coordinate and support mass care and sheltering operations.

5. **Emergency Communications.** Assess the capability of State and local agencies' primary and alternate communication systems to establish, maintain, and transfer information during a disaster response.

Participants demonstrated and accomplished many of the exercise objectives as they deployed their resources and capabilities in accordance with existing plans and procedures. Exercise play also revealed ways that future responses could be made more effective. Participants identified gaps in current plans and resources and defined areas in which increased training would be beneficial.

This page is intentionally left blank.

After-Action Report
Part 2: Exercise Goals and Objectives   *Louisiana*
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

PART 3: EXERCISE EVENTS SYNOPSIS

SCENARIO

The exercise scenario was presented to participants before the exercise started. The scenario, which was developed by the Exercise Planning Team in conjunction with the DHS Exercise Support Team, involved the pre- and postlandfall activities of a Category 3 hurricane.

FUNCTIONAL EXERCISE

After receiving the scenario briefing, participants took their places in the EOCs and field locations and began responding to events presented by the SIMCELL according to their designated roles. Participants were encouraged to coordinate with each other and other agencies when there was a need to share information or when there were questions. The SIMCELL helped to drive events, and participants were encouraged to consider the overlap of resources, necessary coordination among agencies and EOCs, and communication protocols required to respond.

At the East Baton Rouge and New Orleans EOCs, participants responded to SIMCELL-generated injects and communicated with field locations as necessary. They also identified issues such as the inability of E-Team software to meet their resource requests and the need for additional exercises to test the capabilities of local resources that have memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with the State for emergencies. A question also arose regarding the Continuity of Operations (COOP) of other agencies and staff training at the National Guard.

At the GOHSEP EOC, there were three primary decisions to be made by the Incident Commander. These decisions included declaration of a state of emergency by the governor, special-needs shelters activation, and transportation both of special-needs populations and the general population. The governor declared a state of emergency immediately after the beginning of the exercise. Participants made the remaining decisions facilitating the evacuation, including contra flow of the highways, coordination with other parishes, procurement of transportation resources, and the evacuation of pets and livestock. Participants identified internal issues such as EOC operating procedures and acronyms and the need for technical support for the various computers, telephones, and visual displays in the EOC; improved communication among branch managers; and additional training on EOC software.

In the field locations, participants established Incident Command Posts (ICPs) and deployed resources to respond to SIMCELL-generated events. Participants focused on communication methods and protocols to ensure the response was coordinated and sufficient. They also identified several other issues, including questions about the city of Baker's authority over residents at Renaissance Village, the number and specific requirements of the special-needs residents at the village, and the need for a public information campaign to educate residents on emergency issues.

FULL-SCALE EXERCISE (FSE)

After receiving the scenario, participants took their places in the EOCs and field locations and began responding to events presented by the SIMCELL according to their designated roles. Partici-

11

pants were encouraged to coordinate with each other and other agencies to share information or answer questions as necessary. The SIMCELL helped to drive events, and participants were encouraged to consider the overlap of resources, necessary coordination among agencies and EOCs, and communication protocols required to respond.

At the East Baton Rouge Parish and New Orleans EOCs, participants responded to SIMCELL-generated injects and communicated with field locations as necessary. They identified issues such as the lack of good communication channels between the EOC and the State and the need for direct contact between the Public Information Officer (PIO) and the GOHSEP, East Baton Rouge Parish, and New Orleans EOCs. They also noted that a Joint Information Center (JIC) located at East Baton Rouge EOC would assist in disseminating information quickly and efficiently as it became available.

In the field locations, participants established ICPs and deployed resources to respond to SIMCELL-generated events. Participants focused on communication methods, protocols, and plans to ensure a coordinated response and accurate planning. They also identified several other issues, including the inability to communicate with and provide emergency warnings and information to Renaissance Village residents, the need for additional channels for first responders (conventional mutual-aid channel 800 MHz), and the difficulty of communicating with Federal officials responsible for Renaissance Village.

H O T W A S H

A Hot Wash was conducted after the functional and full-scale exercises, providing participants with the opportunity to note strengths and areas for improvement. Participants identified the value of the exercises and cited the need and desire to continue building relationships among responding agencies. Although participants were positive about the outcome of the exercise, they also objectively identified improvements to current standard operating procedures (SOPs), Emergency Operating Plans (EOPs), TICPs, and evacuation guidelines and communication protocols. Attendees believed that these improvements were reasonable and even suggested implementing some of the changes immediately, such as setting up a JIC at the East Baton Rouge EOC.

12

After-Action Report
Part 3: Exercise Events Synopsis   *Louisiana*
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR
For Official Use Only – Draft

PART 4: ANALYSIS OF TARGET CAPABILITIES

This section of the report analyzes how well the participants and entities worked together as a whole (e.g., across disciplines and jurisdictions) to achieve selected target capabilities. Target capabilities are the necessary elements in all hazards to effectively prepare for, respond to, and recover from an event or incident. Results for each target capability are summarized below by its corresponding objective. A detailed analysis of the activities and processes that contributed to results related to the target capabilities appears in Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group Performance.

CRITICAL RESOURCE LOGISTICS AND DISTRIBUTION

New Orleans

Participation among the EOC functions with a direct resource management role that affected overall emergency management operations was exemplary. The elements comprising the Logistics Emergency Support Function (ESF) #7 and Finance and Administration sections were well represented. Both sections occupied collocated rooms within the EOC. Several Operations Section elements had space near Logistics and Finance and Administration. Debris Management (ESF #3), Mass Care/Housing (ESF #6), and Agriculture and Natural Resources (ESF #11) were collocated in a room contiguous with Finance and Administration. No representatives were present in Agriculture and Natural Resources, although space had been identified for them in this room.

Resource management tools were available to support emergency management operations. E-Team is the State-approved and sole software application for requesting resources and tracking requisitions. Only the Logistics Section, the focal point for requisitions and Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) requests, accessed E-Team. E-Team is used to requisition support from State sources; EMAC is used for out-of-State sources.

InterScope, available at several locations in the EOC, is another resource management tool. It draws from the city's existing databases to display geolocation information about resources. InterScope did not appear to be fully integrated into emergency management operations. Data were displayed for few ESFs. Public safety and public health data were manually entered as an exercise artifact. Hurricane track data were also manually entered, primarily on the second day of the exercise. This entry appeared to support recordkeeping rather than the prediction of a hurricane path and the potential damage that could occur along the projected path.

Several participants noted that EOC staff did not coordinate requirements with the Logistics Section and made unauthorized requests or purchases in some instances. Those staff members were generally unfamiliar with the requisition process during emergency management operations. Other participants noted that feedback for E-Team requisitions needed improvement. The Logistics Section was able to access status during the exercise. The lack of (or limited) feedback indicates problems with information flow rather than with the E-Team application.

13

Participants emphasized a need to understand what support can be provided from the departments and agencies to facilitate emergency management. They also expressed a need to have access to that information during EOC operations. Furthermore, the participants discussed the use of a collaborative tool to facilitate the exchange of information. They specifically identified WebEOC™ because of its use within the emergency management community.

East Baton Rouge

Overall, personnel working in the East Baton Rouge EOC were able to successfully manage the distribution of their own resources and support the actions required to respond during the scenario. For example, the newly implemented operational layout of the EOC facilitated efficient coordination of tasks to accomplish the individual response missions to which they responded. However, participants commented that the use of the E-Team software hindered their ability to request and track resources from outside the parish.

A major issue that arose was the ability for parish resources to support evacuation of the Renaissance Trailer Park. Participants discussed that East Baton Rouge normally implements shelter-in-place as a population protective action during hurricanes. However, the trailers provided to Katrina evacuees are not physically capable of protecting citizens in wind conditions above 40 mph. Participants were concerned about the time and resources needed to evacuate the multiple Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) trailer parks established in the parish. The exercise was designed to practice and work out the logistics of evacuating one site, so this aspect of resource management did not become a factor during this exercise. In the Hot Wash, however, participants noted that if they have to provide evacuation for all trailer parks, their existing resources could become overwhelmed quickly. Additionally, it appeared that key players (American Red Cross, fire, and police) made efforts to stage resources as the scenario unfolded, but the delay and canceling of the evacuation at the trailer parks did not enable the parish to test its evacuation resource capabilities.

The National Guard did not seem to be engaged as a full player. It appeared the EOC did not understand which roles and responsibilities the National Guard possessed. This could be indicative of problems in a real-world setting, perhaps stemming from a lack of integration between the National Guard and EOC chain of command.

Participants also expressed concern that FEMA may not have fully coordinated the Essential Services Agreement (ESA) with existing plans to ensure that assets that local jurisdictions rely on had not been committed to efforts being conducted by Federal and/or State governments elsewhere.

GOHSEP

The State has made many positive changes and additions to its commodity resource capabilities and procedures. A concerted effort to pre-position assets at resource Staging Areas has been accommodated for by Federal and State agencies. The State has designated four primary and tertiary Staging Areas and has pre-positioned items that will be needed in the early stages of a disaster response. The State EOC has enhanced its resource supply capabilities by increasing the staff dedicated to providing resources during an emergency. The Unified Logistics Team consists of 65 staff members from various agencies tasked with procuring and positioning commodities.

14

After-Action Report
Part 4: Analysis of Target Capabilities   *Louisiana*
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR
For Official Use Only – Draft

During the exercise, newly assigned staff members were taught the processes and protocols for obtaining commodities and distributing them. These staff members will form the core of the Logistics Team and will assist in training additional staff. Staff members interfaced with both Federal and State representatives who will be available during an actual event.

During evacuation, the Resource Support group activated so they could better position personnel and commodities within affected areas. Players positioned comfort facilities and gasoline sources along the evacuation routes, while food, water, and cots were provided to base camps. As the track of the storm became more predictable, ESF groups moved pre-positioned commodities closer to expected impact areas.

CITIZEN PROTECTION: EVACUATION AND IN-PLACE PROTECTION

New Orleans

Participation among the EOC functions with shelter/mass care roles and responsibilities was consistent throughout the exercise. Field representatives were deployed for evacuation events on the first day, when the gathering, processing, and transport of citizens were tested. Within the EOC, the Public Safety, Mass Care/Housing, and Public Health groups were well represented and involved on both days.

The Regional Transit Authority (RTA), which is the primary agency for transportation, had a representative in the EOC on the first day to coordinate the movement of buses for the evacuation exercise. However, they did not provide the appropriate staff to guide and direct overall transportation operations to support emergency management operations.

Several participants noted that the facilities and their locations for State-provided shelters have not yet been designated. Throughout the exercise, ESF groups had to request information from the State EOC before making evacuation and transportation decisions. Participants also noted that pet evacuation and sheltering still needs resolution. The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) was represented in the New Orleans EOC and interacted with other ESF groups on this subject.

East Baton Rouge

The exercise identified a major concern regarding the safety of Hurricane Katrina evacuees living in FEMA trailer parks throughout the State. These citizens have significantly increased the population of East Baton Rouge Parish. The trailers accommodating these evacuees are not strong enough to provide adequate protection from winds exceeding 40 mph. Therefore, coordinated plans among all organizations responsible for the safety of citizens living in parks throughout the State must be created to address a large population base that must be evacuated to safe shelter during a hurricane.

Local emergency preparedness officials demonstrated that they were prepared at a local level to execute an evacuation of residents of the FEMA trailer sites. Agency heads met early in the event to discuss options for safely moving residents from the site to safe shelters. The State was also contacted in accordance with current parish written plans and procedures to establish which agency had the jurisdictional authority to execute the evacuation of the site. Local response agencies

15

staged early to develop onscene Incident Action Plans (IAPs) in accordance with the NIMS and awaited direction from the State on both when and how to act.

Participants discussed the need to review plans in an all-hazards context. The East Baton Rouge EOC participated in two separate functional exercises in which both scenarios required evacuating citizens and establishing shelters for their care. Both scenarios also required the implementation of separate portions of the EOP to respond to the hurricane and an incident at the River Bend Nuclear Power Plant. Players expressed concern that the primary facilities for triage and sheltering were in close proximity on the Louisiana State University (LSU) campus and noted that plans need to be reviewed in case responders need to react to two major incidents simultaneously.

The list of available shelters for evacuees did not distinguish the type of shelter. While the displays in the East Baton Rouge EOC indicated availability of two shelters, one was a special-needs facility and the other was for families of those with special needs. The shelter type should be indicated for planning purposes.

GOHSEP

Historically, hurricanes in Louisiana have disrupted utilities, communications, medical, transportation, and food service systems at the same time. Because of those impacts, emergency response efforts can be seriously reduced. The movement of disaster supplies, service providers, emergency workers, and volunteers can be impeded. Professional emergency responders may be delayed in reaching their assigned organizations because of injury, death, or family problems.

Mass care was discussed throughout the 2-day exercise. Everyone in the Logistics Section and Unified Command group possessed wide experience in mass care operations. This experience is needed to properly prepare and care for a large population of individuals.

On the first day of the exercise, 48 hours before landfall, mass care representatives prepared for the worst-case scenario by pre-positioning emergency service functions for food distribution and evacuee shelters. Discussions took place to coordinate support services for the emergency needs of responding agencies and those citizens needing rescue.

Special-needs populations were moved to preidentified shelters run by the Department of Health and select hospitals. The State set up special-needs shelters in Bossier City, Monroe, Baton Rouge, Alexandria, and Hammond. Once the decision was made to activate the special-needs shelters, the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers provided generators for each shelter. The State has also pre-positioned gasoline to operate these generators.

Other mass care support was provided during the evacuation by supplying portable toilets along evacuation routes as well as food, water, and cots to base camps that were activated to provide commodities to affected areas. In the early hours of the response, ESF #7 (Resource Support) provided food, water, cots, and ice to shelters and affected parishes. Because the number of evacuees from the threatened area was more than ESF #8 (Health and Medical) could support, Federal assistance was requested.

Mass care issues during the exercise were determined by the anticipated consequences of the incident and the impact area. Receiving parishes hosting evacuees were provided with resources

16

beyond their capabilities to open shelters. This included staffing, commodities, bedding, and medical care. The opening of general population shelters required similar tasks and would need to be coordinated with decisions about transportation. Shelters would have to be ready to receive as the evacuation was beginning and remain continuously monitored to direct special-needs patients as well as the general population.

Mass care support for sheltering operations follows a plan similar to the hospitals. Supplies needed are based on the number of people being sheltered. Therefore, the mass care support for either type of shelter can be preplanned, but the timing of the evacuation, including the possible speeding up of the storm, will affect the deployment of resources.

EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION AND WARNING

New Orleans

During the exercise, it was noted that the city of New Orleans would play a critical role in disseminating public information and warning the city and surrounding parishes within Region 1 of the impending storm. Additionally, participants discussed how they could assist emergency responders. However, participants agreed that clear, consistent information must come from the top down, so that the private sector can communicate this to the public and make appropriate decisions.

The Public Information ESF representatives identified a series of needs related to JIC operations that would improve overall information coordination within the Unified Command structure, including enhanced situational awareness (including asset visibility and resource distribution), assessment procedures and processes (analysis and gap identification), and better coordinated strategic public awareness during disasters through the JIC.

East Baton Rouge

Local officials realized the need to notify the citizens of the impending hurricane. The parish PIO developed and issued warnings through various media outlets and through the Emergency Alert System (EAS) in accordance with written parish plans and procedures. Emergency preparedness officials were concerned that they had no way of notifying the residents of the FEMA trailer site. Currently, there are no warning sirens in place at the facility, and the residents do not have telephones installed in their trailers, so the Community Alert System could not be used to notify trailer occupants.

The PIO was occupied in the field for most of the exercise and was unavailable to the EOC. An assistant did remain at the EOC; however, if announcements to the public are to be made from the EOC, it may be better to send the assistant to the field while the PIO coordinates from the EOC.

The mayor's PIO indicated that public information must be well coordinated and efficiently distributed to all affected areas to ensure that public officials provide the media with the same information to avoid public panic and confusion.

COMMUNICATIONS

New Orleans

The current communication capabilities of the New Orleans region were demonstrated on both days of the exercise. Since this was not a TICP evaluation, an up-to-date equipment inventory was

17

not available to baseline the existing infrastructure and capabilities post-Katrina. To provide context and an overview of the capabilities checked during in the exercise, highlights and facts of the current infrastructure are listed below.

♦ New Orleans has an EDACS 800 MHz trunked system with 24 channels simulcast at two sites (EOC and the Cox Communications tower in east New Orleans); there is also an 800 MHz
9-channel single site at the airport.

♦ St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes' systems, as last described in the 2005 TICP for the New Orleans Urban Area, are no longer functioning.

♦ Jefferson Parish has two 800 MHz trunked systems: one for the Sheriff's Office (using a crane for a tower) and one for other government services (e.g., fire, Emergency Medical Services [EMS], and emergency management).

♦ A dedicated T-1 line exists between New Orleans dispatch and the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office that allows a link between any groups in either of the two 800 MHz law enforcement systems.

♦ Plans are being developed for a shared 800 MHz system across all the parishes and the city.

Communication checks were performed throughout the exercise to demonstrate that operability and interoperability were technically feasible within and across jurisdictions and disciplines using the public safety land mobile radio (LMR) systems. These checks generally proved successful but demonstrated the need for increased understanding of procedures for swapped radios, sharing channels, and activation of gateway devices (e.g., ACU 1000s). In addition to checks on LMR capabilities, various forms of backup communications that link government components (e.g., Unisys mobile communications vehicle with satellite capabilities), a State-owned RapidCom mobile communication van with an ACU 1000 and a satellite link, Fsuna Guns providing Voice over Internet Protocol [VoIP] and high-speed data communications, and an Internet Protocol [IP]-based digital data network) were also demonstrated by the New Orleans Mayor's Office of Technology, which is the designated lead for ESF #2 (Communications). While technically successful, the results from the demonstrations of LMR and backup services highlighted the need for increased coordination between the operations and logistics components of the New Orleans EOC. Additionally, the need for an updated regional communications plan, more refined SOPs, and continued development of the communication infrastructure were observed.

Because multiple agencies had roles in the exercise, it was difficult to fully assess all parish communication capabilities and processes in an operations-based exercise environment. Additionally, because there is not yet a finalized regional communications plan, no observations were made comparing demonstrated capabilities to predetermined policies and protocols.

GOHSEP

In this exercise, several parish EOCs and the GOHSEP EOC were activated 48 hours before the simulated hurricane reached the coastline. The start time was designated for maximum exercise purposes and by no means reflects the time Louisiana EOCs would activate if this were an actual event. For exercise purposes, they were operational 48 hours before a Category 3 hurricane was expected to hit Louisiana. Because of recent training, the activation of the GOHSEP EOC took place quickly. Communications were in place, and the use of E-Team as the common system to collect and process information was activated and operational throughout all participating parish EOCs and several State agencies. As the situation continued to escalate, expansion of activity in all affected parishes continued. The GOHSEP EOC began to implement shift schedules and execute staffing plans.

Notification to all participating agencies was done through telephone, e-mail, and/or electronic sources (E-Team). As the first day wore on, reports increased of evacuees and incidents occurring on evacuation routes.

In the two areas where direct law enforcement activity was underway, traffic control and limiting access to the area were managed with State and local law enforcement and the National Guard. This was not specifically directed through emergency management but as a matter of existing response SOPs.

Throughout the exercise, the ESFs communicated well both within their specific function as well as with supporting agencies. Resource Support maintained a constant dialogue with the FEMA representative and discussed the procedures and protocols to obtain Federal assistance. When Federal assistance was not available, supplies were sought through the Office of the Governor–Division of Administration.

During the FSE, local public safety agencies across disciplines (fire, EMS, and law enforcement) from the Louisiana Homeland Security Region II demonstrated the use of interoperable communications in the Baton Rouge Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). These agencies were able to successfully communicate using their primary LMR systems, and to a lesser degree, commercial services in a joint response capability in three separate venues (i.e., East Baton Rouge EOC, Baker Police Department, and Renaissance Village trailer park). The communications portion of the exercise focused on the initial prelandfall response to a Category 3 hurricane (day 1).

Highlights of the exercise are listed below to provide context and an overview of the communication capabilities tested during the exercise.

♦ Interoperable communications were readily available to participating local public safety agencies. For example, tactical radio talk groups (e.g., BK-SE, BK-RD) were rapidly assigned to the Delta Force Task Force as requested during the hostage situation at the Baker shelter. The local public safety agencies included the following:

  – Brownsfield Fire Department
  – Chaneyville Fire Department
  – City of Baker Fire Department
  – City of Baker Police Department

- City of Baker Public Works Department
- Denham Springs Fire Department
- East Baton Rouge Sheriff's Office
- Lake Charles Police Department
- West Baton Rouge Sheriff's Office
- West Feliciana Sheriff's Office
- Zachary Fire Department

♦ First responder agencies within the Baton Rouge UASI area demonstrated the use of interoperable communications across multiple jurisdictions (city, parish, State). For example, console and gateway patches were established by East Baton Rouge dispatchers. The assigned Communications Leader (COML) directed this action in anticipation of the planned evacuation of the Renaissance Village trailer park by the Baker Fire and Police Departments to accommodate the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) response by the Arcadian Ambulance Service and to test communications with the State police at the State EOC.

♦ First responder agencies within the Baton Rouge UASI area demonstrated the use of communication interoperability solutions using all equipment categories (cached radios, shared channels, gateways/console patches, and shared systems) included in Section 3 of the Louisiana Homeland Security Region II TICP. For example, several public safety agencies used the East Baton Rouge 800 MHz trunked radio communication system as their primary communication solution.

♦ Urban area protocol and procedures for Incident Command were used to coordinate communications in the field. All communication usage followed normal Incident Command as outlined in Section 5 of the Louisiana Homeland Security Region II TICP.

Overall, interoperable communications in the Baton Rouge urban area were tested by multiple agencies and disciplines from many jurisdictions. The exercise demonstrated that the Baton Rouge urban area was able to apply interoperable communication resources outlined in the Louisiana Homeland Security Region II TICP, including the implementation of an ICS as dictated by NIMS.

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS: PLANS AND PROCEDURES

New Orleans

Participation throughout the exercise was exemplary, especially because city agencies from the New Orleans OHSPS that do not normally have the opportunity to attend were present. If continued, this high standard of participation will allow more effective EOC activation and operations during an actual incident. This exercise gave ample opportunity for each agency to define its roles and responsibilities during a hurricane. Even though participants may have observed some chaotic activity, the lessons learned far outweighed the initial confusion. It was also noted that the interagency communication and coordination was above standard, and response efforts benefited from the cooperation of all city agencies.

During the exercise, several situational briefings were conducted that affected the EOC mission outcome. The only downfall to these briefings was that ESF stations were in some instances left vacant, with no one to support Incident Commanders in the field.

20

After-Action Report
Part 4: Analysis of Target Capabilities   *Louisiana*
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR
For Official Use Only – Draft

Each participating agency operated within the scope determined. Several lessons were learned in the process, such as EOC space and staffing requirements. It was also noted that organization of EOC space, resources, and communications could be improved, allowing for smoother operations in the future. Without the participation of city agencies, this would not have been as evident.

The EOP and supporting SOPs and checklists were not continuously used during the exercise. Participants commented that the current EOP, SOPs, and checklists are outdated and do not reflect their procedures since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Several participants commented that status boards throughout the EOC, as well as signage showing where each agency was located in the EOC, would have allowed them to keep better track of what resources were in place.

East Baton Rouge

SOPs seemed to be handwritten, informal, and not codified in the response plans. Personnel did not appear to use manuals or documents as reference material. The reference documents available to them did not appear to have been updated (except for contact telephone numbers) since well before Hurricane Katrina. The lack of use of SOPS may have occurred because the exercise events did not require them or because personnel assumed they would not be useful.

21

After-Action Report
Part 4: Analysis of Target Capabilities   *Louisiana*
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR
For Official Use Only – Draft

This page is intentionally left blank.

After-Action Report
Part 4: Analysis of Target Capabilities   *Louisiana*
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

PART 5: ANALYSIS OF BREAKOUT GROUP PERFORMANCE

LOUISIANA GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (GOHSEP)

This section of the report analyzes how well the participants worked together within their functional area to achieve selected target capabilities. The target capabilities are things that are necessary in all hazards to effectively prepare for, respond to, and recover from an event or incident. Results for each target capability are summarized below by its corresponding objective.

Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution/Citizen Protection: Evacuation and In-Place Sheltering

Issue 1. Long-term resources were not identified early by all ESFs.

Observation: While ESF #7 (Resource Support) was aware of what commodities the general population needed, no specific commodity requirements were identified from the other ESFs with the exception of the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries. Obtaining this information early in a response to a disaster is a critical step in attaining a true common operating picture of the resources available and needed. Commodities are available to support the population and responders and to identify, with the appropriate lead time required, additional resources that must be requested from Federal resources and/or purchased through State procurement procedures. Unified Logistics has taken steps to ensure these commodities are available by pre-positioning an extensive supply of food, water, fuel, and other supplies in resource Staging Areas throughout the State.

Special-needs populations were moved to preidentified shelters that were run by the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH). The State established special-needs shelters in Bossier City, Monroe, Baton Rouge, Alexandria, and Hammond. Once the decision was made to activate the special-needs shelters, the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers provided generators for each shelter. The State has also pre-positioned gasoline to operate these generators.

Other mass care support was provided by positioning comfort facilities and gasoline along the evacuation routes and providing food, water, and cots to base camps that were being activated. In the early hours of the response, ESF #7 provided food, water, cots, and ice to these shelters and affected parishes. Realizing that the number of evacuees from the threatened area was more than they could support, ESF #8 (Public Health and Medical Services) requested Federal assistance in providing shelters.

ESF #7 is also developing a resource database that is envisioned to be a living document populated both with resources on-hand and those available from other sources. This will assist in identifying all resources needed during the early stages of a disaster response.

Recommendation 1: All Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) should identify their needs in the early phases of incident management for critical resources that must be replenished.

23

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group   *Louisiana*
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

Action 1: Perform needs assessment.

Action 2: Incorporate identification of resource needs into SOPs for all ESFs.

Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution

Issue 1: System deficiencies in E-Team made tracking resources difficult.

Observation: Requests were submitted through the E-Team software, but whether they were effectively tracked was not evident. Many participants complained that resource requests were incomplete and did not provide sufficient information to source, task, and track the completion of the requirement. Some seemed to use the E-Team software as a process rather than a tool to facilitate the process of providing resource assistance.

Recommendation 1: Procedures for tracking tasks that have been entered into E-Team should be refined to ensure an effective tracking capability.

Action 1: Provide a series of training events to ensure operators are thoroughly familiar with the E-Team capabilities and functionality.

Action 2: Develop training on a standard method of using E-Team resource requests more efficiently.

Issue 2: Tasking National Guard personnel to staff the regional Staging Areas was difficult because of multiple steps in the request process for staff.

Observation: ESF #7 has the responsibility to manage the equipment and commodities prestaged at the regional Staging Areas; however, the warehouses are staffed with National Guard personnel. ESF #7 is required to coordinate tasking of regional Staging Area personnel through ESF #16 (Military Support to Civilian Affairs), thus adding an additional coordination activity during the response to a disaster.

Recommendation 1: Develop a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to eliminate additional coordination.

Action 1: ESFs #7 and #16 should ensure consistency with policy and legal issues.

Emergency Public Information and Warning

Issue 1: There was a lack of interaction between PIOs and the JIC and between players and officials.

Observation: The PIOs and JIC were nearly invisible to players in the EOC. While the PIOs and JIC coordinated real-world media, the players were unable to interact with them as they would need to if a disaster were to actually occur.

Recommendation 1: Incorporate branch managers and public/elected officials in the process.

Action 1: Consult branch managers for input when drafting the PIO talking points.

24

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group *Louisiana*
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

Action 2: The PIOs and the JIC should maintain policies on how to inform public/elected officials of the situation.

Communications

Issue 1: EOC layout and capabilities hampered effective face-to-face communications.

Observation: The EOC is designed based on the Unified Command structure, and in some instances the physical layout seemed to hamper communications for some ESFs. For example, because ESF #8 provides support across the Unified Command, they have workspace in each of the branches—Transportation/Evacuation, Infrastructure, Human Services, Emergency Services. This physical separation creates a coordination and communication problem not only for ESF #8 representatives but also for the Coordination Section, which frequently sent the same task to multiple ESF #8 representatives. On the other hand, all of the ESF #16 desks were collocated, which seemed to create a positive environment for information coordination and collaboration. ESF #7 did not have a desk in the EOC, so other ESFs seemed to be unaware that they were available as a resource. Additionally, ESF #14 (Public Information) had no visibility and, as a result, seemed excluded from the exercise. Within the Infrastructure Branch, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) seemed to be overlooked. For example, when ESF #5 (Emergency Management) Operation Section coordination staff received a mission assignment for maps, they were uncertain to whom the request should be assigned and seemed unaware that the USGS was a resource.

Recommendation 1: Consider reorganizing the workspace within the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to collocate Emergency Support Function (ESF) #8 workspaces and provide visibility for ESFs #7 and #15. Provide orientation to ESF #5 as a means of ensuring familiarity with ESFs and branch functions and capabilities.

Action 1: Collocate, where possible, all ESF #8 desks.

Action 2: Identify a single point of reception for mission assignments/taskers for each ESF.

Action 3: Identify ESF #7 with signage.

Action 4: Brief taskers on branch and ESF capabilities/resources.

Issue 2: EOC participants were not fully trained on computers and E-Team software.

Observation: Logging onto the computer was a problem for many team members, which caused a delay in operations for several ESFs. E-Team software seemed cumbersome and problematic for the majority of users. The E-Team software was not intuitive, and some users were unaware that instructions for using the software were in the Duty Station Guide. Some team members indicated that the documented instructions were too wordy and difficult to follow. The functionality of the software seemed to inhibit effective tasker/mission assignment management. For example, there are multiple tabs for each ESF, which confused users, and the process was unclear for forwarding taskers from one ESF to another, resending misrouted tasks back to the logger/tasker, and following up requests sent to one ESF from another. Additionally, a previous version of the

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group   *Louisiana*
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

software had a "pending operations" tab, which was missing from the current version. Some users found this option useful and requested to have the functionality back.

Recommendation 1: Improve E-Team software functionality and user instructions.

Action 1: Simplify the E-Team User Instructions.

Action 2: Create only one tab for each ESF.

Action 3: Add a "pending operations" tab.

Recommendation 2: Conduct computer and E-Team software training.

Action 1: Provide user training for logging onto the computer system and accessing e-mail, files, and applications.

Action 2: Provide user training for accessing and using all functions of the E-Team software.

Action 3: Develop easy-to-read/easy-to-use training and instruction materials.

Additional Observations: Plans and Procedures

Issue 1: Unified Command and EOC coordination were inhibited by unfamiliarity with the new structure.

Observation: The GOHSEP drafted the 2006 State EOP that created new ESFs and organized their functions into branches. For example, the Infrastructure Branch includes Transportation, Public Works, and so forth and is staffed by the appropriate agencies. A branch manager has been appointed, and the ESF leads, each representing different agencies, implement decisions made by Unified Command. Normally, the Unified Command cabinet members are working directly with personnel from their own departments versus a branch manager, who perhaps is not in their chain of command. A period of adjustment is required; otherwise, this ICS will be counterproductive to EOC operations.

Recommendation 1: Unified Command must adjust and coordinate with the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) organization.

Action 1: Increase training at the branch level and include senior leadership.

Issue 2: Decisions made by the Unified Command were not always supported by concise goal/objective setting in the Incident Action Plan (IAP).

Observation: The planning section had two meetings to create the IAP for each operational period with the branch managers and ESF leads. This was a new process for some participants and will continue for real incidents. The IAP sets objectives for the next operational period, usually a 12-hour period of time. The first IAP included more than 15 objectives, which may be too many for just one operational period. Some objectives were in the realm of SOPs that needed to be added to the individual branch and ESF SOPs or placed on a timeline for completion.

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group   *Louisiana*
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

The Unified Command adjusted the IAP process and developed strategic goals for the IAP, including save lives, provide security, and repair critical infrastructure. The objectives were then mapped back to the goals, which provided direction for the entire operation once decisions had been made.

Recommendation 1: Continue to develop Incident Action Plan (IAP) processes and training.

Action 1: The IAP process must continue to mature and become more streamlined, while objectives must be measurable and relevant to the goal they support.

Action 2: Branch managers and their deputies must be trained in the planning process to increase their use of the IAP as a unifying tool.

Action 3: Parish EOC personnel must be familiar with the IAP, and decisionmakers should be familiar with the unifying aspects of this planning tool.

Action 4: Branch managers and their ESF leads should meet independently to develop procedures specific to their branches for use by their respective ESF agencies.

Issue 3: Local EOCs were not in sync with State EOC timelines.

Observation: Various cabinet secretaries described their respective agency operation centers that implement both their normal and emergency functions. These centers are in contact with the EOC, have access to E-Team, and are the frontline service delivery for the protective actions directed by Unified Command. Therefore, synchronization of their operational periods with the EOC is important for a coordinated response. The EOC planning timeline, situation reporting, and resource management interface should be brought back to respective agencies for them to adjust their operations in an effort to meet EOC timelines.

Recommendation 1: Integrate operational timelines.

Action 1: Agency leadership, branch managers, ESF leads, and EOC representatives should review exercise results and make sure that agency operations are timed to meet GOHSEP EOC timelines.

Action 2: Agency operation center personnel should be trained on the EOC data flow, E-Team, and the IAP to synchronize their operations as appropriate.

N EW O RLEANS

This section of the report analyzes how well the participants worked together within their functional area to achieve selected target capabilities. The target capabilities are those things necessary in all hazards to effectively prepare for, respond to, and recover from an event or incident. Results for each of the target capabilities are summarized below by their corresponding objective.

27

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group   *Louisiana*
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

Citizen Protection: Evacuation and In-Place Protection

Issue 1: The State has not identified and disseminated the facilities/locations for State-provided shelters.

Observation: On multiple occasions during the exercise, the ESFs queried the State EOC for information about shelters. For example, ESF #8 (Health and Medical) had to request from the State EOC the location of State shelters before making evacuation and transportation decisions for special-needs citizens. This additional step added to the delay time. Predesignating State shelters would facilitate local (i.e., city and parish) evacuation planning, coordination, and execution.

Recommendation 1: Identify and designate State-provided shelters.

Action 1: The GOHSEP, New Orleans OHSPS, and parish/local entities should collaborate to identify potential facilities for use as State-provided shelters. These candidates should be thoroughly vetted and a list of recommendations provided to the governor.

Action 2: The governor should designate facilities from this list as State-provided shelters.

Action 3: The GOHSEP should coordinate with the DHS to include these State-provided shelters in the appropriate regional plans.

Action 4: The GOHSEP, New Orleans OHSPS, and parish/local entities should incorporate these shelters into the appropriate plans (e.g., Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan [CEMP], SOPs).

Issue 2: The city has not identified facilities for sheltering during storms rated lower than Category 3, nor was the repair and maintenance status of city shelters identified.

Observation: Several participants noted that the city of New Orleans has not identified shelters that could be used when evacuation occurs for lower-rated storms. These same participants also noted that existing facilities are still in various stages of repair. Citizens would benefit from having shelters available for less intensive storms—for example, citizens who are homeless or reside in structures that are susceptible to damage from lower-rated storms. As existing shelters are repaired, some of those could satisfy this need.

Recommendation 1: Designate shelters for use during storms rated lower than Category 3.

Action 1: New Orleans OHSPS and the Department of Public Works should identify and document those facilities that could be used as shelters during lower category storms.

Action 2: Include these proposed facilities in the prioritized repair and maintenance list created for the mayor.

Action 3: New Orleans OHSPS should recommend to the mayor those facilities that could be used as shelters during lower category storms.

28

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group   *Louisiana*
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

Action 4: The mayor should designate facilities for use as shelters during lower category storms.

Action 5: New Orleans OHSPS should incorporate those shelters selected by the mayor into the appropriate plans (e.g., CEMP, SOPs).

Action 6: New Orleans OHSPS should coordinate with GOHSEP to include those shelters in the appropriate regional plans.

Recommendation 2: Determine the status of existing shelters.

Action 1: New Orleans OHSPS and the Department of Public Works should identify and document the repair and maintenance status of all city shelters.

Action 2: New Orleans OHSPS and the Department of Public Works should jointly develop a schedule to effect maintenance and repair, prioritize the workload, and recommend this priority for the repair and maintenance of the city's shelters to the mayor for a decision.

Action 3: The mayor should approve a schedule for repair and maintenance of the city's shelters.

Issue 3: Pet shelters are still unresolved.

Observation: Participants noted that pet evacuation and sheltering is still an issue that governmental (State, city, parish, and local) and nongovernmental (American Red Cross, SPCA) entities need to address. Many citizens choose to not be separated from their pets, which are often considered to be family members. Any pet solutions must be correlated with those adopted for the evacuation and sheltering of people.

Recommendation 1: Identify, coordinate, and document facilities to be used for sheltering pets.

Action 1: GOHSEP, New Orleans OHSPS, parish/local entities, the American Red Cross, and the SPCA should develop, coordinate, and implement standard guidelines for the selection of pet shelters and their collocation with people shelters.

Action 2: GOHSEP, New Orleans OHSPS, parish/local entities, American Red Cross, and SPCA should recommend collocated people/pet shelters to the appropriate governance for selection.

Action 3: The appropriate governance should designate facilities from this list as people/pet shelters.

Action 4: GOHSEP, New Orleans OHSPS, and parish/local entities should incorporate these shelters into the appropriate plans (e.g., CEMP, SOPs).

Action 5: GOHSEP coordinates with DHS to include these people/pet shelters in the appropriate regional plans.

Issue 4: The management of overall transportation operations (ESF #1) needs improvement.

29

Observation: AMTRAK representatives were present in the EOC and at field locations to assess rail operations for evacuation. An RTA representative was also present in the EOC specifically to coordinate the movement of buses from collection/debarkation points. This RTA representative had direct radio communications with a field supervisor responsible for the buses. However, several participants and evaluators noted a critical shortcoming in the operation of ESF #1 (Transportation)—the lack of a leader with decisionmaking authority.

The primary agency for transportation, RTA, did not have a decisionmaker present to guide and direct transportation operations during the exercise. No one from RTA was in charge of ESF #1 to plan, coordinate, and implement operations across all modes of transportation. This lack of comprehensive transportation management can adversely affect the operations of individual ESFs and the conduct of EOC operations. The effect would be sharply felt during evacuation, return, and supply efforts. For example, participants noted that the use of non-AMTRAK track slowed the evacuation to Shreveport. No one with expertise in regional rail operations and decisionmaking authority was available within ESF #1 to coordinate an alternative route.

Recommendation 1: The mayor should mandate that the primary agency and supporting agencies for each ESF participate in EOC operations, both exercise and actual, with representatives possessing decisionmaking authority.

Action 1: If statutory authority is lacking to issue such a mandate, city governance should initiate actions to acquire such authority.

Action 2: If statutory authority already exists, then the mayor should issue a mandate requiring the presence of representatives with decisionmaking authority for each primary and supporting agency during EOC operations.

Recommendation 2: Identify and coordinate the use of alternate means of rail transportation during evacuation operations.

Action 1: Establish a working group under the leadership of New Orleans OHSPS that includes representatives from RTA, New Orleans Public Belt Railroad, and AMTRAK.

Action 2: Identify alternative evacuation routes for rail traffic.

Action 3: Coordinate with the owners of the right-of-way and track on each route for use during all-hazards incidents.

Action 4: Coordinate with Federal and State entities as required.

Action 5: Include these routes in appropriate State, regional, parish, and city/local plans.

Issue 5: More personnel are required to triage and transport evacuees traveling by rail.

Observation: This concern has two aspects: providing medical triage during evacuation operations and selecting transportation for evacuation.

30

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group   *Louisiana*
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

Medical triage was applied during the evacuation exercise. The process for citizens with special needs is to identify and transport them, along with medical patients, to a medical faculty for further evacuation. Participants noted that although transportation triage was the strength, there is room for improvement. For example, more medical triage personnel are needed in the field during evacuation operations.

The second triage concern involves the status and selection of a transportation means. AMTRAK representatives were present in the EOC and at field locations to assess rail operations for evacuation. An RTA representative was also present in the EOC specifically to coordinate the movement of buses from collection/debarkation points. This RTA representative had direct radio communications with a field supervisor responsible for the buses. However, several participants and evaluators noted a critical shortcoming in the operation of ESF #1 (Transportation): the lack of a leader with decisionmaking authority.

The primary agency for transportation, RTA, did not have a decisionmaker present to guide and direct transportation operations on either day of the exercise. The RTA representative in the EOC on May 22 (day 1 of the exercise) was there solely to coordinate the movement of buses for the evacuation exercise. No one was in charge of ESF #1 to plan, coordinate, and implement operations across all modes of transportation. This lack of comprehensive transportation management can adversely affect the operations of multiple individual ESFs and the conduct of EOC operations. The effect would be sharply felt during evacuation, return, and supply efforts. For example, participants noted that the use of non-AMTRAK track slowed the evacuation to Shreveport. No one with expertise in regional rail operations and decisionmaking authority was available within ESF #1 to coordinate an alternative route.

Recommendation 1: Establish a working group under the leadership of the New Orleans Office of Homeland Security and Public Safety (OHSPS) that includes representatives from New Orleans Health Department (NOHD) and parish health departments/entities. This working group may be the same one defining public health roles and responsibilities during all-hazards events.

Action 1: Define the medical triage requirements to support evacuation operations.

Action 2: Develop, coordinate, and implement a public health annex to appropriate plans.

Recommendation 2: City government should mandate that the primary agency for each Emergency Support Function (ESF) participate in Emergency Operations Center (EOC) operations, both exercise and actual, with representatives possessing decisionmaking authority.

Recommendation 3: The New Orleans Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (OHSEP) should establish a working group under the leadership of New Orleans OHSEP that includes representatives from the Regional Transit Authority (RTA), New Orleans Public Belt Railroad (NOPBR), and AMTRAK.

Action 1: Identify alternative evacuation routes for rail traffic.

Action 2: Coordinate with the owners of the right-of-way and track on each route for use during all-hazards incidents.

31

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group   *Louisiana*
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

Action 3: Coordinate with Federal and State entities as required.

Action 4: Include these routes in appropriate State, regional, parish, and city/local plans.

Communications

This section discusses observations of the New Orleans regional communication capabilities and areas for improvement. These observations are based on four of the five capability descriptions of communications as outlined in the Target Capabilities List (TCL): governance, SOPs, technology, and usage. (Training, the fifth capability, was not assessed as part of this exercise.) Within each of these areas, recommendations are referenced, where applicable, according to their corresponding critical task number from the Universal Task List (UTL) as well as to evaluation criteria delineated in the TICP Exercise Evaluation Guide (EEG).

Issue 1: Plans, policies, and procedures supporting communications with all Federal, State, tribal, regional, and local governments and agencies, as well as voluntary agencies, are incomplete.

Observation: The Regional Communications Plan had not been finalized at the time of the exercise. However, local public safety agencies across the New Orleans UASI demonstrated the capability to achieve interoperable communications through a variety of means (e.g., swapped radios, shared channels, gateway devices). Communication checks showed that local agencies were generally able to establish communications with each other (with the exception of New Orleans dispatch to St. Bernard Parish Fire Department, which was awaiting the acquisition of radios), despite the loss of much of their infrastructure. This loss complicated communications in cases such as when the city of New Orleans needs to communicate with St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes through Jefferson Parish.

Although communications were feasible among local public safety agencies, there did not appear to be a framework for supporting agency communications across all levels of government and public safety and service disciplines. It is possible that this broader set of communication requirements (inclusive of interoperability across Federal, State, and local agencies) will be addressed in the regional plan currently under development; however, the controllers, evaluators, and observers did not witness this aspect of interoperability during the exercise. For example, the resources that the New Orleans Mayor's Office of Technology could provide for Incident Commander-level backup communications were not known by local public safety agencies (law enforcement, fire, and EMS).

Recommendation 1: Complete development of the Regional Communications Plan with attention to supporting communications with additional Federal, State, local, public service, and volunteer public safety requirements.[1]

---

[1] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 1,1.1, 1.4, 1.4.2, 1.5, 5.2, 5.4, and the prerequisite for EEG Form 1.1: SOPs –Policies, Practices, and Procedures Tasks 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8*

32

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group   *Louisiana*
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

Action 1: Identify relevant representation by agencies with assets and response requirements for participation in the completion of the regional plan. Agency representation should include parish and city law enforcement, fire, and EMS; New Orleans OEP; the Mayor's Office of Technology; Louisiana State Police (LSP); relevant Federal agencies (e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], FEMA, National Guard, U.S. Coast Guard [USCG]); public health agencies (e.g., State health officials); and volunteer organizations likely to respond to a large-scale incident in New Orleans (e.g., American Red Cross).

Action 2: Finalize and disseminate the plan to participating agencies.

Action 3: Implement and exercise the plan through interim tabletop exercises (TTXs) and an eventual full-scale exercise (FSE).

Recommendation 2: Coordinate the regional plan with other public service agencies/regions involved in the broader emergency response efforts (e.g., transportation, utilities, public works).[2]

Action 1: Identify what assets and/or resources from other public service agencies would be provided to the region and incorporate them into the regional plan.[3]

Action 2: Share and coordinate the New Orleans Regional Communications Plan with other Louisiana region communications plans.[4]

Issue 2: Communication logistics are not coordinated with the operational needs of Incident Commanders and first responders.

Observation: ESF #2 (Communications), led by the New Orleans Mayor's Office of Technology, actively coordinated various backup communication systems with commercial providers (e.g., satellite telephones, Nextel direct connect phones, Roam Secure text messaging devices). As the designated communication logistics lead, ESF #2 maintained a list of backup communication assets that were available, deployed, or down according to the exercise scenario and coordinated this with various service providers (e.g., Nextel, Cingular, Cox, Bell South) with which memorandums of agreement (MOAs) were already in place. Many of these technologies were demonstrated and proved effective during the exercise. Other actions led by ESF #2 were performed effectively, including backing up critical information technology (IT) systems; updating and reviewing personnel contact lists; and testing satellite, cellular, and power devices. Although much of the checklists and inventorying of backup/redundant commercial services had been performed, ESF #2 did not visually map out their existing infrastructure or pre-positioned equipment as the scenario progressed. Such mapping of assets seemed to be a common aspect of similar ESF stations within the EOC in coordination with the Incident Commander to provide situational awareness.

---

[2] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 1,1.1, 1.4.2, 1.5, and 5.2*

[3] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 1.1, 1.4, 2.2, 5.4, and the prerequisite for EEG Form 1.1: SOPs – Policies, Practices, and Procedures Tasks 7 and 8*

[4] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 1, 1.1*

Observers and evaluators were unclear about the coordination between ESF #2 and the operational components of the EOC, which relied on public safety LMR systems for mission-critical voice communications. ESF #2 did not appear to have responsibility or knowledge of LMR systems or assets within the region. Consequently, there was a gap in coordination between the communication requirements of the ICS operations and the capabilities offered by ESF #2. No Communications Unit Leader (COML) was identified during the exercise, which could have further inhibited this coordination, as there was no documentation of public safety communication resources available or in use as required in the ICS 205 form (Incident Radio Communications Plan) required by NIMS.

Recommendation 1: Develop a plan to coordinate communication infrastructure and asset data for land mobile radio (LMR), landline, and commercial services with operational requirements within the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) structure.[5]

Action 1: Develop a plan for identifying, assessing, tracking, deploying, and repairing LMR, landline, and commercial communication capabilities.

Action 2: Coordinate these plans with existing redundancy and backup plans in place by ESF #2.

Action 3: Develop and distribute maps and infrastructure inventories of LMR, landline, and commercial capabilities in preparation for tracking assets during an incident.[6]

Recommendation 2: Coordinate communication requirements of Incident Command operations with the capabilities and assets of Emergency Support Function (ESF) #2.[7]

Action 1: Develop a plan for monitoring, tracking, evaluating, and coordinating tactical communication operations requirements and capabilities between the EOC and any ICP.[8]

Action 2: Identify a COML within EOPs to coordinate requirements tracking with the Incident Commander with asset inventories of ESF #2.[9]

Action 3: Develop a checklist to be used by the COML and ESF #2 to coordinate decisions regarding the deployment of backup communication capabilities.

Action 4: Provide awareness and training to the COML and designated ESF #2 lead to ensure they coordinate effectively and understand their responsibilities.[10]

---

[5] *In reference to UTL# Res.B.1.6.1.1.5; EEG Form 1.2: SOPs – Command and Control Task 5*

[6] *In reference to UTL# Res.A.3 3, Res.B.1.6.1.1.5; EEG Form 1.2: SOPs – Command and Control Tasks 4, 5, 6, and 7*

[7] *In reference to UTL# Res.A.3 2; EEG Form 1.1: SOPs – Policies, Practices, and Procedures Task 6; and EEG Form 1.2: SOPs – Command and Control Task 3*

[8] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 1.6, 2.2, 5, 5.1, Res.B.1.6.1.1.5; EEG Form 1.1: SOPs – Policies, Practices, and Procedures Tasks 6, 7, and 8; and EEG Form 1.2: SOPs – Command and Control Tasks 3 and 5*

[9] *In reference to UTL# Res.A.3 2, Res.A.3 3, Res.B.1.6.1.1.5 and EEG Form 1.2: SOPs – Command and Control Tasks 3, 4, 5, and 10*

[10] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 1.4, 2, 2.2, 5.1, Res.A.3 2, Res.A.3 3, Res.B.1.6.1.1.5 and EEG Form 1.2: SOPs – Command and Control Tasks 5 and 7*

Issue 3: Overreliance on commercial services for mission-critical communications caused a breakdown in communication when certain systems were rendered inoperable.

Observation: Commercially-provided services—wireless cellular, Blackberry, and/or landline telephones—served as the primary means of voice communications throughout each of the jurisdictions and disciplines including public safety agencies at each of the incident locations and the EOC. On day 2 of the exercise, injects were added to take down cellular systems as could typically occur in large-scale incidents. These injects were challenging for agencies that did not have mission-critical LMR capabilities or whose systems were not interoperable with others (e.g., transportation, utilities, and public health).[11]

In addition to a heavy reliance on commercial services for primary voice and data communications, public safety agencies frequently used landline and cellular devices (e.g., cellular telephones, Blackberries, landline telephones) to prompt the activation or use of LMR systems. Although interoperable communication checks on LMR systems between various parish dispatch centers were technologically capable (e.g., console-to-console patch between New Orleans joint dispatch and Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, shared channels between adjacent parishes, and the shared 800 MHz system in New Orleans), exercise participants used their desktop computers, landline and cellular telephones, and Blackberries as prompts before attempting to use these interoperability mechanisms over LMR systems. These forms of telephone prompts are often in line with general procedures, but the ability to quickly activate or use LMR systems should be immediately evident as well.

Recommendation 1: Build land mobile radio (LMR) capabilities to ensure mission-critical communication capabilities in case of saturation or disruption of commercial service.[12]

Action 1: Continue to rebuild damaged or lost radio infrastructure to minimize gaps in the radio frequency coverage areas.[13]

Action 2: Increase the availability of portable radios for each of the agencies across each of the jurisdictions.[14]

Action 3: Establish steps to move to a shared system among jurisdictions and disciplines to aid in efficient and effective radio communications.[15]

---

[11] *A number of issues were identified as plausible reasons for the reliance on these commercial services rather than LMRs. Specifically, due to the destruction in the aftermath of last year's hurricane season, there is a shortage in the number of portable radios available for each of the agencies, and the ability to use a shared system did not exist at the time of the exercise. The destruction of a number of key towers has also negatively impacted the radio frequency coverage throughout all parishes. Each of these factors was identified by emergency responder personnel as drivers for why LMR is not the primary means of voice communications outside of public safety officers with tactical missions.*

[12] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 4.1.3 and EEG Form 1.1: Task 7*

[13] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 2.2, 4.1.3, 5.4*

[14] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 5.4 and EEG Form 1.2: Task 7*

[15] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 4.1 3, 5.2 and EEG Form 1.3: Task 7*

35

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group   *Louisiana*
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

Recommendation 2: Create standard operating procedures (SOPs) and operational guidelines (i.e., decision tree or checklist) for how and when to use commercial communication technologies and integrate them into a regional communications plan.[16]

Action 1: Create SOPs and operational guidelines for using cellular/PCS phones and Blackberry services.[17]

Action 2: Create SOPs and operational guidelines for using wire line services and other technologies that Federal, State, and local responders would likely depend on during an incident (e.g., wire line, satellite telephones).[18]

Recommendation 3: Because of the responders' heavy reliance on commercial services, future exercises should further challenge players in pre- and postlandfall scenarios (e.g., power failure, overwhelmed networks) that would affect the coverage and availability of commercial services.

Action 1: Develop scenarios in future TICP FSEs involving overwhelmed or unavailable commercial networks.[19]

Action 2: Ensure that Wireless Priority Service (WPS), Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) cards, and portable and mobile satellite communications are available for required staff and that staff are trained to use these services.[20]

Issue 4: Communication coverage at key locations within the New Orleans UASI region is inadequate.

Observation: Coverage assessments are needed at locations that are used during emergency evacuations. At the Morial Convention Center, a predesignated site that is likely to be used during large-scale incidents for evacuee processing, participants noted degraded audio quality, which prevented their ability to communicate with each other onsite and with the EOC. The probable cause of this audio degradation is a lack of sufficient coverage in the building.

Recommendation 1: Ensure adequate coverage for radio communications in key locations in all regional evacuation or emergency response plans.

Action 1: Perform propagation analyses in key buildings/locations that would be used in pre- and postlandfall response.

Action 2: Address potential coverage issue areas and ensure system functionality at these key locations.

Issue 5: Mutual aid and swapped radios were not known or monitored among primary response agencies.

---

[16] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 1, 1.4, 5.1 and EEG Form 1.1 SOPs – Policies, Practices, and Procedures Task 8*

[17] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 1.4, 5.1 and EEG Form 1.1 SOPs – Policies, Practices, and Procedures Task 8*

[18] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 1.1*

[19] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 1.5*

[20] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 1.6*

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group   *Louisiana*
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

Observation: For overall effective interoperable communications, personnel between jurisdictions and disciplines should be able to quickly identify and distinguish mutual-aid channels from normal operating or shared channels. Although there were no observations of technical problems using shared channel capability, incidents within the exercise were identified in which response agencies were not sure how to activate or efficiently use these forms of interoperability. For example, dispatchers had to contact other responders or coordinators (either onsite locally or placing a call from a cellular telephone) to determine the proper channel to select on their radios for mutual-aid capability.

Swapped radios were not extensively used in cases in which shared channels were unavailable. Those radios that were exchanged between agencies were not monitored, as was demonstrated when New Orleans police had to call other parishes and the LSP to ask that they pick up their swapped radios to answer a call.

When required, command-level interoperability was demonstrated among dispatches, the EOC, and ICPs. However, participants were unable to communicate with each other directly onsite. This difficulty should be considered a usage issue because the officers were not aware of the processes or capabilities for requesting the activation of a gateway device or other backup communications. The availability of interoperable capabilities for onsite tactical communications, inclusive of the full breadth of interoperability solutions (e.g., swapped radios, shared channels, gateway devices), has not been completely demonstrated or tested with an FSE.

Recommendation 1: Train and exercise mutual-aid channels use within all response agencies.[21]

Action 1: Equip radios with guides or charts to ensure proper identification of mutual-aid channels as well as any additional subsequent channels used for emergency preparedness.[22]

Recommendation 2: Train and exercise the use of swapped radios.[23]

Action 1: Develop an awareness and exercise plan to ensure that agencies swapping radios are prepared to use them in emergencies.

Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution

Issue 1: There were no requests for reconnaissance assets during the postlandfall response phase.

Observation: Hurricanes typically damage broad geographical areas that require reconnaissance to determine status to critical infrastructure in the affected area. A number of organizations/agencies provided various forms of reconnaissance. For instance, USCG helicopters were tasked to provide route reconnaissance during their search and rescue (SAR) missions. The Army Corps of Engineers also performs reconnaissance via air; these are typically contracted helicopters.

---

[21] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 1.1 and EEG Form 1.3: Usage Task 6*
[22] *In reference to EEG Form 1.3: Usage Tasks 4 and 6*
[23] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 1.1 and EEG Form 1.3: Usage Task 5*

37

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group *Louisiana*
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

National Guard representatives were available, but no requests were made for reconnaissance assets in preparation for damage assessment. Units deployed in the city were tasked to accomplish "windshield" reconnaissance. Although ESF #4 requested the USCG to accomplish reconnaissance during SAR missions, there appeared to be no coordinated reconnaissance effort.

No requests were made for large-area reconnaissance capability (e.g., Predator, EP3). These systems would provide a near-continuous capability for affected areas. Live video could be used for real-time rescue direction and damage assessment. Stored video can be viewed afterward for more detailed analysis.

Reconnaissance of infrastructure critical to recovery can support decisionmakers in prioritizing those assets for repair. A coordinated effort ensures all reconnaissance sources are used to the maximum extent possible and to eliminate redundant taskings. For example, tasking roadbound assets to a location better viewed from the air would waste resources and may endanger personnel.

Recommendation 1: Establish a reconnaissance Emergency Support Function (ESF) to allow Emergency Operations Center (EOC) command to plan for and coordinate reconnaissance during an incident.

Action 1: Prepare a reconnaissance ESF that brings together organizations that can provide reconnaissance during incidents. The new ESF should address all forms of reconnaissance.

Action 2: Develop emergency management reconnaissance procedures.

Action 3: Create a training program for EOC personnel describing various methods of reconnaissance that could participate. Training should cover major strengths and weaknesses for each method within the context of a particular incident (e.g., hurricane, flood).

Issue 2: The EOC staff is neither aware of the resources and capabilities available from State and city departments and agencies, nor are they aware of how to coordinate for such resources.

Observation: Several participants noted that awareness and coordination of resources and capabilities are areas for improvement. ESF members individually understood what resources and capabilities they had available within their own department or agency and generally within their respective ESFs. With a few exceptions, across ESFs and at the EOC level, there was not a similar understanding.

Recommendation 1: The New Orleans Office of Homeland Security and Public Safety (OHSPS) should coordinate with city departments and agencies to identify, develop, and document information about their resources and capabilities.

Action 1: Establish a working group under the leadership of New Orleans OHSPS to identify, develop, and document the information required from each department and agency. The working group should consist of ESF leads, which will then coordinate with representatives from each department and agency.

Action 2: The working group should also identify, develop, and document information that each ESF should maintain and have access to during the conduct of emergency management operations.

Action 3: Ensure that this information is consistent with and supports the policies, plans, and procedures recommended for development and implementation elsewhere in this AAR.

Action 4: Ensure that information identified is incorporated into existing and future tools.

Recommendation 2: Once actions at the city and Emergency Operations Center (EOC) levels have been completed, the working group should develop and collect comparable information about the resources and capabilities of other parishes with appropriate Federal partners, Region 1, and State departments and agencies.

Issue 3: The departments, agencies, and ESFs did not recognize how important their information was to others.

Observation: ESF members were generally aware of the status of resources within their purview. For example, they tracked warehouse and distribution point levels, locations of public safety and public works equipment and crews, and availability of transportation nodes and roadways. They used this information to respond to exercise injects. Their responses, however, addressed the form of the event rather than the intent behind it. Each was treated as an independent question to be answered individually (i.e., as an ESF or ESF member) rather than as one in a series of related events that cause the recipient to interact with other ESFs to develop and provide a coordinated (i.e., multi-ESF or EOC) solution to an issue. Because of this perspective, routine coordination and sharing of information among ESFs was less pervasive than it should have been.

Recommendation 1: Incorporate into the documentation developed for the recommendations under Plans and Procedures those policies, plans, and procedures that facilitate the routine exchange of resource management information to ensure a coordinated Emergency Operations Center (EOC) response to events.

Recommendation 2: Incorporate resource management into an overall Emergency Operations Center (EOC) staff training program that uses a building block approach that includes initial, recurring, and sustainment training.

Action 1: Ensure that the all EOC representatives have received the required NIMS training. Completion of this training will provide a common frame of reference for EOC staff and also ensure that the city meets the eligibility requirements for DHS grants.

Action 2: Upon completion of NIMS training, all EOC representatives should train in their respective ESFs. TTXs that validate previously developed policies, plans, and procedures should be included in the ESF training program.

Action 3: Upon completion of ESF training, the New Orleans OEP should conduct EOC training involving all ESFs. This collective training could be accomplished as part of a larger exercise but should include tailored exercises that the New Orleans OEP has developed to address shortfalls.

39

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group   *Louisiana*
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR
For Official Use Only – Draft

Issue 4: The EOC had tools available to support resource management, but these tools were not used uniformly.

Observation: The EOC has tools available to facilitate resource management (e.g., InterScope, E-Team applications). These tools were not used to full capacity, either because the EOC staff was unaware of the tools' availability or because the staff did not know the procedures for use. InterScope, which participants said was available at several locations in the EOC, draws on existing city databases to display geolocation information about resources. Data were shown for a few ESFs. The ESFs that used InterScope—public health and public safety—may have done so because the system engineer/system integrator connected an InterScope computer to a wall display in their functional space. The application was not projected on displays elsewhere in the EOC. The city has been developing the application since late 2005.

E-Team is the State-approved application for requesting resources and tracking requisitions. The system allows for submission of requisitions to the State and their subsequent tracking through system-generated alerts and manual monitoring of status updates/changes. Some participants indicated that they did not receive status updates of submitted requisitions. Other participants said that staff did not follow procedures for requesting logistics support. The issue appears to be that EOC staff is not familiar with the requisition process; the software application itself does not seem to be a problem. On several occasions, Logistics Section staff provided EOC staff with guidance for submitting requests for support.

Recommendation 1: Develop, coordinate, and implement documentation that explains how InterScope will be used, and defines its functionality, capabilities, and limitations.

Action 1: Establish a working group under the leadership of New Orleans OHSEP to create the necessary systems engineering documentation.

Action 2: Develop, coordinate, and implement a concept of operations (CONOPS) that describes how the tool will be used to support EOC operations.

Action 3: Develop, coordinate, and implement a customer requirements document (CRD) that defines the functions and capabilities that EOC users expect from InterScope.

Action 4: Develop, coordinate, and implement a systems requirements document (SRD) that defines requirements that will implement the customer-validated functions and capabilities for InterScope.

Action 5: Integrate InterScope into emergency management operations through exercises and actual EOC operations.

Recommendation 2: Develop, coordinate, and implement or revise existing policies and procedures for requesting logistics support.

Action 1: Ensure that existing polices and procedures are consistent with State procedures. If not, revise city procedures accordingly.

40

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group *Louisiana*
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

Action 2: Adapt State-compliant procedures to EOC operations.

Action 3: As part of a city training and exercise program, educate EOC staff on the E-Team application, including its functionality, capabilities and limitations, and on the established procedures for requesting support from the State of Louisiana and under EMAC.

Recommendation 3: Ensure that existing tools can be integrated into any collaborative tool suite selected to support Emergency Operations Center (EOC) operations.

Issue 5: The EOC lacked an electronic means to share information.

Observation: Most information exchanges were paper-based or face-to-face. Although there is nothing wrong with these methods, best practices involve the use of electronic media to share routine status information. Electronic media is more efficient, provides an automatic record copy, is easily archived, and ensures traceability. Participants discussed the use of a collaborative tool suite, specifically identifying WebEOC because of its use in the emergency management community. The recommendations and actions that follow are applicable regardless of the tool selected.

Recommendation 1: Develop, coordinate, and implement documentation that explains how the collaborative tool will be used and defines its functionality, capabilities, and limitations.

Action 1: Establish a working group under the leadership of the New Orleans OHSPS to create the necessary system engineering documentation for the collaborative tool. This working group may be the same one that accomplishes the recommended actions for the InterScope application.

Action 2: Develop, coordinate, and implement a CONOPS that describes how the collaborative tool will be used to support EOC operations.

Action 3: Develop, coordinate, and implement a CRD that defines the functions and capabilities that EOC users expect from the collaborative tool.

Action 4: Develop, coordinate, and implement an SRD that defines requirements that will implement the customer-validated functions and capabilities for the collaborative tool.

Action 5: Initiate acquisition actions in accordance with the city's procurement policies and procedures.

Action 6: Adopt the following definitions for the information areas used in the collaborative tool:

♦ **Situational Awareness.** This contains information about actual or potential events that will cause activation of an EOC.

♦ **EOC Journal.** This contains a record of all activities when an EOC has been activated, supports action-tracking, and contributes to lessons-learned analysis.

♦ **Reporting.** This contains copies of event-specific reports submitted in accordance with the established reporting process.

41

♦ **Maps.** These contain a utility to access topographic and street maps.

♦ **References.** These contain planning documents such as policies, CEMPs, SOPs, resource manuals, and checklists.

Action 7: Organize the collaborative tool into the following information areas as a minimum and ensure the following:

♦ Situation Awareness
  – Consistent with the guidelines in the appropriate CEMP and SOP
  – Keyed to the incidents monitored for situation awareness and the actual events that result in an EOC activation
  – Performed on a daily basis by the organization designated to perform this function for New Orleans
  – Performed for event-specific situation awareness by the EOC when activated

♦ EOC Journal
  – Consistent with the guidelines in the CEMP and SOP
  – Maintained by the EOC when activated

♦ Reporting
  – Consistent with the guidelines in the CEMP and SOP
  – Performed on a daily basis by the organization designated to perform situation awareness for New Orleans
  – Performed for event-specific reports by the EOC when activated

♦ Maps
  – Consistent with the guidelines in the CEMP and SOP
  – Maintained on a daily basis by the organization designated to perform situation awareness for New Orleans
  – Maintained for event-specific maps by the EOC when activated

♦ References
  – Consistent with the guidelines in the CEMP and SOP
  – Maintained on a daily basis by the organization designated to perform situation awareness for New Orleans

Emergency Public Information and Warning

Issue 1: There was no system in place to effectively and efficiently notify the residents of New Orleans and surrounding parishes of protective action decisions made during the pre-landfall, landfall, and postlandfall hurricane incident.

Observation: During the 2-day exercise, the New Orleans EOC did not activate a JIC for the purpose of gathering, analyzing, prioritizing, and disseminating emergency public information to the citizens of New Orleans and surrounding parishes. The ESF #14 (Public Information) active during the exercise was made up of employees from the Mayor's Office. The participants stated that the emergency preparedness and response agencies within New Orleans are concerned that

there is no system in place at this time to conduct an effective mass notification of Protective Action Decisions (PADs) to residents of New Orleans and surrounding parishes. Local responders are restricted to the amount of protective actions they can disseminate to the public during an actual emergency. Because of the devastation from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, there is no warning siren or public address systems active to warn remaining residents in New Orleans and surrounding parishes. Additionally, there are several FEMA trailer parks in New Orleans and surrounding parishes where the majority of residents have no transportation or mobility.

Participants stated that local planners are also concerned that they have not been allowed to educate residents of New Orleans, surrounding parishes, and FEMA trailer parks on how they will be informed of an emergency evacuation or catastrophic event and what procedures should be followed. In the event of a hurricane, there would be sufficient time to provide residents with notification even if it meant going door-to-door, but local officials fear that in an incident where there is no early warning such as a tornado or hazardous chemical release, they will have no way to effectively notify the thousands of residents at these sites.

Recommendation 1: Establish procedures for activating a Joint Information Center (JIC) in catastrophic incidents.

Action 1: An Emergency Public Information Committee made up of emergency planners from each of the ESFs should be established and vetted by the director of the New Orleans OHSPS for the purpose of establishing procedures for the activation of a JIC during catastrophic incidents.

Action 2: Identify those policies, plans, and procedures that need to be revised or developed that will support the activation of a JIC during catastrophic incidents. Ensure that these policies, plans, and procedures are consistent with the State EOP and the National Response Plan (NRP). Structure the emergency policies, plans, and procedures so they are consistent with NIMS and provide for command and control during the activation of the JIC.

Action 3: A sufficient number of the emergency policies, plans, and procedures should be made available in three-ring binders at each functional area in the New Orleans EOC.

Action 4: All ESF primary coordinating agencies should identify and make available a certified PIO to support the JIC during a catastrophic incident.

Action 5: Public information personnel should work with the NIMS Integration Center (NIC) to validate compliance with the NIMS and NRP responsibilities, standards, and requirements.

Action 6: The JIC emergency policies, plans, and procedures should clearly delineate the lines of authority for all city agencies that have legal authority to be represented during the prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery activities of an incident.

Action 7: The Mayor's Office of Public Information should continue to conduct orientations, training, and exercises to identify the strengths and weaknesses and validation of the JIC policies, plans, and procedures.

Recommendation 2: Install warning sirens with voice messaging capabilities.

43

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group *Louisiana*
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

Action 1: Install an emergency warning siren that allows local officials to broadcast verbal instructions over a public address system on the exact nature of the emergency and the steps residents should follow to prevent injury and death.

Recommendation 3: Educate residents on warning systems and procedures.

Action 1: Develop an educational program for residents of FEMA trailer parks on how they will be notified of impending emergencies and the steps they should take when a warning for the area is issued. The program should include the different types of warnings that may be issued (e.g., hurricane, tornado, chemical release) and evacuation or shelter-in-place procedures.

Action 2: Train all residents on the warning and notification program through the use of pamphlets, flyers, and workshops with local emergency preparedness officials.

Action 3: Conduct drills at the trailer sites using the warning and notification systems to evaluate the effectiveness of the educational program.

Recommendation 4: Use mobile emergency vehicles with public address systems.

Action 1: Use the current public address systems installed on fire, police, and EMS vehicles that can be driven through the trailer park to warn and notify the residents of impending emergencies.

Action 2: Train all first responders on the proper procedures to be followed to notify residents with the in-vehicle public address systems. Responders should be provided with prescripted messages for the various events that may require a mass notification of the residents.

Mass Care

Issue 1: The role for health services during emergency management operations needs more definition, and the provision of medical triage needs improvement.

Observation: Participants indicated that the NOHD and DHS have different perceptions of the role for health services. The disconnect between perceived, assumed, and actual roles could impede coordination and provision of health services during preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation activities for all-hazards events.

Medical triage was performed during the evacuation exercise. The process for citizens with special needs is to identify and transport them, along with medical patients, to a medical faculty for further evacuation. Participants noted that although transportation triage was a strength, there is room for improvement. For example, more medical triage personnel are needed in the field during evacuation operations. It was also noted that a public health annex needs to be developed.

Recommendation 1: Identify, coordinate, and implement standard roles and responsibilities for public health services across preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation activities.

Action 1: Establish a working group under the leadership of New Orleans OHSEP and Public Safety that includes representatives from the NOHD and parish health departments/entities.

44

Action 2: Define public health roles and responsibilities during all-hazards incidents.

Action 3: Ensure that these roles and responsibilities are consistent with GOHSEP and the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (LADHH).

Action 4: GOHSEP and New Orleans OHSPS should collaborate with DHS to clarify and correct any misperceptions about the public health role during all-hazard incidents.

Action 5: Incorporate agreed-upon public health roles and responsibilities into the appropriate plans (e.g., CEMP, SOPs).

Recommendation 2: Develop, coordinate, and implement a public health annex.

Action 1: Leverage the work group established under the leadership of New Orleans OHSPS and Public Safety to define public health roles and responsibilities during all-hazards incidents.

Action 2: Develop, coordinate, and implement a public health annex that documents the agreed public health roles and responsibilities.

Action 3: Develop, coordinate, and implement the medical triage requirements to support evacuation operations.

Action 4: Incorporate the validated medical triage requirements for evacuation operations into the public health annex.

Issue 2: Mass care roles and responsibilities are not clearly defined.

Observation: Participants indicated that the NOHD and DHS have different perceptions of the exact role for health services. Specifics were not identified; however, it was noted that a public health annex needs to be developed.

Recommendation 1: Establish a working group under the leadership of New Orleans Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (OHSEP) and Public Safety that includes representatives from the New Orleans Health Department (NOHD) and parish health departments/entities.

Action 1: Define public health roles and responsibilities during all-hazards incidents.

Action 2: Ensure that these roles and responsibilities are consistent with those of GOHSEP and LADHH.

Action 3: Develop, coordinate, and implement a public health annex to appropriate plans.

Recommendation 2: The Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP) and New Orleans Office of Homeland Security and Public Safety (OHSPS) should collaborate with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to clarify and correct any misperceptions about the public health role during all-hazard incidents.

45

Additional Observations: Plans and Procedures

Issue 1: The New Orleans EOC does not have updated emergency policies, plans, and procedures to effectively manage a catastrophic incident.

Observation: Although the New Orleans emergency policies, plans, and procedures were available during the exercise, some of the New Orleans EOC participants did not consult these documents to make critical decisions and allocate appropriate resources because the participants stated that all of the plans were outdated and do not have supporting SOPs and checklists to effectively coordinate an emergency response or catastrophic incident. Even though critical decisions were made by Unified Command, allocation of needed resources was not made in a timely manner, and resource accountability was limited. Decisionmakers were overwhelmed by the events and did not follow their emergency policies, plans, and procedures, which would have facilitated the New Orleans EOC operations.

Recommendation 1: Coordinate with city officials so the current emergency policies, plans, and procedures are revised for the purpose of coordinating an effective response during a catastrophic incident.

Action 1: An Emergency Response Committee made up of emergency planners from each of the ESFs should be established and vetted by the New Orleans OHSPS director to develop or revise the emergency policies, plans, and procedures.

Action 2: Identify the emergency policies, plans, and procedures that need to be revised or developed that will support the EOP. Ensure that these newly revised emergency policies, plans, and procedures are consistent with the Louisiana State EOP and the NRP. Structure the emergency policies, plans, and procedures so they are consistent with the NIMS and provide for command and control during the activation of the EOC.

Action 3: A sufficient number of emergency policies, plans, and procedures should be made available in three-ring binders at each functional area in the New Orleans EOC.

Action 4: All response agencies having legal authority to operate during a catastrophic incident should be verified and provided with a copy of the emergency policies, plans, and procedures.

Action 5: Copies of the emergency policies, plans, and procedures should be available to the public via the Internet.

Action 6: Training and exercises should be scheduled to familiarize the leadership of New Orleans OHSPS and Public Safety and the functional area representatives with the emergency policies, plans, and procedures.

Action 7: Along with emergency policies, plans, and procedures being made available for each functional table, maps and other visual aids should be incorporated into the plan because they are essential to the decisionmaking process.

Action 8: Applicable local laws, ordinances, or executive orders should support these policies, plans, and procedures. Conduct additional training and exercises to ensure all agencies and elected officials are familiar with their roles in the New Orleans EOC.

Action 9: Emergency management personnel should work with the NIC to validate compliance with the NIMS and NRP responsibilities, standards, and requirements.

Action 10: New Orleans OHSPS emergency policies, plans, and procedures should clearly delineate the lines of authority for all city agencies that have legal authority to be represented during the prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery phases of an incident.

Action 11: New Orleans OHSPS should continue to conduct orientations, training, and exercises to identify the strengths and weaknesses and validate their emergency policies, plans, and procedures.

Action 12: The mayor of New Orleans should adopt and execute an executive order that establishes the New Orleans OHSPS as the agency responsible for mitigating against, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from all types of emergencies and/or disasters.

Issue 2: The New Orleans EOC relied heavily on contracted emergency management personnel used to staff the New Orleans EOC during peacetime. During catastrophic incidents, they may not be available for long-term operations.

Observation: The EOC personnel were predominantly contractors with emergency management expertise. These people proved highly competent and motivated to conduct operations effectively and efficiently. The exercise was successful because of these contractor personnel and proves the value of having experts performing emergency management functions. Unfortunately, they may not be available for the long term, and many issues in developing an effective emergency management capability will require long-term solutions.

Of special note was the person responsible for IT. His efforts ensured supporting systems were up and running and remained so through the exercise. IT, in addition to robust communication, is a critical EOC capability. It is essential that the EOC have the personnel who can establish a fully functional EOC in a timely manner to address emergency response events.

Recommendation 1: A cadre of professional Emergency Operations Center (EOC) personnel should be recruited from the New Orleans or surrounding jurisdictions to ensure emergency management is accomplished in an effective and efficient manner. A professional EOC cadre provides the necessary knowledge and skill to establish the EOC during an incident as rapidly as possible. A professional EOC cadre is the best way to develop EOC policies, plans, and standard operating procedures (SOPs) and coordinate with counterparts at the Federal and State levels. Professional personnel are more likely to form relationships with other emergency personnel from neighboring States and localities. These relationships can be beneficial during an incident. In certain situations, the relationships may make emergency response more effective and efficient because the other emergency management personnel support the local EOC; they will already be known to the local EOC personnel.

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group   *Louisiana*
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

Action 1: Staff the EOC with personnel to cover at least two 12-hour shifts for 2 weeks without augmentation. This would require at least two people per key command staff positions (i.e., operations, logistics, planning, and administration). Transition should allow the current contractor to train new city personnel to work in the EOC.

Action 2: Establish a formal EOC training program to ensure personnel are aware of current policies and procedures.

Action 3: Establish sources to augment the EOC during emergencies. Sources should not be other city departments that support ESFs. Consider local volunteers and mutual-aid associations (MAAs) (e.g., EMACs) as primary sources and contingency contractors as secondary sources.

Action 4: Practice augmentation during major exercises to ensure contractors are familiar with local procedures.

Issue 3: The information flow in the EOC was ineffective.

Observation: Information (i.e., exercise injects) came primarily from the EOC's information center and was then passed to the Planning Section's situation unit via hardcopy and e-mail. The situation unit then had people make a copy and pass the information form to an assistant. The EOC coordinator passed the message to the Unified Command team, which decided which ESF would be tasked. However, in certain instances the assistant made the distribution to what he believed was the correct ESF. Designated runners made distribution to the Incident Commander's assistant and to the respective ESFs; electronic means were not used for distribution between the Planning Section and the ESF or EOC coordinator. Information also flowed through the section chiefs or their deputies and then to an ESF.

The Planning Section manually input information into a database system (i.e., RAMSAFE), a spreadsheet, and a text document. The text document was displayed on a large LCD screen in the EOC briefing area. Although it was used for status tracking occasionally, it would only display a few items at the same time. In one instance, this document showed two inputs that addressed the same event (i.e., the second input was the closure action), but a viewer could not tell they were addressing the same event unless he/she asked someone knowledgeable.

There was no way a status of priority actions could be maintained. In addition, the Unified Command team and EOC coordinator were in separate rooms and would have to physically move to the display to use it. This was a poor substitute for a true common operating picture.

Information flow was impeded by the participants' unfamiliarity with procedures and the EOC's design. Some participants were not included in the information flow even though the EOC commander emphasized that participants should ensure information is passed and take the opportunity to network with other participants since they would be real-world players as well. The EOC layout attempted to float ESFs in and out based on need. However, this did not work as designed and suffered from the absence of an ESF #1 representative. As a consequence, the EOC commander and coordinator had to move around the EOC to ensure events were coordinated properly.

48

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group   *Louisiana*
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

Update briefings were scheduled at 2-hour intervals during each day. These briefings provided status on the various ESFs participating in the events. Some ESFs had high-ranking personnel give the briefings. However, there was no effort to focus the briefing on the current priorities; each ESF provided what it thought was important. Some information was redundant with information provided in previous briefings. In addition, the briefings attracted more people than required; in some cases, ESF desks were left uncovered.

Recommendation 1: Information flow should be streamlined by flowing through the EOC coordinator. The EOC coordinator should notify the Unified Command team, but he/she should also be empowered to pass information to the affected ESF.

Action 1: Revise EOC layout to place the Unified Command team, the EOC coordinator, and ESF leads in the same area. Functional areas should have their own meeting area off the main floor, but there should always be a representative at the main table who can make decisions. In addition, EOC staff leads should be situated directly behind the EOC coordinator or in an adjacent room, if they are not an ESF lead. See the recommended layout on page XX.

Action 2: Maximize use of electronic means to transfer information among EOC elements. Web-based means (e.g., WebEOC) should have a chat capability that allows ESF leads to talk with their respective teams.

Action 3: Limit EOC briefings to command and ESF leads. An exception would be subject matter experts (SMEs) brought in to address specific events. Briefing points should tie to current priorities or significant events and follow a standard format (i.e., problem, fix, timeframe). Use remote briefing for the rest of the EOC via the Internet.

Issue 4: There was no prelandfall predictive damage assessment.

Observation: A predictive damage assessment based on the predicted storm track would allow for effective and efficient preparation for landfall and recovery. The analysis will allow decisionmakers to get an idea of how a storm will affect postlandfall operations. It will provide information on the likely damage to critical infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and power lines.

For example, the analysis may show that primary roads will sustain significant damage. This knowledge will allow decisionmakers to better position recovery assets, develop alternate means locally, and/or request appropriate assistance from Federal and State partners.

The EOC did have a Geographic Information System (GIS) that could have been used to display critical infrastructure and overlaid with the predicted storm track with various damage areas. Various ESFs reported that assets would be deployed to safe locations based on potential flooding if levies failed. However, this was based on general knowledge of flood plains. Although adequate, a more detailed analysis could provide decisionmakers with a better idea of what to expect.

Recommendation 1: Develop a process to predict damage during an incident.

Action 1: Develop predictive damage assessment procedures.

Action 2: Train EOC personnel in damage assessment and assign those personnel to the EOC.

Action 3: Develop tools to help personnel predict likely damage. Tools should build on existing systems supporting the EOC and allow exchanging and sharing information from multiple sources.

Issue 5: EOC decisionmakers did not have a common operating picture.

Observation: EOC personnel did not have a common operating picture supporting EOC decisionmakers. A GIS was available, yet it appeared its capabilities were not fully used. A common operating picture supports decisionmakers by providing relevant information on the situation and status of current actions and allows participants to see what is happening. The common operating picture must be available to all participants, and each participant must understand how to use it and support it with relevant information. Each ESF must understand its responsibility to update events on which it is working and ensure they are input into the common operating picture correctly.

See these Web sites for relevant articles:

http://dels.nas.edu/dr/docs/Young.pdf
http://www.geoplace.com/uploads/FeatureArticle/0510em.asp
http://www.geoplace.com/uploads/OnlineExclusives/hsfunding.asp
http://www.mel.nist.gov/div826/msid/sima/simconf/proc/ftp/akers_2perpage.pdf

50

Recommendation 1: Establish a common operating picture to display the status of priority events to the EOC command structure to allow for timely decisions.

Action 1: Develop a common operating picture policy and supporting procedures identifying the types of information required in a common operating picture. Policy and procedures should identify the priority of information with respect to situation (i.e., pre- versus postevent).

Action 2: Determine tools required to create the common operating picture. Tools should take advantage of existing technology and be common across localities and among Federal, State, and local emergency management agencies to the maximum extent practicable.

Action 3: Develop common operating picture procedures and training for EOC and ESF personnel that establish the requirement to push information into a common operating picture rather than wait to be asked. Procedures should state explicitly how often information should be updated by individual ESFs.

Issue 6: The current layout of the New Orleans EOC is not conducive to effective operations.

Observation: Participants realized that direction, control, and warning are essential functions of emergency preparedness and response operations. They provide the capability for city leaders to control city resources, communicate decisions to the public, and deploy assets to meet critical needs. The functions of the EOC provided the appropriate response during the incident, resulting in saving lives, protecting property, and coordinating recovery operations. Participants noted that emergencies of this nature placed an extraordinary strain on New Orleans. The demand for services escalated while the ability to deliver diminished. Participants noted that special skills, equipment, and fixed facilities are needed to coordinate the response efforts by the Incident Commanders in the field. These requirements create a need for city officials to direct and control their respective emergency response agencies and communities under the most adverse circumstances from a central location that is protected from the elements.

The Unified Command team stated that it is the responsibility of the EOC to gather information during a catastrophic incident, make decisions, and direct necessary actions. This requires close coordination among key city officials. Such coordination is best obtained when these city officials and key ESF staff are located near each other, preferably in the same facility, and have direct lines of survivable communications. The New Orleans EOC is currently organized by departments rather than by ESF layout.

Recommendation 1: Coordinate with city officials to locate a dedicated central facility from which all city emergency efforts can be conducted and directed and organize it in accordance with the Emergency Support Function (ESF) and current organizational design that is consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) standards.

Action 1: Define the functions to be performed; once these functions are determined, necessary staff, organization, size, and functional layout for the EOC can be developed.

Action 2: Identify a dedicated central facility to run EOC operations in an emergency on a sustained 24-hour basis that includes approximately 85 square feet per person. Every effort should

51

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group   *Louisiana*
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

be made to locate the EOC in or close to the heart of government offices that have 24-hour communication capabilities with city emergency dispatchers.

Action 3: Consider a separate EOC facility only after it has been determined that it is not practical to construct an EOC either by modification of an existing structure or by incorporation into a planned government building. The EOC layout should include a nerve center, called the Operations Room, from which direction and control are exercised.

Action 4: Determine the need for two-way communications between agencies.

Action 5: Determine the need for EOC supplies and equipment such as computers that will support a sustained operation.

Action 6: Determine the food supplies for the EOC during long-term operations such as a commissary of nonperishable food.

Action 7: Kitchen equipment and supplies should be identified and purchased for the EOC for both short-term and long-term operations.

Action 8: Medical and sanitary supplies should be identified and purchased for the EOC for both males and females.

Action 9: Visual displays such as status and situation boards should be identified and purchased as a backup to computer technology.

Action 10: EOC SOPs and specific checklists and job aids should be developed and copies furnished to all participating ESF representatives. The SOP should cover layout and function of the EOC as a whole and for major ESF groups and individuals. Use of EOC displays, message forms, and other operational forms should be described.

Action 11: The OEP should prepare and submit a grant application for EOC renovation funds through the Louisiana GOHSEP to FEMA. Upon receipt of these funds, combine them with the New Orleans Department of Public Works grants.

Action 12: Once the EOC has been established and staffed, and the SOP has been prepared, conduct periodic training and exercises to familiarize EOC staff with their assigned duties.

EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH

This section of the report provides an analysis of how well the participants/entities worked together within their functional areas to achieve the selected target capabilities. The target capabilities are those things that are necessary in all hazards to effectively prepare for, respond to, and recover from an event or incident. The following results for each target capability are summarized by their corresponding objective.

Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution

Issue 1: There was a lack of coordination of local resources among Federal, State, and local emergency preparedness planners.

52

Venue: East Baton Rouge EOC

Observation: Participants noted that physical resources such as busses have been committed to support State operations outside of the parish as part of the Essential Services Agreement that was coordinated by FEMA. Participants indicated that these agreements may not have been fully coordinated with already existing plans to ensure that assets local jurisdictions rely on will not be committed to efforts being conducted by the State and/or Federal Government elsewhere in the State. This may cause a problem if the resources are requested to support external response operations when they are already committed within the parish. An example of this from the exercise was observed through the allocation of Baker School System busses to transport FEMA trailer park residents to the Baker Municipal Center for shelter. In response to the impending effects of the approaching hurricane, the schools declared an early dismissal and, therefore, the buses would not be available until after 2:00 p.m. to assist with the evacuation. While this did not prove to be a critical factor in the response to this scenario, delays in asset identification, allocation, and delivery should be avoided as a part of all-hazards planning, especially if a rapid response time for the arrival of a resource is required.

Recommendation 1: Ensure that plans have been reviewed for the allocation of essential assets to prevent them from being overcommitted.

Recommendation 2: Conduct future exercises to test various scenarios in which similar assets may be required to support multiple activities.

Shelter and Mass Care

Issue 1: There was a lack of Federal and State guidance on who is responsible for implementing a safe and efficient evacuation of the residents of the FEMA Renaissance Village trailer park.

Venue: East Baton Rouge EOC, Renaissance Village

Observation: Early in the exercise, the East Baton Rouge Parish OHSEP director realized there was a need to address evacuation of the FEMA trailer park if tropical storm-force winds reached the parish. She called for a meeting between the Baker Police Department chief and the city/parish attorney. The concern was that since parish officials have been unable to receive previous guidance from their Federal or State counterparts, they didn't know who was responsible for evacuating the approximately 1,500 residents of the trailer park. The overwhelming majority of residents have no transportation. Parish officials have requested information on the demographics of the residents, such as special-needs issues, age, and so forth, with unsuccessful results. According to exercise participants, they have made numerous requests to FEMA for guidance and contacted the site management company directly. Exercise participants said they were given conflicting information. For example, FEMA stated that the parish should not make contact with the site residents—they should go through the management company. However, the management company stated that all contact must be made through FEMA channels.

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group   *Louisiana*
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

Through a series of calls and requests to the State during the exercise, the parish made several efforts to request written guidance through E-Team about who should be responsible for executing an evacuation and where residents should go. A conference call was finally established between the Baker Police chief, the parish OHSEP director, and the FEMA representative in the State EOC. The FEMA representative advised the parish that they were responsible for evacuation of residents and they should proceed as they would in any other evacuation. The parish officials explained that they do not evacuate their residents. They also informed the FEMA representative that they were not allowed to enter the FEMA site without prior authorization so they could not adequately prepare an evacuation plan. For the parish to evacuate anyone from the FEMA site, they would need prior knowledge of the number of residents, any special needs they may have, and knowledge of where they should be sheltered. Their current parish plan calls for them to notify and seek guidance from the State, and the State would act on the request from that point. Emergency management officials followed their written, approved plan; the FEMA representative's request to circumvent the system placed them at risk for liability. They were unable to receive any written guidance on what steps to take, so they were unable to execute an evacuation.

Recommendation 1: Coordinate with Federal, State, and local officials so a written plan can be developed to provide for the evacuation needs of the FEMA trailer site.

Action 1: Establish written authorization so local planners can access the site to evaluate the evacuation needs of the site's occupants.

Action 2: Conduct a meeting with FEMA, GOHSEP, the Federally contracted management company, and parish officials so all occupant needs can be identified.

Action 3: Develop a written evacuation plan identifying lines of authority to execute an evacuation and resources needed to carry out a successful and safe evacuation of the FEMA site.

Action 4: Train all local responders and FEMA site occupants on the approved evacuation plan.

Action 5: Conduct a drill involving Federal, State, and local authorities as well as the FEMA site occupants to validate the effectiveness of the evacuation plan and revise as needed.

Emergency Public Information and Warning

Issue 1: There is no system to effectively and efficiently notify residents of the FEMA trailer site of impending evacuation or shelter-in-place actions.

Venue: Renaissance Village

Observation: The East Baton Rouge emergency preparedness and response agencies are concerned because there is no system in place to conduct an effective mass notification of the Baker FEMA trailer park residents. Local responders have restricted access to the FEMA site for planning purposes and limited access to the site during an actual emergency. The only landline telephones at the site are in the main guard office. Onsite employees of the federally contracted management group have limited means of communication between their own personnel and no way of communicating with emergency responders other than cellular telephones or face-to-face

54

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group   *Louisiana*
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

conversations when they are away from the front gate area. There is no warning siren or public address system in or near the site. The site management group does have an electronic bullhorn that provides a way to communicate with residents, but this is not an effective, timely way to notify everyone at the site. Local planners are also concerned that they have not been allowed to educate the FEMA site residents on how they will be informed in the event of an emergency evacuation or catastrophic event and what procedures should be followed. In the event of a hurricane, there would be sufficient time to provide residents with notification even if it meant going door-to-door, but local officials fear that in an incident where there is no early warning, such as a tornado or hazardous chemical release, they will have no way of effectively notifying the 1,500 residents.

Recommendation 1: Install warning sirens with voice messaging capabilities and community alert system integration.

Action 1: Install an emergency warning siren that allows local officials to broadcast verbal instructions over a public address system on the exact nature of the emergency and the steps residents should follow to prevent injury and death.

Action 2: Connect the warning siren to the current parish community alert system.

Recommendation 2: Educate residents on warning systems and procedures.

Action 1: Develop an educational program for the residents of the FEMA trailer park on how they will be notified of impending emergencies and steps they should take if a warning for the area is issued. The program should include the different types of warnings that may be issued (e.g., hurricane, tornado, chemical release) and evacuation or shelter-in-place procedures.

Action 2: Train all residents on the warning and notification program through the use of pamphlets, flyers, and workshops with local emergency preparedness officials.

Action 3: Conduct warning and notification drills at the trailer park to evaluate the effectiveness of the educational program.

Recommendation 3: Use mobile emergency vehicles with public address systems.

Action 1: Use the current public address systems installed on fire, police, and EMS vehicles that can be driven through the trailer park to warn and notify the residents of impending emergencies.

Action 2: Train all first responders on the proper procedures to be followed to notify residents with the in-vehicle public address systems. Responders should be provided with prescripted messages for the various events that may require a mass notification of the residents.

Communications

This section discusses observations of the New Orleans regional communication capabilities and areas for improvement. These observations are based on four of the five capability descriptions of communications as outlined in the TCL: governance, SOPs, technology, and usage. (Training, the fifth capability was not assessed as part of this exercise.) Within each of these areas, recommenda-

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group   *Louisiana*
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

tions are referenced according to their corresponding critical task number from the UTL as well as to evaluation criteria delineated in the TICP EEG.

Communications: Governance

Issue 1: There are no communication plans, policies, or procedures to support required communications with all Federal, State, tribal, regional, local governments and agencies or volunteer agencies.

Venues: East Baton Rouge EOC, Baker Police Department, Renaissance Village

Observation: The Louisiana Region II Communications Interoperability Subcommittee consists solely of State, city, and parish public safety agencies across law enforcement, fire, EMS, and emergency management disciplines. While State and local agencies within the Baton Rouge urban area demonstrated the capability to enable a joint response, Federal agencies such as the FBI, FEMA, and the USCG did not play a role in the exercise and did not have a representative in the East Baton Rouge EOC. At the Baker Police Department/Shelter and the Renaissance Village trailer park venues, no Federal agency representatives were present except for private security guards assigned to the FEMA-managed trailer facility.

Although communication interoperability was demonstrated between local public safety agencies during the exercise, Federal interoperability requirements were not tested. For the Louisiana Region II, there did not appear to be a broader set of identified communication requirements (inclusive of interoperability across Federal, State, and local agencies) that would be typically detailed in a regional communications plan.

Recommendation 1: Louisiana Homeland Security Region II should update its Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan (TICP) to support required communications with Federal and volunteer agencies.[24]

Action 1: The East Baton Rouge EOC should develop a set of desired interoperability requirements with Federal homeland security and law enforcement agencies (e.g., FBI and USCG) and voluntary agencies (e.g., American Red Cross).[25]

Action 2: Once interoperability requirements have been identified, each Federal or volunteer agency should be included in the regular meetings of the Louisiana Region II Communications Interoperability Subcommittee that meets on the third Tuesday of each month from 9:30 a.m. to 11:30 a.m., and included in the TICP.

Recommendation 2: Develop a Regional Communications Plan for the Louisiana Homeland Security Region II with attention to supporting communications with additional Federal, State, local, public service, and volunteer public safety requirements.[26]

---

[24] *In reference to Common Capability UTL# Com.C 1.1, 1.4, 1.4.2, 1.5, 5.2, and 5.4 and a prerequisite for EEG Form 1.1: SOPs – Policies, Practices, and Procedures Tasks 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8*

[25] *In reference to Common Capability UTL# Com.C 1.1, 1.4.2, 1.5, and 5.2*

56

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group   Louisiana
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

Action 1: Identify relevant representation by agencies with assets and response requirements for participation in the completion of a regional communications plan. Agency representation should include parish and city law enforcement, fire, and EMS; East Baton Rouge OHSEP; the Mayor's Office of East Baton Rouge; LSP; relevant Federal agencies (e.g., FBI, FEMA, National Guard, USCG); public health agencies (e.g., State health officials); and volunteer organizations likely to respond to a large-scale incident in Baton Rouge (e.g., American Red Cross).

Action 2: Finalize the regional plan and disseminate it to participating agencies.

Action 3: Implement and exercise the regional plan through interim TTXs and an eventual FSE.

Communications: Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)

Issue 1: Incomplete policies and procedures for radio caches and console/gateway patches are tested and exercised on a regular basis, including documenting the request, activation, deactivation, and resolution of any problems.[27]

Venues: East Baton Rouge EOC, Baker Police Department, Renaissance Village

Observation: The controllers observed that several interoperable solutions implemented during the exercise were fulfilled efficiently by the COML for the responding agencies (players). Controllers observed the explicit request and subsequent fulfillment of multiple interoperable communications resources in accordance with SOPs outlined in their TICP. However, it should be noted that controllers were unable to determine whether the console and the gateway patches used to establish mutual-aid channels were deactivated at the termination of the exercise.

Recommendation 1: The policies and procedures for deactivating radio caches and console/gateway patches should be followed, as outlined in the Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan (TICP).

Action 1: Update the TICP to reflect an additional step to the SOP whereby the termination of a gateway is announced on the shared channel.[28]

Action 2: Once the TICP is updated, communicate this revised SOP to the appropriate public safety agencies at the next Louisiana Region II Communications Interoperability Subcommittee meeting.

Action 3: Implement and exercise the updated SOP through interim TTXs and an eventual FSE.[29]

---

[26] *In reference to Common Capability UTL# Com.C 1.1, 1.4, 2.2, and 5.4 and a prerequisite for EEG Form 1.1: SOPs – Policies, Practices, and Procedures Tasks 7 and 8*

[27] *In reference to Common Capability UTL# Res A.3.2 and EEG Form 1.1: SOPs – Policies, Practices, and Procedures Tasks 2 and 4*

[28] *In reference to Common Capability UTL# Res A.3.2, A.3.3 and EEG Form 1.1: SOPs – Policies, Practices, and Procedures Tasks 2 and 4*

[29] *In reference to Common Capability UTL# Com.C 1.1 and EEG Form 1.3: Usage Tasks 5 and 7*

Issue 2: There was no unambiguous Incident Command and ICP led by a single Incident Commander.[30]

Venues: Baker Police Department, Renaissance Village

Observation: During the exercise, Unified Command venues were established at the Baker Police Department/Shelter and the Renaissance Village trailer park. Both of these venues clearly communicated their activation or deactivation to personnel or other venues. While the Incident Commander is responsible for this activity, dispatch personnel and other senior operational officers at the scene usually reinforced this vital step to ensure it was not overlooked.

Typically, the East Baton Rouge EOC has a role in monitoring field activities from the perspective of multiple jurisdictions and response capabilities. During the FSE, the East Baton Rouge EOC had a limited role in activating and deactivating Incident Command at the venues (which is the normal routine). Information was received by the East Baton Rouge EOC through liaisons with the respective public safety agencies involved in the response. In some instances, information was received and disseminated using commercial services (i.e., cellular telephones). In other instances, information was disseminated to the liaisons who obtained incident information using LMR portable radios located at the East Baton Rouge EOC.

Recommendation 1: Train, exercise, and regularly use the functional announcement that Incident Command has been established, who is in charge, and where it is located for dispatch, response personnel, and others monitoring the event.[31]

Action 1: Hold review training with first responder agencies in the East Baton Rouge UASI area to review protocol and procedures used to coordinate incident site communications within a NIMS-compliant framework.

Action 2: In the training, include a review of the roles and responsibilities of the emergency management personnel and the representatives of the first responder agencies located at the East Baton Rouge EOC vis-à-vis the Incident Commander and senior operational personnel located at the ICP in the field.

Action 3: Once initial training has been held, the Louisiana Region II Communications Interoperability Subcommittee meeting should schedule annual refresher training.

Action 4: Implement and exercise Incident Command through interim TTXs and an eventual FSE.[32]

Issue 3: The ICP was established in an inadequate location that was unable to facilitate communications with adequate access to information on the mission-critical LMR communication networks.[33]

---

[30] *In reference to Common Capability UTL# Res A.3.3 and EEG Form 1.2: SOPs – Command and Control Tasks 1, 5, and 9*

[31] *In reference to EEG Form 1.2: SOPs – Command and Control Tasks 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 10*

[32] *In reference to EEG Form 1.2: SOPs – Command and Control Tasks 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, and 10*

Venues: Baker EOC, Baker Police Department

Observation: During the exercise, the Baker EOC was established in an office in the Baker Police Department. This site was ineffective as an EOC since representatives of important city services were not present, radio communication by portable LMR radio would not work, and there was no supporting communication equipment such as facsimile machines, Internet service for e-mail, or other devices. The Baker Police and Fire Departments did not have synchronized situational awareness because personnel using portable radios had to leave the building to reach the network.

EOCs are critical to effective interagency coordination during large-scale or sustained emergency situations. The first critical element is sufficient space for personnel from varied departments or agencies to gather. The second element is effective communications with field personnel responding to the emergency and outside departments or organizations. The EOC should have enough space to allow personnel from appropriate agencies to interact with each other and the organizations they represent. This is important so representatives can effectively monitor the situation and acquire additional resources as required. The EOC should also provide for the use of radios, telephones, facsimiles, and Internet communications.

Recommendation 1: Without stipulating the need for an EOC for the city of Baker, if the city wishes to activate its own EOC, it should identify a facility where an effective EOC could be promptly created, if required.

Action 1: Identify relevant agencies that would use an EOC for the city of Baker.

Action 2: Develop a list of operational and technical requirements for the city of Baker EOC.

Action 3: After the requirements are identified, coordinate requirements with the appropriate State and parish agencies (e.g., East Baton Rouge EOC and State of Louisiana EOC).

Communications: Technology

Issue 1: Portable radios used by some responders did not work at all locations in the parish.

Venue: Baker EOC

Observation: Portable radios operated by the Baker Fire and Police Departments at the Baker EOC did not have any radio frequency coverage in the EOC. In addition, even though the Baker Police Department had adequate radio frequency coverage using their mobile radio, the officers were only able to monitor one channel at a time. The Baker Fire Department did not have access to a mobile radio in the EOC and therefore had no radio frequency coverage. As a result, the Baker Fire Department had to routinely exit the building to communicate on the fire command channel.

The Baker EOC is not adequate for EOC Unified Command purposes and does not provide an adequate portable radio frequency signal. The lack of a radio frequency coverage signal in the EOC prevented the functional responsibilities from interacting frequently and even negated coordination

---

[33]*In reference to EEG Form: 1.1: SOPs – Policies, Practices, and Procedures Task 9*

59

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group   Louisiana
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR
For Official Use Only – Draft

by the Baker Fire and Police Departments. The Incident Command personnel and functional sections using their own communication nets should have access to their communication equipment in the EOC.

Recommendation 1: Provide adequate radio frequency coverage for existing mission-critical land mobile radio (LMR) communication networks available at the Baker Emergency Operations Center (EOC).[34]

Action 1: Develop a list of technical and operational requirements (e.g., equipment and training) for a Baker EOC for Unified Command and communications purposes.

Action 2: After the requirements are identified, vet them at the next Louisiana Region II Communications Interoperability Subcommittee meeting and plan to implement communication solutions that will provide better radio frequency coverage at the Baker EOC.

Action 3: Increase the availability of portable radios for first responder agencies across each of the jurisdictions operating in the city of Baker.[35]

Issue 2: There is a lack of alternative wireless services in the parish.

Venues: All

Observation: During the course of the exercise, controllers noted a heavy dependence on commercial services (e.g., wire line services, cellular services, Internet) to communicate both within and among the various exercise venues during the response. While the TICP documents radio assets for the Louisiana Homeland Security Region II use one technology, LMR, there is no inventory of available commercial services or equipment. However, the Baton Rouge urban area uses commercial services for public safety operations such as various administrative and some tactical functions, both critical capabilities for interoperability. Commercial services resources should be tested in future exercises.

Recommendation 1: The Louisiana Homeland Security Region II should update its Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan (TICP) to include wireless commercial solutions (e.g., Blackberry devices, cellular/portable satellite communications [PSC] phones, satellite phones).

Action 1: Include which agencies have specific types of commercial services, how they are used, the functionality each provides (e.g., administrative, tactical, redundancy), existing/future requirement gaps, additional functional requirements, and the types and locations of existing LMR interoperability solutions that have linkages to commercial services.

Action 2: Once commercial services have been identified, vet them with the Federal, State, regional, local, and voluntary agencies at the Louisiana Region II Communications Interoperability Subcommittee.

---

[34] *In reference to Common Capability UTL# Com.C 4.1.3 and EEG Form 1.3: Usage, Tasks 1 and 2*

[35] *In reference to Common Capability UTL# Com.C 5.4 and EEG Form 1.2: SOPs – Command and Control Task 7*

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group   *Louisiana*
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

Recommendation 2: Create standard operating procedures (SOPs) and operational guidelines for using wireless commercial solutions and integrate them into the Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan (TICP).

Action 1: Develop SOPs (including request, activation, and deactivation) for each of the various commercial wireless solutions (e.g., Blackberry devices, cellular/PCS phones, WPS, GETS, satellite phones [e.g., Iridium or Global star]) that Federal, State, regional, local, and voluntary responders would likely depend on during an incident.[36]

Action 2: Once SOPs have been developed, vet them with all the Federal, State, regional, local, and voluntary agencies that make up the Louisiana Region II Communications Interoperability Subcommittee.

Action 3: Integrate SOPs regarding the use of commercial communication technologies into a Regional Communications Plan.[37]

Action 4: Implement and exercise the SOPs through interim TTXs and an eventual FSE.[38]

Recommendation 3: Because of the responders' heavy reliance on commercial services, future exercises should challenge players in pre- and postlandfall scenarios that involve loss of power, overcapacity of the networks, and lack of availability.

Action 1: Implement and exercise wireless commercial solutions (e.g., cellular networks) in future TICP FSEs.[39]

Action 2: Ensure that WPS and GETS cards, portable satellite communications (e.g., Iridium or Global star) are available and appropriate first responders are trained on the use of these wireless commercial solutions.[40]

Communications: Usage

Issue 1: Mission-critical LMR and wireless commercial networks were not regularly rechecked for quality, degradation, or failure.[41]

Venues: All

Observation: Communication systems existing in Louisiana Region II, including LMR networks and wireless commercial services, were not adequately tested against an evacuation plan. The exercise anticipated an evacuation of citizens from an at-risk location and removal to a shelter for safety. The prelandfall evacuation never materialized, so the first responders and

---

[36] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 1.1, 1.4, 5.1 and EEG Form 1.1 SOPs – Policies, Practices, and Procedures Task 8*

[37] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 1, 1.4, 5.1 and EEG Form 1.1 SOPs – Policies, Practices, and Procedures Task 8*

[38] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 1.5, 1.6.*

[39] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 1.4, 1.5.*

[40] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 1.6.*

[41] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 1.4, 1.4.2, 1.6, 4.1.3 and EEG Form: 1.1: SOPs – Policies, Practices, and Procedures Task 9*

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group *Louisiana*
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

communication equipment were not suitably tested. The response would likely have been strained by the exercise. It is undetermined how communications would have performed under such conditions.

Recommendation 1: Conduct a followup exercise to test the adequacy of interoperable communications during evacuation operations in response to a Category 3 hurricane.

Action 1: Identify prelandfall scenarios or events to test the use of interoperable communications.

Action 2: Identify postlandfall scenarios or events to test the use of interoperable communications.

Action 3: Conduct an FSE that includes both prelandfall and postlandfall testing of interoperability communications (including wireless commercial services and equipment).[42]

Issue 2: First responders did not demonstrate familiarity with available shared channels (e.g., mutual-aid channels).[43]

Venues: All

Observation: Baker Police Department personnel had difficulty finding some channels on their radios, which is typically the case for large shared-trunked LMR systems like the East Baton Rouge system. Channel selection can be especially difficult for agencies that use multiple talk groups. However, the responders in the field should be familiar with communication equipment and operating procedures. Typically, all first responder personnel should demonstrate familiarity with communication equipment used in the department. All communication equipment should be reviewed to ensure consistency in talk group/channel names. If equipment has insufficient space for a complete talk group, keep a chart or guide with the equipment at all times to ensure an operator can identify the correct channels.

Recommendation 1: Train and exercise mutual-aid channel use within all response agencies.[44]

Action 1: Based on the information in the TICP, develop a simple training guide to document mutual-aid channels (e.g., ITAC channels) that are available to first responders on their respective LMR systems.[45]

Action 2: Once this training guide has been developed, coordinate with the Louisiana Region II Communications Interoperability Subcommittee to schedule an initial training session.

Action 3: Once initial training has been held, the Louisiana Region II Communications Interoperability Subcommittee should schedule annual refresher training.

---

[42] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 1.5, 1.6*

[43] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 1.1 and EEG Form 1.3: Usage Tasks 1, 2, and 6*

[44] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 1.1 and EEG Form 1.3: Usage Tasks 1, 2, and 6*

[45] *In reference to EEG Form 1.3: Usage Tasks 4 and 6*

Action 4: Implement and exercise mutual-aid channels through interim TTXs and an eventual FSE.[46]

Additional Observations: Plans and Procedures

Issue 1: Participants demonstrated a lack of understanding/awareness of other agencies' roles and responsibilities because of the rearrangement of responsibilities according to ESF.

Venue: East Baton Rouge EOC

Observation: Some participants in the East Baton Rouge EOC seemed to be unaware of how they should interact with their counterparts at the State EOC. This affected the efficiency of the operations in the EBR EOC, particularly in managing the flow of resources to the scene. For example, the American Red Cross representative was asked to provide a status of the Pete Maravich Assembly (PMAC) shelter to receive incoming special-needs evacuees. The American Red Cross representative indicated a need for an estimated time of arrival to ensure that the shelter would be operational in time. The EOC deputy director had to instruct the Department of Social Services representative that it was his responsibility to track the status of the buses en route from New Orleans to the LSU Field House for triage, not the transportation representative, to whom he thought the responsibility had transferred. Part of this confusion may have been a result of the reorganization of the ESFs as part of the NRP, and the State's reorganization of and recent implementation of interim procedures for managing task responsibilities according to ESF during the upcoming hurricane season.

Recommendation 1: Ensure that all Emergency Operations Center (EOC) personnel are aware of their roles and responsibilities before and during staffing of an EOC position.

Action 1: Develop a chart that maps the responsibilities of East Baton Rouge EOC positions with their counterparts' responsibilities in the State EOC operating structure. Distribute the chart to EOC personnel before the EOC activation. Place a copy of the chart at each ESF desk in the EOC for use during an actual event.

Action 2: Develop and provide awareness training for EOC personnel regarding the changes that have been made in the ESF system.

Issue 2: Using E-Team as the primary method to manage resources left an open end in the resource request/delivery cycle.

Venue: East Baton Rouge EOC

Observation: Players discussed the value of submitting all requests for assistance/resources to the State EOC through the E-Team software as the primary method of resource management. Players indicated that there was no way for them to actively track the status of their request via a formal tracking number and that multiple requests went unanswered. Players demonstrated the operational

---

[46] *In reference to UTL# Com.C 1.1 and EEG Form 1.3: Usage Task 6*

63

After-Action Report
Part 5: Analysis of Breakout Group *Louisiana*
Performance
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

experience they possessed by establishing positive contact with the State EOC; however, they were requested to resubmit their requests through E-Team to test its functionality.

Participants at the State and East Baton Rouge debriefing conducted on May 25, 2006, discussed the possibility that the East Baton Rouge players were logged into the training portal instead of the operations portal of the system and that this was the reason requests went unanswered. If this was the case, this may be the result of user error; however, participants noted that E-Team needs to be simplified for use by both experienced and inexperienced personnel during all events. GOHSEP representatives indicated that system adjustments are already being implemented. In addition, participants determined that personnel need to be fully trained on the system before working in the EOC.

Recommendation 1: Ensure that all Emergency Operations Center (EOC) personnel are trained to use E-Team software.

Action 1: Develop a computer-based training program that walks an individual through the process of entering and monitoring information in E-Team.

Action 2: Conduct a drill with EOC personnel focused solely on familiarizing and increasing the comfort of individuals in using E-Team.

Recommendation 2: Simplify the E-Team user interface.

Action 1: Ensure that a tracking method (i.e., confirmation number) is available immediately upon entering a request into the system so the user inputting the message can view the status of their request at all times.

64

APPENDIX B: PARTICIPANT FEEDBACK – GOHSEP EOC

Evaluation forms were distributed to participants of the Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP) Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The following data provide an overview of participants' feedback regarding the exercise.

I. Recommendations and Action Steps

1. Based on exercise play, list the top three issues and/or areas that need improvement, identify action steps that should be taken to address those issues, and indicate if it is a high, medium, or low priority.

COMMUNICATIONS

♦ "Communications, communications, communications! The resources are here, but things from simple communication devices (like phones) to how to effectively use E-Team and communicate with each other needs more work. That's the hardest part."

♦ "Communication between all ESFs seems to be better, but the economic development phase needs work to establish the specifics of what we need to do and when we need to do them."

♦ "Our e-mail addresses did not match what was listed in the book at the desk."

♦ "Clarify means of communication (radio type and frequency) interagency (high)."

♦ "Better communication between branches – meetings with players (high)"

♦ "No communication between teams (ESF #7 isolated)"

♦ "Master listing of agencies (personnel) contact info should be compiled (high)."

♦ "Could not hear Unified Command briefings"

♦ "Communication on request – seeing where the request came from, went to, and when it was done"

♦ "More briefings of what is really going on"

♦ "Establish communication with ESF leader."

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION (ESF)-SPECIFIC

♦ "Internal ESF #8 issues which need to be resolved. Contra flow, scheduling of staff at our desk, QA."

♦ "Request a USCG 0-3/0-4 in ESF #16 (high)."

♦ "Evacuation timetables must be coordinated between ESFs #1 and #6 – discussion with players (high)."

B-1

After-Action Report
Appendix B: Participant Feedback –   *Louisiana*
GOHSEP EOC
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

♦ "ESF #1 tabs—we only need one on E-Team."

INFORMATION FLOW

♦ "Better understanding of EOC SERT second ESF group. Who creates tasks and sent tasks to different ESFs?"

♦ "How are resource requests to be distributed to offsite EOCs? (Straight from GOHSEP or from GOHSEP to ESF lead to State EOC then to offsite EOC)"

♦ "No situational awareness, SITREPs, IAPs (high)"

♦ "Written procedures for handling the mundane (paperwork, signing authority) aspects of completing a task/E-Team request"

♦ "Request routing system"

♦ "Branch operations and workflow/more drills (high)"

MEDICAL

♦ "Process for E-Team requests for medical transportation evacuation"

♦ "Patient clarification system"

♦ "EMed Flow – followup of tasks once placed in EMed"

♦ "Interagency communication once mission assignment is entered into E-Med"

♦ "Develop listing info of hospitals, nursing homes, and any other facilities in impact area where people remain and probability or time estimate of when they would need evacuation (medium)."

MISCELLANEOUS

♦ "Need for individual branch meetings"

♦ "Disposition of special-needs shelters evacuees"

♦ "It is more complicated having our staff offsite."

♦ "Computers were overwhelmed, slow, or not ready (high)."

♦ "Noise/distractions in the OEP (high)"

♦ "Need login for LAVOAD and an assigned station in the main EOC. We have been assigned space with ESFs #6 and #7 but we support many more. We cannot view tasks/requests assigned to LAVOAD or other issues we can assist with."

♦ "Because of physical isolation, injects unknown to logistics"

NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (NIMS)/INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM (ICS)

♦ "Unified Command structure is confusing. It is a NIMS/ICS mixed with the NRP. The USCG needs to call info to the ESFs (high)."

♦ "ICS—where are the vests? T-cards may be less than optimal, but the E-Team has no way to list available assets (high)."

♦ "Incorporate more ICS (leaders wearing vests, scheduled meetings for each ESF, etc.) (medium)."

ORGANIZATION

♦ "Organization of EOC. By setting up as branches, you have several locations for the same ESF (ESF #8 is in four places) (medium)."

♦ "Need more people working each ESF desk."

♦ "To see the agency name underneath ESF name plate at each cubicle to assist with identifying solving issues (i.e., ESF #13/DOJ legal) (low)"

♦ "Appropriate interaction between agencies should be defined (low)."

♦ "Transportation – An EMS and DOTD coordinator needs to be placed in the field in each region."

PARTICIPANT ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

♦ "Role clarification would be helpful."

♦ "Who does what and how? Who takes action on the requests? Responses to requests were slow. It seems that this could be faster."

♦ "Assignment of tasks (high)"

♦ "Definitive functions of branch manager, a list of all responsibilities so that the branch manager can know the expectations of the job"

♦ "Clarification of branch manager position"

♦ "Don't give us branch managers that don't know the system!"

♦ "Branch manager—fill vacancies!"

♦ "LSU role not defined in exercises; if our role changes, we need advance notice."

♦ "State police and DOTD roles need to be defined (how will dual roles be worked out?)."

♦ "Branch leaders more involved"

♦ "Roles and responsibilities by agency need to be identified."

♦ "More clearly define functions, duties, capabilities, and equipment available from LANG (medium)."

B-3

After-Action Report
Appendix B: Participant Feedback –   *Louisiana*
GOHSEP EOC
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

♦ "Need a better understanding of what each agency does for routing mission items to proper contacts"

PLANNING

♦ "Plan area – SOP for planning (high)."

TRAINING/E-TEAM

♦ "Training on computer for each member in ESF #11"

♦ "E-Team training for players (high). Exercise is not the time for training."

♦ "More E-Team training"

♦ "E-Team is confusing. We need training."

♦ "E-Team training on use – all players (high)"

♦ "Branch manager training (high)"

♦ "Timely communication between functions and to JIC"

♦ "Specific training (situational) is needed for E-Teams (medium)."

♦ "Prior to the exercise it would have been helpful to have had knowledge of the process for handling resource requests as well as the computer program."

♦ "We need E-Team training. It took us a while to figure out what was tasked to us."

♦ "ESF #8 desk—need more training on how to carry out requested tasks. A run-through scenario would be helpful at the individual support branches (high)."

♦ "Train E-Team (high)."

♦ "E-Team training (high)"

♦ "E-Team training for staff"

♦ "More training of branch concept (high)"

♦ "Branch manager training"

♦ "E-Team training and data processes"

♦ "E-Team needs accurate training of flow—beginning to end."

♦ "E-Team – training, notification when request in received, search by date, request, resource"

♦ "E-Team seems to be inconsistent and has some bugs. Different login IDs for the same ESF pulled up different requests. They weren't consistent."

♦ "Need a better way to know if our E-Teams were filled or completed."

♦ "Improve E-Team (high)."

B-4

After-Action Report
Appendix B: Participant Feedback –   *Louisiana*
GOHSEP EOC
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

♦ "E-Team use—players need to take the initiative to conduct E-Team training on their own. There were no standard procedures between the ESFs."

♦ "E-Team not working well enough to exercise system—this all but paralyzes the process with uncertainty."

♦ "Add another feature that will allow updates in the status section on the update function."

♦ "No three-ring binder to allow E-Team access"

♦ "E-Team (What needs to go into E-Team, how is it placed in E-Team?)"

♦ "More specific info included into request"

2. Describe the action steps that should be taken in your area of responsibility. Who should be assigned responsibility for each item?

COMMUNICATIONS

♦ "Make sure any offsite EOC has reliable communication with operators/main EOC and can hear the briefings/plan update in real time."

♦ "Phone lists and directions at each desk"

♦ "Exhaustive contact information – online, maintained by GOHSEP"

♦ "Communications familiarity – computer, phone, fax, printer, back up"

♦ "Meet communications ESF technical staff for comm. equipment training LSP-DWF"

♦ "We'll provide a single point-of-contact (e-mail) for exercise event notification."

♦ "We'll prepare a standardized weather brief in PowerPoint format to complement the oral briefs we normally give."

♦ "Provide connectivity with DOTD EOC."

♦ "Local parish EOC notification to DHH of hospitals and care facility status in parish DHH – relay to DWF"

♦ "Establish better communication with field LNOs."

CREDENTIALING

♦ "Credentialing. USCG has civilian employees that should be credentialed as first responders along with the military personnel. GOHSEP should develop a statewide credentialing plan and publicize it."

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION (ESF)-SPECIFIC

♦ "ESF #1 DOTD needs more staff at EOC."

After-Action Report
Appendix B: Participant Feedback –   *Louisiana*
GOHSEP EOC
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

♦ "What could help ESF #7 the most is a listing of what expertise can be found with what groups, i.e., potable water—which drives truck, which tests water, etc. More detail or request form would also be helpful from OPS."

♦ "Better coordination at EOC desk for ESF #10 between primaries – ID and agree on SOPs – joint"

♦ "Meetings with ESF after this exercise"

LOUISIANA NATIONAL GUARD

♦ "LANG liaison provide accurate list of SAR assets to DWF"

♦ "LANG personnel: use tactical knowledge to assist ESFs."

MISCELLANEOUS

♦ "Continue to refine the shelter census by working with shelter task force and parish OEPs."

♦ "Continue to seek help with these issues from GOHSEP staff – person sitting at desk."

♦ "Red Cross should bring evacuation maps to place at every station."

♦ "I was told GOHSEP will be hosting branch meetings. We needed a change to host as a branch."

♦ "Access staffing for DOTD level at EOC."

PARTICIPANT ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

♦ "Identify ESF #8 roles and responsibilities by various participants."

♦ "Until branch managers are on board, identify ESF to fill in as branch manager."

♦ "Team leaders and JFO operations should be assigned responsibility for actions, not branch managers."

♦ "Branch manager: Lead section, push mission, brief-backs"

PLANNING

♦ "SOP for planning during event will be developed."

♦ "Further exercise and review of SOPs"

TRAINING/E-TEAM

♦ "E-Team training—GOHSEP should schedule for all players."

♦ "Train everyone in our ESFs to know exactly what is expected and how to handle the tasks."

♦ "More training for branch managers"

♦ "We need additional training on E-Team, MAC issues."

♦ "E-Team training – ESF #16 lead MOB"

B-6

♦ "Person receiving E-Team request – person letting other leaders know what is going on to direct request to higher headquarters JOCK, person logging all events, person keeping status of completing tasks, runner"

♦ "Once establishing support to a request through E-Team, walk to ESF and let them know support is coming so the report doesn't get missed."

U.S. COAST GUARD

♦ "You need to realize the USCG operator whether you consider it a State exercise, Federal exercise, Stafford or Non-Stafford Act. As a result, since USCG is Federal colead in ESFs #9 and #10 as well as a larger player in ESFs #1 and #13, you should have the USCG working in true ESFs."

♦ "The USCG has a lot of resources and talented people who can get the mission completed. Don't get caught up with the fact that they are Federal!"

♦ "Don't say you need boats or planes, rather tell us what you need completed. We are a better judge of what assets we have and what we can do. Tell us the mission!"

♦ "USCG needs to be involved in ESFs #9 and #10, also to some extent ESF #16."

♦ "USCG will have staff here to manage these areas."

♦ "Our logistics team and ESF branch manager"

3. **List the policies, plans, and procedures that should be reviewed, revised, or developed. Indicate the priority level for each.**

CREDENTIALING

♦ "Credentialing. Only heard update by LSP during the briefing, but what is the policy? Will first responders be issued uniform credentials—different parishes had varying policies. Need uniform statewide credentialing policy."

♦ "Access card for agency personnel that rotate on shifts"

MEDICAL

♦ "Medical institution evacuation plan"

♦ "Request for medical transportation assets – DOTD, ESF, GOHSEP"

♦ "Patient classification system (ESF #8) NIMS/ICS"

♦ "Model your system more clearly on the National Response Plan. Where was the IAP?"

ORGANIZATION

♦ "Branch versus ESF organization is confusing. Do you go to ESF lead or branch lead first?"

PARTICIPANT ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

♦ "Plans for branch managers' role"

♦ "It appears to be a common assumption by GOHSEP that State agency employees should know how to function in the EOC. Keep in mind that as State agency employees we have many other responsibilities that are not related to emergency preparedness, so an orientation to the war room and procedures would go far in making the learning curve easier to maneuver."

PETS

♦ Pet evacuations

PLANNING

♦ "IAPs need to be shared or posted."

♦ "Review ESF #8 plan and all other ESF plans and State plan."

♦ "MOUs with Pac States for EMAC support"

♦ "Face-to-face contact with supporting ESFs"

♦ "Look at operation from some ESFs (those that say all year that they will be there with the toys, then during the drill state we will only deploy after you have exerted all your resources)."

♦ "Disposition of special-needs evacuees (ESF #8)"

♦ "Review LA GOHSEP process from mission tasking and resource allocation mission/resource tracking."

♦ "Interagency and Federal agency plan/procedure/training – comm. systems (high)"

♦ "Plan or policy of commitment of resources for SAR from LANG"

♦ "DHH policy of mandating parish EOC to provide hospital, nursing home population status of unevacuated facilities 24 hours before landfall – medical"

♦ "Information flow. Some ESFs did not know who to forward info to, which closes out missions?"

♦ "Integrating existing agency compacts, agreements, etc., into the system with avenues to financial assistance as an alternative to EMACS and FEMA"

♦ "Better coordination in transportation branch – need branch meetings (high)"

♦ "Use of E-Team – splitting mission"

♦ "Keys (high) – OEP staff (GOHSEP) did not know use of split buttons – I learned this function from VOAD ped."

After-Action Report
Appendix B: Participant Feedback –   *Louisiana*
GOHSEP EOC
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

♦ "The training sessions for use of branch and computer databases suggested by GOHSEP is a good idea (high)."

♦ "The computer system doesn't work – Department of Justice set us LAVOAD – as request – it was lost – then when we answered, Justice got it but had no notice of receipt."

♦ "Logistics procedures relatively right already – pre-positioning of assets and strategic locations makes commodity delivery much easier."

♦ "Assets can't be communicated in the E-Team software. Also, software glitches were quite problematic—resource database should help with this."

♦ "Broadcasting conference calls to the EOC is important, good and improved communications – good decision! (The shift change briefing as well!)"

♦ "Better communication—who reports? When? Where? Contact info, especially contacts for shifts and alternating phone numbers, e-mail addresses"

♦ "E-Team request should contain more detailed info (high)."

♦ "Everyone should have their own copy of the desk books to keep so everyone can be very knowledgeable of all aspects of GOHSEP."

♦ "Review emergency plans; know roles and responsibilities for all agencies."

♦ "Participate in E-Team training."

♦ "E-Team database—would like to see a viewed icon once a task has been split or sent off— an icon to come up showing that it has been viewed and after a while you know to pick up the phone for followup if they never viewed it."

♦ "All reports by agency issue—would like to see subcategories stating each ESF and each agency and agency by division—each task fall under the ESF category then once tasked by the ESF you can see the task still under that ESF plus see it under the agency and/or division so everyone can keep track of their ESF plus simplify the view by only seeing the tasks assigned to your agency."

♦ "Establish better routing procedures through flow chart, etc."

TRAINING/E-TEAM

♦ "Clarify on E-Team that if a request is not sent to the wrong ESF, it goes back to OPS, not forwarded on to the ESF, we think that is right."

♦ "Procedures for sending information up the line from ESFs to branch manager"

♦ "Routing of tasks need to have defined procedures."

♦ "Need a better way to notify us of items tasked to us. When phone starts ringing, we are entering in our own E-Teams; it is easy to not check up on what is tasked to us."

♦ "E-Team job aids need to be implemented and more user-friendly."

*After-Action Report*
Appendix B: Participant Feedback – *Louisiana*
GOHSEP EOC
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

U S C G

♦ "Need two chairs and space at USCG desk"

♦ "USCG should be part of several ESFs (#9, #10, #13, and #16)."

♦ "USCG is not a technical specialist."

II. Exercise Design and Conduct

1. What is your assessment of the exercise design and conduct?

The exercise was well structured and organized.

- Strongly Agree, 3%
- Agree, 13%
- Disagree, 24%
- Neither disagree nor agree, 47%
- Strongly Disagree, 13%

The exercise scenario was plausible and realistic.

- Strongly Disagree, 8%
- Disagree, 10%
- Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 15%
- Agree, 42%
- Strongly Agree, 25%

The briefings helped the particpants understand and become engaged in the scenario.

- Strongly Agree, 10%
- Disagree, 15%
- Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 37%
- Agree, 28%
- Strongly Disagree, 10%

Participation in the exercise was appropriate for someone in my position.

- Strongly Disagree, 8%
- Disagree, 8%
- Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 18%
- Agree, 24%
- Strongly Agree, 42%

The participants included the right people in terms of level and mix of disciplines.

- Strongly Disagree, 5%
- Disagree, 8%
- Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 29%
- Agree, 40%
- Strongly Agree, 18%

The exercise provided a good test of knowledge/skills obtained in training courses.

- Strongly Disagree, 10%
- Disagree, 23%
- Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 19%
- Agree, 35%
- Strongly Agree, 13%

B-10

After-Action Report
Appendix B: Participant Feedback – *Louisiana*
GOHSEP EOC
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

Training course(s) enhanced my performance during the exercise.

Strongly Disagree, 11%

Disagree, 11%

Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 31%

Agree, 29%

Strongly Agree, 18%

The exercise prepared me to better respond to a catastrophic incident.

Strongly Disagree, 8%

Disagree, 13%

Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 21%

Agree, 32%

Strongly Agree, 26%

The exercise will be beneficial to my agency/jurisdiction as we prepare for a catastrophic incident.

Strongly Disagree, 5%

Disagree, 15%

Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 23%

Agree, 23%

Strongly Agree, 34%

2. What changes would you make to improve this exercise?

COMMUNICATIONS

♦ "Poor communication throughout"

♦ "Better communication about who needed to be here and what we were expected to do"

♦ "Communication by each ESF primary as to the specifics of what we are to do during the exercise"

♦ "Good job incorporating the conference calls with the folks in the bullpen. This was NOT done during Katrina, which left the worker bees in a state of confusion/uncertainty as to what was going on future plans. Good job!"

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION (ESF)-SPECIFIC

♦ "USCG not listed under pertinent ESF functions"

♦ "ESF labels on cubicles need to also have layman's terms for ease of identification, e.g., ESF #10 (Oil/Hazmat)."

♦ "Missions did not force enough interaction with other ESFs. Did not allow a robust exercising of ESF #10."

INFORMATION FLOW

♦ "With all new issues, I had a few issues with the objectives of the Unified Command."

B-11

MISCELLANEOUS

♦ "Timeline for exercise was very confusing to meet participants. This contributed to a gap."

♦ "Difficult in mixing real world with scenario"

♦ "Branch managers' roles need to be defined clearly!"

♦ "With only 2 days, we had to take for granted that missions were taken care of."

♦ "It took too much of my time reporting to GOHSEP. I lost time that I needed to be working on issues."

♦ "More chairs are needed for the branch managers to sit at their workstations."

♦ "Some participants never received packets—not enough."

♦ "Need situational board displayed and updated routinely. Need situational boards on both ends of the room."

♦ "USCG needs two desk or two chairs at a larger desk."

♦ "Good job incorporating ICS; however, there is still no leadership. Vests worn would assist in this."

♦ "State Fire Marshall's Office needs to be in EOC to coordinate SAR with DWF, LANG, and Coast Guard. Regional fire services should be coordinated through fire marshall."

♦ "ESF #1 needs earlier timetable for us to test our responses to our established triggers."

♦ "It seemed that issues discussed in the classroom would have been completed prior to the exercise."

♦ "Although I have no training or working experience in ESF #7 functions, the willingness to act as a 'warm body' to help with the workload is certainly there."

♦ "I was so unprepared before I arrived I can't honestly say my level is on the high end. As a learning exercise my skill level improved, but I have a long way to go."

♦ "Uncompressed time"

♦ "To contact each agency: State, parish, and local for possible issues that they may come across during a hurricane and what agencies would respond to what type of services or tasks and use that info to guide the exercise; therefore, everyone will be able to accept tasks, split tasks, etc."

PARTICIPANT ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

♦ "Instructions on participation in the exercise should be given to participants prior to the day of the exercise."

♦ "Introduction to all ESF desk/areas and give functions in common language."

♦ "Better understanding of the database before exercise begins"

B-12

After-Action Report
Appendix B: Participant Feedback –   *Louisiana*
GOHSEP EOC
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

T ECHNOLOGY

♦ "Put the SITREPs up on the screen for all to see."

♦ "E-Team does not adequately keep player involved."

♦ "Cannot log into E-Team."

♦ "Confusion as to which E-Team module to use for exercise. Some folks went by the manual and screen indicated (use the training module for exercises)."

♦ "Separate #4 and #9 briefings on PowerPoint."

♦ "How do I enter an asset into E-Team? I ended up entering boats in the request section by mistake. No clear direction as to how to enter assets in the manual."

♦ "Need a loud audio ding when a request is sent to your E-Team computer so you are aware of it. Ding should continue until you have responded to it."

♦ "Used E-Team to relay the status of the Mississippi River; however, many interested parties don't have access to E-Team within the OEP."

♦ "Just poking around E-Team to see what was in there, I came across a request for the status of the river. This request came from a Louisiana DOTD member not in the OEP. I received this request 1 hour and 45 minutes after the request was made."

♦ "When updating a request, there is no clear-cut place to put that update, and the user must know to change the 'send-to' to the other agency or else it will come back to your agency. There should be a 'reply' button that:

 1. Automatically puts your agency ID in front of what you have typed (so those who read it know who typed it).

 2. The reply goes to those entities you select and not back to yourself."

♦ "There should be a 'case closed' option for a request that will automatically flag it as completed."

♦ "The 'sent to the world' feature in E-Team for a request is not user-friendly, nor is it conclusive to the time-sensitive requests, as those who can assist don't know about this need unless they go searching for taskers/requests. Those who need something need to know to send it to a specific work or else it will get lost in the hundreds of other requests."

♦ "There are too many users in the system. Also, there are some duplicates (e.g., ESF #9 and ESF #9 USAR, FEMA and U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency)."

♦ "For my user, 'USCG 1,' I made two users, 'USCG 1' State agency and 'USCG 1' EOC staff. The State agency user was offline, while the EOC staff user was online. I think I missed some requests and updates because folks chose the State agency user, which was first on the list. Suggestion: For offline users, don't allow them to be listed or don't allow them to be clicked on as an active link."

B-13

After-Action Report
Appendix B: Participant Feedback –   *Louisiana*
GOHSEP EOC
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

♦ "On the forward requests, make it so you can send to multiple addresses. If a request is answered and sent to another agency other than the initial requestor than the original requestor, then the original requestor is out of the loop on its status."

♦ "Most issues seem to be with E-Team. Suggest changes be made to improve it and training provided."

TRAINING

♦ "Ensure the players have computer ICS forms 100, 200, 300, 700, and 800. Most can be done online for free!"

♦ "ICS is no good unless people are trained."

♦ "Training is needed to determine role and duties."

♦ "Training/orientation prior to the exercise"

♦ "E-Team training prior to exercises"

♦ "Longer. Training (NIMS, NRP) should be required prior to exercise."

♦ "Need to train folks on E-Team. Your job aids are not helpful."

♦ "Prior to conducting the exercise, ESFs need hands-on class with E-Teams. Need to have crawl-walk-run phases of training to establish SOPs within the organization."

♦ "More training of branches – more examples involving all members/players on a more frequent basis"

♦ "Training classes for E-Team operators"

♦ "Provide written E-Team instructions or guidance."

SIMULATION CELL (SIMCELL)

♦ "Try to be consistent, i.e., DSS got a call from the SIMCELL about 1,000 special-needs patients. DHH did not receive the call nor get info on this from DSS."

♦ "Better define how to use and function of the SIMCELL."

♦ "Established begin and end times were not adhered to."

♦ "SIMCELL injects were not accurate or realistic."

♦ "Injects should have communicated more effectively to all teams."

♦ "More practice and make it more realistic, i.e., busy, chaotic, and sense of emergency in training."

This page is intentionally left blank.

APPENDIX C: PARTICIPANT FEEDBACK – EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH EOC

I. Recommendations and Action Steps

1. Based on exercise play, list the top three issues and/or areas that need improvement. Identify action steps that should be taken to address those issues and indicate if it is a high, medium, or low priority.

♦ "Communications out of EOC room (high)"
♦ "More phone lines for EOC (high)"
♦ "Better radio communications"
♦ "Command center—additional telephone line antennas for radios"
♦ "Command center—additional telephone line (high)"
♦ "Antennas for radio (high)"
♦ "Laptop computers to input data as arriving and happening (high)"

2. Describe the action steps that should be taken in your area of responsibility. Who should be assigned responsibility for each item?

♦ "Communications for the fire department will be addressed by the fire department."
♦ "Each player had a specific duty which was carried out."
♦ "For the top issues, the fire and police departments are responsible."

3. List the policies, plans, and procedures that should be reviewed, revised, or developed. Indicate the priority level for each.

♦ "Contacts for school board, school buses, nursing home, city employees"
♦ "A large map of the city in EOC"

II. Exercise Design and Conduct
**1. What is your assessment of the exercise design and conduct?**

C-1

After-Action Report
Appendix C: Participant Feedback –   *Louisiana*
East Baton Rouge Parish EOC
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

The exercise was well structured and organized.

Strongly Disagree, 0%
Disagree, 0%
Strongly Agree, 17%
Agree, 33%
Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 50%

The exercise scenario was plausible and realistic.

Strongly Disagree, 0%
Disagree, 0%
Agree, 17%
Strongly Agree, 33%
Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 50%

The briefings helped the participants undertand and become engaged in the scenario.

Strongly Disagree, 0%
Disagree, 34%
Strongly Agree, 33%
Agree, 33%
Neither Agree Nor Disagree, 0%

Particpation in the exercise was appropriate for someone in my position.

Disagree, 0%
Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 0%
Strongly Agree, 33%
Agree, 67%

The particpants included the right people in terms of level and mix of disciplines.

Strongly Disagree, 0%
Disagree, 0%
Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 17%
Strongly Agree, 50%
Agree, 33%

The exercise provided a good test of knowledge/skills obtained in training courses.

Strongly Disagree, 0%
Disagree, 0%
Strongly Agree, 20%
Agree, 20%
Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 60%

C-2

After-Action Report
Appendix C: Participant Feedback – *Louisiana*
East Baton Rouge Parish EOC
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

Training course(s) enhanced my performance during the exercise.

Strongly Agree, 0%
Strongly Disagree, 0%
Agree, 40%
Disagree, 40%
Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 20%

The exercise prepared me to better respond to a catastrophic incident.

Strongly Disagree, 0%
Disagree, 0%
Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 34%
Strongly Agree, 33%
Agree, 33%

The exercise will be beneficial to my agency/jurisdiction as we prepare for a catastrophic incident.

Strongly Disagree, 0%
Disagree, 0%
Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 34%
Strongly Agree, 33%
Agree, 33%

2. What changes would you make to improve this exercise?

♦ "More communications with EOC"
♦ "More communication and debriefing from EOC on what is happening"

C-3

After-Action Report
Appendix C: Participant Feedback –   *Louisiana*
East Baton Rouge Parish EOC
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

This page is intentionally left blank.

C-4

APPENDIX D: PARTICIPANT FEEDBACK – NEW ORLEANS

Evaluation forms were distributed to participants at the New Orleans EOC. The data below provide an overview of participants' feedback regarding the exercise.

I. Recommendations and Action Steps

COMMUNICATIONS

♦ "Communication with State"
♦ "EOC portable communications"
♦ "Relationship with State needs improvement in terms of knowing who to communicate with"
♦ "Communications between city of New Orleans and State of Louisiana E-Team"
♦ "Interdepartmental communication"
♦ "Very little communication with surrounding parishes"
♦ "Was approached to assist with an animal rescue – were not part of the city's communication system nor have a landline at our station (Louisiana SPCA)"
♦ "Messages—controlled"
♦ "Information sharing"
♦ "Communications"
♦ "Coordination with facilitator and ESF lead on status of exercise"
♦ "Chain of communication needs refining to become more direct."
♦ "Coordination and communication with law department for last-minute contracts"
♦ "Coordination and communication with logistics"
♦ "Consolidate EOC function for better communication."
♦ "Incident Command at EOC needs practice following chain with regard to communication."
♦ "Interagency communications after cell and hardline failure"
♦ "Communications with staff and EOC"
♦ "Well-coordinated satellite office"
♦ "Interagency coordination in several ESF function NS communication"
♦ "Communication—goes along with info flow—not only within agency but to other players as well"

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION (ESF)-SPECIFIC

♦ "Grouping ESFs #4, #9, and #10 together"

♦ "Routing of messages—messages were being received in duplicate/triplicate and/or being given to the wrong ESF for disposition."

♦ "Collocation of logistics personnel—all personnel should be in same area to facilitate communication."

D-1

After-Action Report
Appendix D: Participant Feedback –   *Louisiana*
New Orleans
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

EVACUATION PLANNING

♦ "Destinations for evacuees"
♦ "People being directed to proper bus"
♦ "Scanning people as they get on the buses or train"
♦ "Post registration processing (i.e., lines for buses)"
♦ "Train boarding at UP7 (i.e., need lines for buses)"
♦ "Recognizing resources and availability"
♦ "Citizen with no transportation"
♦ "Evacuating nursing homes"
♦ "Registration at convention center"
♦ "Registration at central city (for senior citizens)"
♦ "Wristbands for kids"

INFORMATION FLOW

♦ "Not enough data received via e-mail in advance (too much word-of-mouth info)"

♦ "It would be helpful to have a screen with a moving exercise timeline (this would be helpful to all to quickly determine if they were on schedule with pre-event evacuation schedule and other tasks."

♦ "Confusion between actual time of day with simulated time of day and dates"

♦ "Requesting system confusing with too many processes to get one request done (not enough clerical support—viewing screens only in one place)"

♦ "Information flow sharing"

♦ "Documentation of unit/branch/section activities"

♦ "Approval time from which info/communications are received to relay should be minimized."

♦ "Info on incidents and exercise rules needs to filter to the appropriate levels."

♦ "Information sharing"

♦ "Dissemination of storm-related information"

♦ "Transportation access information"

♦ "Information flow—did not seem that once info arrived at appropriate agency it always got forwarded in a timely fashion"

♦ "Messaging and transfer of information needs a better format."

♦ Information flow and exchange with surrounding parishes and State needs to be more timely."

MISCELLANEOUS

♦ "Placarding of vehicles/credentials of skilled workers"

♦ "Some scenarios are vague."

♦ "Flee and evacuation"

♦ "Needs to be event-oriented."

♦ "Not using staff wisely—too many people"

♦ "Need better information on State shelters—do not want to give out wrong information"

♦ "Develop security guidelines."

♦ "Logistics"

♦ "Business that sell weapons"

♦ "Preidentification of what housing and staging—only had one warehouse identified at start of exercise and nowhere to stage volunteers"

♦ "Credentialing process"

NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (NIMS)/INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM (ICS)

♦ "Lack of ICS structure span of control"
♦ "City departments need to work in an ICS structure and follow the ESFs"

PARTICIPANT ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

♦ "Coroner's office involvement"
♦ "Aware of members, roles, responsibility"
♦ "Some agencies never showed up."
♦ "Situational awareness of unit/branch/section activities"
♦ "Training for all personnel on roles/responsibilities/operations"
♦ "Agencies that need to attend"

SIMCELL

♦ "SIMCELLs not clearly identified, had to hunt down"
♦ "SIMCELLs dedicated to unit"
♦ "SIMCELL messages were confusing (used real hospital name but wrong actions)."
♦ "There needs to be more incidents to give the real feel."
♦ "Number of injects situations (add times)"

D-3

After-Action Report
Appendix D: Participant Feedback –   *Louisiana*
New Orleans
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

♦ "Injects from SIMCELL did not always seem complex enough/complete."

TECHNOLOGY

♦ "Continuing improvement in the purchase and use of emergency OPS center software applications, particularly WebEOC"

♦ "HC stranding by GER 911 company, which is low cost"

♦ "Data entry for three-resource request tracking for agencies"

♦ "State of Louisiana changed software without notifying or informing city of New Orleans of change/upgrade."

♦ "PC access to different scenes on flood areas, road closures, etc."

♦ "General network performance of the EOC internet is poor especially mid-morning and mid-afternoon—this is difficult on data/network-dependent support function like G15 for planning."

♦ "Standards—databases, information"

♦ "Personnel were using personal e-mails."

♦ "E-Team"

TRAINING

♦ "Departments that do not interact with HS and EOC on a daily basis need basic training on concepts and terminology."

♦ "More personnel need technical training at the EOC (i.e., computer lingo)."

♦ "Complete knowledge of EOC plan and details, all EOC reps should be empowered with plan specifics, knowledge of resources and internal processes."

COMMUNICATIONS

♦ "E-mail data in advance (medium)"
♦ "EOC portable communications (high)"
♦ "Better communication at level of information systems (high)"
♦ "Closer and all levels of State and local information systems to satisfy and complete gaps (high)"
♦ "Program facilitators should redress the approval time and chain of communication (high)."
♦ "Stand-alone emergency com system for all city agencies (high)"
♦ "EOC physical structure should be modified to aid in communication (high)."

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION (ESF)-SPECIFIC

♦ "Work with ESF #13 regarding conover's participation."
♦ "Work with police, fires, EMS regarding placarding vehicles and credentialing workers."
♦ "Need a uniform way to track all assets and let all ESFs know what they are."

D-4

After-Action Report
Appendix D: Participant Feedback –   *Louisiana*
New Orleans
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

♦ "Group fire together (medium)."

EVACUATION PLANNING

♦ "This should be more organized, as there was no set limit on the number of passengers per bus (high)."

♦ "Personnel using the scanners should be apart from each other since being too close they would get confused on whose scanner beeps as they read the barcodes (high)."

♦ "Flee and evacuation (high)"

♦ "Need system to verify availability of space at specific shelter before dispatching transportation"

♦ "Evacuation process flows need to be documented and distributed to all players."

♦ "A call center needs to be set up to transport citizens without transport."

♦ "Translator is needed during registration—Spanish and Vietnamese (high)."

♦ "Wristbands should be childproof."

INFORMATION FLOW

♦ "Designate personnel as documentation unit leaders/specialists and unify a method/system through which all units can forward input."

♦ "Need to share information with local city departments and State EOC; need phone numbers and contacts worked out in advance"

♦ "Contact law to ensure purchasing is in loop (medium)."

♦ "Working with logistics to resolve (high)"

♦ "Distribution of revised Orleans Parish EOP and annex maps, charts"

MISCELLANEOUS

♦ "Continue to inject and encourage continuity and interdigitations of plans including language tp criteria."

♦ "Feedback from observer team lead (high)"

♦ "Work with company (high)."

♦ "Too many people—agencies had too many people to be effective."

♦ "Those vendors should be willing to work with the predefined guidelines and stated prior to the exercise."

♦ "Work closer with facilitators."

♦ "Gathering major layers to set out plan (high)"

After-Action Report
Appendix D: Participant Feedback –   *Louisiana*
New Orleans
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

♦ "More time to go over rules"

♦ "Business should take weapons when evaluating."

♦ "Warehousing/staging—work with logistics chief preincident to have separate warehouse for requested supplies, donations and prestaged items, as well as two staging locations—one for requested personnel and one for standby personnel."

♦ "Design new EOC to accommodate logistics personnel."

♦ "Identify three alternatives prestorm to house satellite office."

♦ "For credentialing, we will participate in prestorm planning process."

♦ "A second EOP internal exercise"

♦ "A structured EOP/EOC rep debrief following exercise debrief"

♦ "The registration form should include a complete address (high)."

♦ "A special area should be designated with equipment."

NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (NIMS)/INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM (ICS)

♦ "Greater compliance with NIMS should be required (medium)."
♦ "Following ICS structure is imperative (high)."

PARTICIPANTS ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

♦ "Communicate to agencies that need to attend"

TECHNOLOGY

♦ "Develop computer program to facilitate moving timeline for use both in exercises and actual hurricane event."

♦ "Data entry for e-resource request tracking for agencies (medium)"

♦ "Set up 'drive' on city computer system to access different scenes on flood areas/road closures (high)."

♦ "Interdepartment interfacing—message boards available on every monitor and between each EOC (high)"

♦ "Need forms in electronic format that can continue to have info added to single form and way for each solution to be transmitted from ESF desks to message board"

♦ "After the EOC moves to permanent location at City Hall, extensive network load testing and perhaps improvement to switches needs to be done."

♦ "Develop/implement central application to enter/update information"

♦ "Develop common data standard based on DHS, NIMS model to improve data sharing."

D-6

After-Action Report
Appendix D: Participant Feedback –   *Louisiana*
New Orleans
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

♦ "Create, support central reprinting all data, not just spatial."

♦ "Identify secure/nonsecure data, and develop central mechanism."

♦ "Have IT personnel make sure everyone has OEM address."

♦ "Computerized message system"

♦ "Implement technology throughout EOC for quick-check visualization."

♦ "Need electronic forms. Less paper!"

♦ "More electronic sharing"

♦ "Web site or display of storm info (high)"

♦ "Web site or display of transportation information (high)"

♦ "Messages—one central set of inboxes for section broken down by unit so requests are not handed to wrong person or multiple people"

♦ "Status board should be displayed on all computers and be interfaced with surrounding parishes and State (high)."

TRAINING

♦ "Communication education of staff (high)"

♦ "Include La/SPCA in city's comm. system (high)."

♦ "Have personnel trained on process."

♦ "Repeat training exercise participation biweekly for familiarity."

♦ "Train more people for backups (high)."

♦ "For all issues, I believe more exercises would help because it highlights problem areas for departments to work on that they may not have been aware of. It also helps to prioritize situations."

♦ "Continue exercise and training to encourage better communication (high)."

SIMULATION CELL (SIMCELL)

♦ "Vague scenarios need more details (medium)."
♦ "Provide SIMCELLs to everyone at inception (high)."
♦ "Use fictitious names or have local person supply accurate information."
♦ "Create more incidents."

COMMUNICATIONS

♦ "Department directors should play a lead role in redressing approval time and chain of communication."

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION (ESF)-SPECIFIC

♦ "Continue to task ESF #8 annex criteria to appropriate agencies."

♦ "Joint effort with ESFs #13 and #8 regarding the coroner"

♦ "Need ESF #8 annex completed for <mark>crit</mark> of New Orleans."

♦ "ESF #8 team leader (Dr. Stephens)"

♦ "Determine specific ESF lead."

♦ "ESF #8 lead needs to coordinate with State to close information loop on sheltering."

♦ "Have each ESF's files and template ready for updating and remapping during an emergency."

♦ "Formally recognize the dire need for logistics to become a real-life department, and provide staffing resources and budget as necessary."

♦ "Anthony Jones (ESF #2) will work closer with facilitators."

♦ "EOC should group 5 together."

♦ "Review lessons learned and recommendation with all Mass Care partners participating in exercise."

♦ "Disseminate ESF #6 plan and annex to all primary and supporting agencies."

♦ "Review and map ESF #6 response partners' evacuation and continuity plans."

EVACUATION PLANNING

♦ "No transport – RTA"
♦ "Evacuating nursing homes— owner responsibility"

LOGISTICS

♦ "Additional fuel storage and mobile dispensing – CAO/EMD"

♦ "Additional fleet services personnel – CAO/EMD"

♦ "Personnel and supply accommodations at relocated service location – CAO/EMD"

♦ "I will work with logistics chief to ID messaging procedure and also coordinate with Mass Care, which receives a number of volunteer requests that should have gone through logistics."

♦ "Warehousing/staging through Jeff Merryman or Mike Geier"

♦ "Property management – OEP"

After-Action Report
Appendix D: Participant Feedback –   *Louisiana*
New Orleans
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

MEDICAL

♦ "Region 1 DRC needs to educate other parish EOCs and hospitals on hospital evacuation plan."

MISCELLANEOUS

♦ "Improve 'yellowcat' TTC/"

♦ "All actions should be provided by host."

♦ "Modify existing airport hurricane plan to reflect new requirement for airport to support city's plan to evacuate hotel guests by air carriers—staff duty."

♦ "Fleet management – flee and evacuation"

♦ "Placards for vendors and employees to enter city following event and radio communications with vendors to coordinate entry into city (Jay Palestina)"

♦ "Identify scholastic needs."

♦ "Coordinate experiential EOC application implementation."

♦ "Clearly define the ICS/EOC/departmental interface."

♦ "Develop a corps of emergency management specialists from each city department and dedicate resources to enable success."

♦ "Unk. airport played a minor role in this exercise."

♦ "Whoever is point for exercise"

♦ "Weapons – NOPD"

♦ "Participate in the planning process."

♦ "Directions as well as supervision"

♦ "Implement an exercise plan and include layers from parishes and State."

♦ "Complete departmental plans, CEMP, EVAC plans and EOC OPS plans."

NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (NIMS)/INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (ICS)

♦ "EOC should follow ICS structure."

TECHNOLOGY

♦ "We need to make sure wireless is set up in both the inside of MCC and UPT."

♦ "ELEC department – EOC portable communications"

♦ "OEP – data entry"

♦ "I can set this up – software applications."

D-9

After-Action Report
Appendix D: Participant Feedback –   *Louisiana*
New Orleans
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

♦ "State director of MIS systems will help better communication."

♦ "Find a way to reduce sneaker network."

♦ "GIS needs to continue to streamline the organization of its data and procedures."

♦ "Scheduled briefs need better graphic/mapping support from GIS/planning action for – CNO GIS and ESP planning."

♦ "Develop data models based on national standards for emergency management."

♦ "Design and develop central database repointers for EOC application."

♦ "Design a robust data network security model."

♦ "NOFD should do the technical training."

TRAINING

♦ "Exercises should not stop just because the season is here. The lead for each department should be assigned responsibility for their team."

♦ "Train all departments—exercises should occur regularly."

COMMUNICATIONS

♦ "Emergency communication voice/data plan"
♦ "Preidentify phone numbers for logistics personnel, chiefs at staging and warehouse, etc. (high)."
♦ "Review procedure for incoming messages (high)."

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION (ESF)-SPECIFIC

♦ "Hurricane Plan – EMS update"
♦ "Promote more agency interface—the various ESFs were too segregated (high)."
♦ "An ESF #1 leader should be identified and trained before any event or exercise."
♦ "Weapons (high)"
♦ "ESF #6 plan—revisions and updates in progress will be re-reviewed."

EVACUATION PLANNING

♦ "Organize evacuation plan."

♦ "Scanning people as they board"

♦ "Post registration processing."

♦ "Pet evacuation component needs further development; Laura Maloney and Jerry Snead are coordinating further (high)."

♦ "Shelter for Category 1 or 2 (high)"

♦ "Evacuating nursing homes (high)"

♦ "Vehicle and EQDT evacuation/storage plan (in tiers) (high)"

♦ "Assistance for family evacuation; plans for essential personnel (high)"

♦ "All plans should be reviewed with an After-Action Report; however, evacuation plan seems to need better manning. The issue to be addressed looks like whether more volunteers are needed, or does someone plan to hire personnel to work in a potentially dangerous situation?"

♦ "CEMP and annexes, evacuation plan included (high)"

GENERAL EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (EOC)

♦ "Communications within the EOC can be improved, possibly with display monitors around the EOC presenting briefing times, other news."

♦ "Coordination with State, other Federal, and other parish"

♦ "Department agencies directly addressing and managing emergency operation need to review the emergency plans of all other government departments—as experts on the matter, they are better prepared to evaluate the readiness of departments across the board."

♦ "Make sure that EOC members are aware of other EOC personnel positions."

♦ "SOPs need to be created for smoother operation for people just being introduced to EOC (high)."

♦ "EOC operations plans (high)"

MEDICAL

♦ "Mass fatalities"
♦ "ESF #8 public health criteria (11)"
♦ "Hospital and nursing home emergency plans on file with the DHS"
♦ "Contact list of those responsibilities of ESF #8 postureponts at State level (high)"
♦ "State and local emergency preparedness plans—State Annex M and local ESF #8 binder"

MISCELLANEOUS

♦ "Mass prophylaxis"

♦ "Airport emergency plan and hurricane plan to be reviewed by staff"

♦ "SWB emergency plan revised"

♦ "Not so much that things need to be revised but need to distribute to EOC staffers"

♦ "Data flow SOP "

♦ "NRP"

♦ "Data flow"

♦ "Review, revise, exercise, and train toward the CEMP."

♦ "Posture the departments into a task force arrangement for emergency deployment and adjust pay accordingly."

♦ "Adopt intermodal solutions for resource management as well as all support branch activities, i.e., USDOT/MARAD, coastal region cities, New Orleans, etc."

♦ "Force account equipment reporting standardization (high)."

♦ "Official declaration of essential personnel (high)"

♦ "Coordinate and cowrite procedure for information dissemination between volunteer/donations and Mass Care, VOAD, VOLAGS and CBOs."

♦ "Poststorm credentialing"

♦ "Poststorm satellite office"

♦ "CAEP—needs revisions, pick up site locations specific review and MCC staffing and training"

♦ "Planning for registration needs improvement/staffing."

♦ "Individual department plans (high)"

T E C H N O L O G Y

♦ "Procedure for flow of E-Team local requests"

II. Exercise Design and Conduct

1. What is your assessment of the exercise design and conduct?

The exercise was well structured and organized.

Strongly Agree, 18%
Disagree, 9%
Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 15%
Agree, 58%

The exercise scenario was plausible and realistic.

Disagree, 6%
Neither Disagree nor Agree, 16%
Strongly Agree, 46%
Agree, 32%

After-Action Report
Appendix D: Participant Feedback – *Louisiana*
New Orleans
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

The multimedia presentation helped the particpants understand and become engaged in the scenario.

Strongly Disagree, 3%
Disagree, 3%
Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 23%
Strongly Agree, 23%
Agree, 48%

The controllers were knowledgeable about the material, kept the exercise on target, and were sensitive to group dynamics.

Strongly Disagree, 3%
Disagree, 6%
Strongly Agree, 32%
Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 16%
Agree, 43%

The Exercise Plan used during the exercise was a valuable tool throughout the exercise.

Strongly Disagree, 9%
Disagree, 0%
Strongly Agree, 13%
Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 25%
Agree, 53%

Participation in the exercise was appropriate for someone in my position.

Strongly Disagree, 6%
Disagree, 0%
Strongly Agree, 46%
Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 13%
Agree, 35%

The participants included the right people in terms of level and mix of disciplines.

Strongly Disagree, 3%
Disagree, 9%
Strongly Agree, 31%
Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 13%
Agree, 44%

The exercise provided a good test of knowledge/skills obtained in training courses.

Strongly Disagree, 3%
Disagree, 9%
Strongly Agree, 24%
Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 18%
Agree, 46%

D-13

After-Action Report
Appendix D: Participant Feedback – *Louisiana*
New Orleans
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

Training course(s) enhanced my performance during the exercise.

The exercise prepared me to better respond to a catastrophic incident.

The exercise will be beneficial to my agency/jurisdiction as we preapre for a catastrophic incident.

2. What changes would you make to improve this exercise?

C O M M U N I C A T I O N S

♦ "I think the past week issues need to be tested. For example, we did not lose communications in this exercise."

♦ "Less paper communications, creates communications confusion"

E V A C U A T I O N   P L A N N I N G

♦ "Preregister senior citizens with special needs."

I N F O R M A T I O N   F L O W

♦ "Structure format to briefings and only include section chiefs so work can continue. Provide top-down info dissemination."

♦ "Hand out hourly copies of important events, breakthroughs, and injects."

♦ "A real-time Web site that each agency could monitor during the pre- and postevent activity"

♦ "If ESFs are divided into rooms, more information needs to get to outer rooms."

♦ "Process flows need to be documented."

D-14

After-Action Report
Appendix D: Participant Feedback –   *Louisiana*
New Orleans
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

♦ "Means of receiving information and getting that info inside the briefings"

♦ "The exercise plan didn't arrive until day 2 of the exercise. There was a brief PowerPoint scenario devised, but planning needed images from those PDF files to support frequent requests after the briefing slides were on the screen."

MISCELLANEOUS

♦ "The need for continuous improvement"

♦ "Coordination of logistics/quality control"

♦ "Each area of the EOC should have access to master sequence board. Exercise provides good insight into additional training needs. It is essential that there be organized followup to the exercise."

♦ "A bigger meeting area"

♦ "I would like to see more emphasis on the weather conditions gradually affecting the area. Example: Hurricane watch to hurricane warning—winds increasing in the area, to what mph, deteriorating weather conditions."

♦ "Make it more like Katrina (as difficult as possible)."

♦ "Pre-exercise meeting with ESF #3"

PARTICIPANT ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

♦ "Controllers should have been able to address those details onsite."

♦ "Controllers were not engaged enough to address design flaws."

♦ "Why was more city government not here? Shouldn't the mayor have a part in this, or do the Jerrys run the show for him?"

♦ "Require identification of alternate/or backup personnel. No one has been assigned to learn my function in case of a shift rotation or loss of personnel."

♦ "Require increased compliance from all participating agencies/departments in training people for the simulations."

♦ "Assist the participants with deficiencies they have in terms of equipment (monitors for exercise artificialities/inject and the MSEL). Provide handouts reflecting the same—this will minimize rampant photocopying."

TECHNOLOGY

♦ "Automate process as much as possible."

♦ "Make data acquisitions fast and seamless."

After-Action Report
Appendix D: Participant Feedback –   *Louisiana*
New Orleans
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

♦ "Better use of video to give more information about scenarios and changes during the exercise. Updated maps and memos of conditions could be distributed or updated in a timely fashion."

♦ "Explore alternate software messaging, exchange, and recording."

♦ "Electronic forms"

♦ "Electronic messages with return receipt"

TRAINING

♦ "Improve training and make it mandatory."

♦ "Provide training courses in NIMS to purchasing EOC staff to ensure no duplication of work and materials, supplies, and equipment ordered, received, tracking, etc."

SIMULATION CELL (SIMCELL)

♦ "Exercise scenario while plausible was not developed deep enough—too many blank spots forced continued calls to SIMCELL."

♦ "Injects should have been numbered and better controlled in terms of the delivery."

♦ "All players should have been given the SIMCELL number first."

♦ "The rules of the exercise need to be better explained—more incidents to handle."

♦ "Connectivity between observers and injectors"

♦ "Increase difficulty of scenarios."

♦ "Number of injects (not times) for appropriate tracking/logging"

D-16

After-Action Report
Appendix D: Participant Feedback –   *Louisiana*
New Orleans
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

APPENDIX E: ROLE PLAYER FEEDBACK – NEW ORLEANS

This appendix contains comments transcribed directly from Role Player Evaluation Forms. The comments reflect the views and opinions of exercise role players and are not intended to single out any particular agency, entity, or person.

I. Recommendations and Action Steps

1. How did you hear about the exercise?

♦ "L.R.S."
♦ "From my employer"
♦ "DSS/SES/work"
♦ "Mass Care Committee"
♦ "News Media, Clara Kinkland"
♦ "Media"
♦ "E-mail"
♦ "Google"
♦ "My supervisor asked me to participate."
♦ "3-1-1 call center"
♦ "City Hall (advocacy office)"
♦ "Louisiana Rehab Services"
♦ "Work (Marine Corps)"
♦ "Jerry Sneed"
♦ "Department of Social Services – New Orleans"

2. In your opinion, why was this exercise helpful to the community?

♦ "Because it will give you an idea of what you should do in case there is a storm."

♦ "It helped to point out issues that need to be addressed."

♦ "Practice makes perfect—better to understand than not."

♦ "Ability to process people out of the area"

♦ "It brings forth issues that did not arise in the conceptualization of the event."

♦ "Media attention—media's presence would alert community that steps are being taken to be better prepared for the upcoming hurricane season."

♦ "It helped to prepare evacuees for the real hurricane."

♦ "Because it provides helpful information on what to do in case of an emergency."

♦ "It helped to identify problems to be addressed."

E-1

After-Action Report
Appendix E: Role Player Feedback –   *Louisiana*
New Orleans
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

- "Extremely helpful"

- "Better preparation for evacuation purposes"

- "Helpful, yes. Everyone has a role."

- "It is one part of an evacuation plan."

- "It prepared the people recording the information."

- "Anything to avoid a catastrophe is helpful."

- "It seems to be a better way of tracking."

- "Display of organization"

- "It allows people to understand and get to know how an evacuation works."

- "The process is clear."

II. Exercise Design and Conduct

In your opinion, was the exercise helpful to the community?
No 12%
Yes 88%

Were you given clear instructions on how to play your part?
No 18%
Yes 82%

Were the processing site workers easy to identify?

No
12%

Yes
88%

Did you receive clear instructions from the site workers?

No
21%

Yes
79%

3. Please explain any problems you experienced:

♦ "The lines were too long."

♦ "It would be easier if each family could register on the phone for the entire family and when they got to the site they give the last four numbers of their Social Security number and the entire family will appear, and they will be checked in and processed."

♦ "The volunteers did not properly assist."

♦ "The bus left me."

♦ "Special needs; no followup"

♦ "Inability to accommodate other than English-speaking evacuees—when I explained I had been separated from my child, they did not ask his information."

♦ "Special-needs requests were not acknowledged."

♦ "All site workers were not consistent in obtaining information (last names of group members, addresses, inquiries about pets)."

♦ "Wheelchair was needed."

♦ "I asked for a wheelchair and was told to get on the bus."

What was the best part of the exercise?

♦ "If someone is missing, the worker can look into the computer and let me know where they are."

♦ "Overall, I think people will be happy with the new system."

♦ "Helping with process"

♦ "There was actually some point to at least register people."

E-3

♦ "The actual practice"

♦ "Giving different scenarios to site registration workers to determine if they could respond to each different scenario"

♦ "The public service bus was very cool."

♦ "Waiting in line for the bus"

♦ "The snacks"

♦ "The bus ride"

♦ "Transportation was present and waiting for evacuees."

♦ "People's willingness to give their time and energy to try to help make the city safer by being better prepared"

♦ "Clear information and directions"

♦ "The exercise"

♦ "Roleplay—taking part in the event. Such an emergency may happen."

♦ "Being able to participate"

♦ "Getting to act as different people with different scenarios"

♦ "Roleplaying"

♦ "Getting exercise"

♦ "Registration"

♦ "Can handle different situations"

♦ "The arm bands to track the people"

4. What part of the exercise did you think should be improved?

♦ "More computers, more lines (for processing evacuees)"

♦ "Family members should have the same ID number on their armbands."

♦ "Time spent in line waiting to register and how to properly assist abandoned children"

♦ "Preparation for volunteers"

♦ "Information on intake, follow-through; databases should be linked to profiles."

♦ "Organization; more lines to process vast volumes of evacuees"

♦ "Registration—it is the most important part of the process and should be consistent (with information obtained) and as accurate as possible."

♦ "Receive medical equipment (wheelchair, etc.)."

E-4

♦ "Registration, special needs, and pets"

♦ "A real evacuation would not be this orderly."

♦ "Instructions"

♦ "More people that would be involved in the actual process"

♦ "Make it more realistic."

♦ "They should have different sites located around the convention center (e.g., medical, info desk, and travelers' desk)."

♦ "Preparation for the elderly, medically frail, or disabled was not apparent. "

♦ "It did not appear that city services (other than police) were present."

♦ "Use and release of information provided by evacuees should be explained."

♦ "Equipment and special supplies for special needs should be more readily accessible."

♦ "More participation from all community agencies"

♦ "None"

♦ "Special needs should be more clearly identified."

♦ "There should be more barcode labels."

♦ "It was fine."

♦ "Should have more people"

♦ "Food"

♦ "Getting checked in (should move faster)"

♦ "Notification of what would happen with pets"

♦ "Speed up registration by preregistering people."

♦ "The process was somewhat slow."

♦ "It did not duplicate reality."

♦ "The exercise was not realistic. A true evacuation is not as organized**."**

♦ "This needs only the workers involved—the amount of people conducting this exercise doesn't even come close to realistic numbers."

This page is intentionally left blank.

APPENDIX F: PARTICIPANT LIST – BATON ROUGE

Louisiana EOC Functional Exercise/Communications FSE

Baton Rouge, Louisiana
May 23 and 24, 2006

ATTENDEE LIST

(Note: Not every attendee registered at the sites, so this list is not representative of total participation.)

Participants and Observers

Last Name	First Name	Agency	Phone Number	E-mail
GOHSEP EOC				
Abbiatti	Mike	Board of Regents	225-342-4253	abiatti@regents.state.la.us
Allain	Peter	DOTD	225-242-4631	pallain@dotd.louisiana.gov
Allen	Cleo	DSS	225-342-6700	cleo.allen@dss.state.la.us
Allen	Dave	Comlabs	321-243-8425	daa@comlabs.com
Anders	Amy	159 FWCP	225-268-9672	amyanders198@yahoo.com
Anderson	Johnny	Governor's Office	225-342-7015	johnny.anderson@la.gov
Anderson	Johnny G.	Governor's Office	225-342-1263	johnny.anderson@la.gov
Anderson	Larry	LSP	504-471-2775	
Andrews	Dawson	OYD-APSC-YS	225-287-7994	
Annison	John	DOTD	225-766-0772	johndannison@louisiana.dotd.gov
Apple	Terry	DOJ	225-326-6142	
Arcementist	George	USGS	225-298-5487	
Arnold	Pat	GOHSEP/OPS	225-925-7322	parnold@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Aronstein	Patrick	State Fire Marshall	225-922-0839	Pat.aronstein@dps.la.gov
Arrieta	Carlos	159th LRS	504-236-4708	carlos.arrieta@lawo.af.ang.mil
Assefa	Amina	DHH	504-912-8111	aassefa@tulane.edu
Atedint	Winton	WLF	225-765-2989	
Auck	Nichola	GOHSEP	225-925-7324	nauck@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Auterson	David	LA VOAD	347-245-3882	dauterson@msn.com
Averette	Lynn	LSP	225-925-1978	
Avuelle	Scott	DNR	225-342-2710	scotta@dnr.state.la.us
Ball	Johnny T.	LAARNG	504-430-1200	
Ballow	Jim	GOHSEP	225-925-7421	jballow@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Barnett	Joy	LSU HESD	225-922-0569	jbarne@lsuhsc.edu
Baronet	Jim	DOT	225-219-4347	jim.baronet@la.gov
Barr	Steve	GOHSEP	225-925-7423	sbarr@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Barrett	Don	Mystate USA (vendore, software)	217-531-9684	

F-1

After-Action Report
Appendix F: Participant List – Baton Rouge   *Louisiana*
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

Last Name	First Name	Agency	Phone Number	E-mail
Barrett	Stacey	LSP HQ TA	225-925-6224	sbarrett@dps.state.la.us
Barthel	Michael	159 FW LANG	504-391-8427	michael.barthal@lanewo.ang.af.mil
Bartlett	Josh	GOHSEP	850-380-4520	joshua.k.bartlett.@us.army.mil
Becnel	Byron J.	LA DOTD	225-379-1310	
Beddingfield	Scott	USGS	225-298-5481	sbedding@usgs.gov
Bendily	Jody	DOC-DCI	225-634-1200	j.bendily@corrections.la.us
Bennett	Dianna	EMAC-GOHSEP	225-925-7277	laemac@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Bennett	Gary	LA Sheriff Assoc.	225-343-8402	Gary@LSA.org
Blake	Martin	FEMA RG	940-898-0828	Martin.blake@dhs.gov
Blanchard	Bill	DHL	225-343-5988	bblanch@dhl.la.gov
Bodley	Garcia	LA Office of Mental Health	225-342-9952	gbodley@dhh.la.gov
Boehringer	Ernst "Bo"	LDWE	225-765-5115	bboehringer@wlf.louisiana.gov
Bolton	Joel	Lake Charles Police	337-491-1393	nbolten@mail.city-lakecharles.org
Booth	Joseph	LA State Police	225-922-2293	joseph.both@dps.la.gov
Boscille	BG	National Guard		
Bossom	Shelly	GOHSEP Logger/tracker	225-573-0429	sbossom@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Bott	Robert	GOHSEP	225-925-7324	rbott@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Bottcher	Denise	Governor	225-342-9037	Denise.dottcher@la.gov
Boudreaux	Trey	DPSEC	225-342-6739	treyb@corrections.state.la.us
Bourgeolis	Nancy	DHH-OPH Emergency Response	225-763-5717	nbourgeo@dhh.la.gov
Boyd	Valerie	USGC	504-669-6959	valerie.a.boyd@uscg.mil
Bradberry	Johanny	DOTD	225-379-1200	johnnybradberry@dotd.louisiana.gov
Breacx	Kevin	GOHSEP/Operation	225-922-0168	kbreacx@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Bridges	Cynthia	LDR	225-219-2700	cynthia.bridges@la.gov
Bridges	Jim	SARTA GOHSEP	225-319-4810	
Broemmelsisk	John	FHWA	225-757-7614	john.broemmebrinsk@fhwa.dot.gov
Brogdon	Wendy	GOHSEP/OPS	225-925-7336	wbrogdon@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Broussard	Rick	LED	225-342-1948	broussard@hd.gov
Brownin	Chris	LSU FETI	225-278-0958	
Browning	Richard	LSU FETI	225-933-0353	rbrowning@lsu.edu
Brue	Barry	Airguard	504-391-8477	barry.brue@lanewo.ang.af.mil
Bryan	Bill	LA Attorney General's Office	225-326-6031	bryanb@ag.state.la.us
Buie	John	GOHSEP	225-922-1629	jbuie@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Burch	Kevin	National Guard	337-845-4847	kevin.burch@us.army.mil
Burch	William	Economic Development	225-392-5891	wburch@la.gov
Bush	Ed	LANG	225-615-2790	edward.bush1@usarmy.mil
Calvert	Amber	GOHSEP	925-1706	acalvert@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Campbell	Darrul	Corrections DOC	225-319-4511	dcampbell@corrections.state.la.us
Campbell	Brent	DNR	225-342-5529	brent.campbell@la.gov
Cerise	Fred	DHH	225-342-9503	fcerise@dhh.la.gov
Cerniauskas	Chris	OEP	225-329-8269	ccerniauskas@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Cervantes	Jack	ARC ESF #6	225-342-4310	jcervantes@dss.la.state.us
Chamberlain	Webster	ICE/DRO	318-335-0713	
Chambers	Arnold	LPSC	342-1403	arnolde@lpsc.org

F-2

Last Name	First Name	Agency	Phone Number	E-mail
Chastant	Paul	OYD-APSC-YS	225-287-7994	
Last Name	**First Name**	**Agency**	**Phone Number**	**E-mail**
Chenevert	Mark	DOTD	225-573-7717	
Christenson	David	Corps of Engineers	651-290-5204	david.s.christenson@usace.army.mil
Clark	Jimmy	Governor	2245342-1331	jimmy.clarke@la.gov
Clark	Tyler	LANG	504-638-7064	tylerclark@cox.net
Cleinpet	Leonard	Gov	225-342-0919	
Coates	Toby	DHS	225-925-3678	toby.coates@dhs.gov
Coffman	Tifany	GOHSEP	225-922-1318	tcoffman@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Colvin	Jody	LA DOTD	225-242-4635	jodycolvin@dotd.louisiana.gov
Coody	S	DOC-LSP	225-655-2197	scoody@corrections.state.la.us
Coughlin	Glenn	159 FW LANG	504-391-8431	glenn.coughlin@lanewo.ang.af.mil
Dabdoub	Louis	DHS/PSA	504-232-8112	louis.dabdoub@dhs.gov
Davidson	Alicia	GOHSEP Logistics	225-329-8295	adavidson@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Davidson	Jane	DHH	225-342-4464	Jdavidson@dhh.la.gov
Davis	Stephen	LAARNG	225-278-1313	stephen.frank.davis@us.army.mil
Davis	Tommy	LCPD	225-491-1311	
Dawson	Ang L.	DHH	225-342-3417	aelomona@dhh.la.gov
Dawson	Roy	LAARNG	504-452-4106	roy.dawson@us.army.mil
Day Rainey	Pat	LSU-HCSD	225-279-1264	praine@lsuhsc.edu
Dayries	Christina	LA State Police	225-922-0045	christian.dayries@dps.la.gov
Deaville	Matt	KATC	225-236-6351	jhsalum97@yahoo.com
Debosier	Mark	GOHSEP	225-333-6782	mdeposier@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Del Grosso	Bill	DHS Support	202-276-6572	delgrosso_bill@bah.com
Depland	Bridget	DDS	225-342-4148	bdepland@dss.stat.la.us
Dixon Fletcher	Verna	DSS	225-295-8952	vdixon@dss.state.la.us
Doran	William	Gottsep Ops	225-925-7500	wdoran@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Downer	Hunt	Governor's Office	225-342-7015	hunt.downer@la.gov
Drake	Bill	LA DOTD	325-379-1507	billdrake@dotd.louisiana.gov
Dreher	JS	LDWF	225-765-2980	
Dudenhoeffer	Don	Idaho National Lab (DOE)	208-526-0700	
Dumas	Tom	LA DHH/OAD	225-342-0859	tdumas@dhh.la.gov
Duncan	Glen	LSU System/Penmmiton	225-763-2599	glen.duncan@pbnc.edu
Dunn	Alan	GOHSEP	225-925-7324	adunn@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Durd	Stephen	National Guard	318-641-3866	stephen.durd@us.army.mil
Durel	Natalie	FEMA (IEM)	225-252-1778	natalie.durel@iem.com
Durrett	Doug	Department of Corrections RSP	225-655-2571	durrettsd@bellsouth.net
Duyer	Leon William	US CG HQ	202-267-0303	wduyer@comdt.uscg.mil
Dykes	Keith	LAARNG	504-613-8751	keith.dykes@us.army.mil
Edwards	Eric	FEME	202-391-4677	
Elee	Jennifer	LDEO	318-362-5439	jennifer.elee@la.gov
Elkins	Diane	Attorney Gen Office	225-326-6051	elkinsd@ag.state.la.us
Enright	Thomas	DOJ	225-326-6423	Enright@ag.state.la.us
Evans	Toni	LDEQ Secretary	225-219-3719	toni.evans@la.gov
Fain	John Moller	LAARNG	318-542-0986	john.r.fain@us.army.mil
Fairley	Wayne	FEMA	940-898-5145	wayne.fairley@dhs.gov

F-3

After-Action Report
Appendix F: Participant List – Baton Rouge   *Louisiana*
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

Last Name	First Name	Agency	Phone Number	E-mail
Fargio	Judy	DHH/OMH	225-342-2628	jfazio@dhh.la.gov
Farlow	Matt	GOHSEP/ESF #2	925-7420	farlow@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Ferney	Michael	LAARNG	337-962-1818	michael.fernet@us.army.mil
Fink	Christina	Governor's Office	225-342-1677	chris.fink@la.gov
Fink	Robert	LA National Guard	504-289-3090	Robert.fink@us.army.mil
Fleming	Nancy	DHH OMF	225-342-6477	nfleming@dhh.la.gov
Fontenot	Benny	LDAF	225-336-4709	
Fontenot	Duane	DSS	225-342-2302	
Fontest	Cathy	DOC-HDQ	225-819-7023	cfontenst@corrections.state.la.us
Ford	Don	Governor's Office	225-342-0616	don.ford@la.gov
Franklin	Brenda	DHH	225-342-0057	bfranklin@dhh.la.gov
Franklin	Kyle	LA National Guard	504-239-1531	kyle.b.franklin@us.army.mil
Fremin	Loret	LA DOJ AG	225-326-6100	
Fulehel	Stan	LA Dod	225-342-9719	fulchev@la.gov
Garcia	Candace	Red Cross	225-677-8399	cgarcia@lsu.edu
Garcia	Joe	DCO/E US Army North	210-863-4236	joe.garcia@arnorth.army.mil
Garcia	Jonathan	NO-OH	504-628-9040	jrgarcia@cintelg.com
Genre	Marc	LSP/HQ		
Gieger	Samuel	FEMA IT	225-275-5864	
Gill	Josh	LDAF	225-922-1251	jgill@ldaf.state.la.us
Gisclair	David	LOSCO	225-578-7817	dgisclair@lsu.edu
Glascock	Steve	LA DOTD	225-379-2516	stepheglasock@dotd.louisiana.gov
Gonzoulin	Simon	Office of Youth Development	225-287-7944	sponsoulino@oxd.louisiana.gov
Gooden	Angela	LSU HCSD	225-922-1221	agoode@lsuhse.edu
Graff	Frank	JPSO	504-832-2480	graff_fa@jpso.com
Green	Asha	LA Hosp Assoc/HRSA	225-928-0026	agreen@lhaonline.org
Green	Keith	LPIS	225-767-5660	
Grigg	Travis	ARNorth DCEVI	316-214-3281	travis.grigg@arnorth.army.mil
Grimsley	Kevin	USGS	225-298-5481	kjgrims@usgs.gov
Guess	Brenda	LED Bus. Resources	225-342-6442	guess@la.gov
Guidry	Colby	LAARNG	225-654-1394	colby.guidry@us.army.mil
Guidry	Jimmy	DHT	225-392-3417	jguidry@dht.la.gov
Guidry	Roland	Governor's Office/Oil Spills	225-219-5800	roland.guidry@la.gov
Guillory	Lee	Corps of Engineers	504-862-2934	
Gusky	Mike	DOA/OIT	225-219-9475	mgusky@la.gov
Gwin	Judy	OMH/DHH	225-922-3163	jgwin@dhh.la.gov
Haag	Alaric	LSU Earth Scan Lab	225-578-6438	haag@lsu.edu
Hale	Glen	LA State Police	225-925-6241	glenhale@dps.la.gov
Hall	Dale	LSP	225-925-6570	dhall@dps.slate.la.us
Hampton	Buck	LDWF	225-765-2980	bhampton@wf.louisiana.gov
Hardy	Kevin	Regents	225-342-4253	khardy@regents.state.la.us
Harper	Jay	FEMA/DHS	318-458-8904	Jay.harper@dhs.gov
Harris	John	LA ANG	225-303-1648	john.harris@lanewo.ang.af.mil
Harter	John	LA DOTD	225-379-1558	jharter@dotd.louisiana.gov
Haygood	Bill	OHSEP	225-303-2080	whaygood@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Hebert	Carl	GOHSEP		chebert@ohsep.louisiana.gov

F-4

After-Action Report
Appendix F: Participant List – Baton Rouge   *Louisiana*
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

Hebert	Kendall	American Red Cross	225-291-4533	khebert@batonrouge@redcross.org
Last Name	**First Name**	**Agency**	**Phone Number**	**E-mail**
Herford	Jim	LA DOJ	337-515-3359	jlh470@bellsouth.net
Herlocker	Matt	James Lee Witt Associates	504-281-8663	mherlocker@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Hill	John	Gannett	225-342-7333	jhillbr@gannett.com
Hodge	Brent	St. Tammany.com Press	985-778-9223	bhodge@sttammany.com
Howell	Vic	American Red Cross	225-291-4533	vhowell@batonrouge.redcross.org
Howze	Richard	American Red Cross	225-268-9517	dhowze@dss.state.la.us
Hurst	Chuck	LA Sheriffs Assn.	225-278-3038	Chuck@lsa.org
Hyatt	AW	LANG	504-616-5096	arthur.hyatt@lancwo.ang.af.mil
Hyatt	John	FEMA	940-898-5223	
Iandoli	JP	FEMA	940-898-5106	joseph.iandoli@dhs.gov
Istre	Shane	LANG	337-296-7447	shane.istre@us.army.mil
Jackson	Augustine	GOHSEP/Logistics	225-572-9465	
Jackson	Augustine	Division of Admin, State Purchases	225-342-8018	augustine.jackson@la.gov
Jackson	Patrick	LSP	225-658-8426	
James	Edith	LANG	504-202-6177	edith.james@us.army.mil
Jensen	DC	GOHSEP	225-925-7321	dcjensen@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Johnannessen	Bob	DHH	225-342-1532	rjohanne@dhh.la.gov
Jones	Art	GOHSEP/ESF #14	225-242-6295	ajones@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Jones	Jerry	Facility	225-342-0842	jerry.jones@la.gov
Joseph	Allen	EMAC-GOHSEP	225-925-7393	laemac@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Josephson	Bob	FEMA IGA Office	202-327-1022	robert.josephson@dhs.gov
Kaufmann	Chris	St. Tammany Fire Protection Dist. #1	985-960-2777	ekaufmann@stfpd1.org
Keller	Roy	LSU FETI	225-578-3985	rkeller@lsu.edu
Keppingar	Matthew	LDAS	225-925-3770	matthew@ldat.state.la
Kerry	Mark	FEMA (IEM)	225-252-8062	Mark.kerry@iem.com
Kessinger	Arthur	LAARNG	985-351-3311	arthur.kessigner@us.army.mil
Keyser	Gary	GOHSEP	225-925-7500	gkeyser@ohsep.louisiana.gov
King	Michelle	LSP	225-234-1940	
Kirkland Jr.	F. Derald	DOA–OTM	225-342-7704	derald.kirkland@la.gov
Laborde	Pam	Dept. of Corrections Secretary's Office	225-219-0499	plaborde@corrections.state.la.us
LaCaze	K	LDWF–ENF	225-765-2985	klacaze@wlf.louisiana.gov
Lagarde	Brian	JFHZ LANG	318-290-5411	brian.j.lagarde@us.army.mil
Lambert	Becky	LA Dept. of Eco Dev *LED	225-642-6070	blambert@la.gov
Lambert	Mark	DOTD	225-379-1221	
Lambert	Mike	Sorrento Fire Dept./President LFCA	225-806-5596	mrlz01e@atel
Landreneau	Bennett	National Guard	318-542-1942	bennett.landreneau@us.army.mil
Landry	Avis	WVUE-TV	504-483-1503	
Lang	Leah	GOHSEP Logger Tracker	225-925-7425	llang@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Lang	Tammy	GOHSEP/Logistics	225-572-9465	
Lang	Tammy	GOHSEP	225-318-	tammy.lang@us.army.mil

After-Action Report
Appendix F: Participant List – Baton Rouge *Louisiana*
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

Last Name	First Name	Agency	Phone Number	E-mail
			641-3854	
Law	Linda	DOJ	225-326-6100	
Le Duft	Rancly	WAFB	225-379-7876	rleduft@wafb.com
LeBlanc	Gary	LSP	225-925-6113	gleblanc@dps.state.la.us
Leg	Denise	GOHSEP/Logistics	225-572-9465	
LeJeune	Cyril	LDAF-Forestry	225-925-4500	cyril_l@ldaf.state.la.us
Leonard	Shaun	GOHSEP Logistics	225-925-7313	sleonard@ohsep.louisiana.gov
LeSage	Joseph	DPS/SFM	225-268-5549	donnie.lesage@ops.la.gov
Lincoln	Sue	LA Network	291-2727 ext. 4	sue@la-net.net
Looper	Terry	DHH	225-342-2795	tcooper@dhh.la.gov
Lopinto		LANG	504-391-8602	michael.lopinto@ang.af.mil
Lowe	Michael	ERPS of OWG	504-862-2244	
Lussier	Roland	Comlabs	321-890-7472	roland@comlabs.com
Mack	Lyndle	Treasury	225-342-0030	
Macklin	Ted	DHS IP	703-966-6535	theodore.macklin@dhs.gov
Madden	Darryl	FEMA/DHS	225-226-0427	Darryl.madden@dhs.gov
Magee	Cameron	Lang Tac	225-925-7733	cameron.magee@us.army.mil
Malatesta	Eric	Sparkhound	225-216-1500	
Mann	Darin	DEQ	485-8033 and 219-0860	darin.mann@la.gov
Marks	Donnie	LPSC	225-742-1473	donniem@lpsc.org
Martinez	Felipe	LED	225-342-5883	
Mayne	Jeff	LA DWF, Law ENF	225-765-2980	jmayne@wlf.louisiana.gov
McDaniel	Mike	GOHSEP	225-925-7426	mmcdaniel@ohsep.louisiana.gov
McDaniels	Mike	LDEQ Secretary	225-219-3950	mike.mcdaniels@la.gov
McDermotts	Tony	Priority 5	603-380-6345	tony@priority5.com
McDonald	Rex	LSP	225-925-4017	rex.mcdonald@dps.la.gov
McGimsey	Richard	LA DOJ	225-326-6001	mcgimseyR@ag.state.la.us
McKee	Rod	WBRZ	225-336-2344	
McLaughlin	Daniel	GOHSEP	225-925-7324	dmclaughlin@ohsep.louisiana.gov
McMorris	Mickey	LA State Police	225-925-4551	mickey.mcmorris@dps.la.gov
Mederos	Eileen	HRSA	504-450-3255	emederos@lhadrlue.org
Melon	Rudy	LDEQ/ENF	225-219-3729	rudy.melon@la.gov
Mers	John	GOHSEP/Logistics	225-572-9465	
Metoye	Pamela	DHH/OPH	225-763-5470	pmetoye1@dhh.la.gov
Mievs	John	LANG	337-593-2040	john.miers@la.nfb.army.mil
Miller	Chuck	Priority 5	617-678-0011	chuck.miller@priority5.com
Millet	Clair	DHH-OPH	225-763-3965	cpmillet@dhh.la.gov
Milton	Joseph	LAANG	225-241-0012	mike.milton@us.army.mil
Misczak	Mark	FEMA RG	940-367-5552	mark.misczak@dhs.gov
Mitchell	Brant	GOHSEP/LA ARNG	225-925-7332	bmitchell@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Moller	Jan	T-P	225-342-5207	jmoller@tpmail.com
Moller	John	TP	225-342-5207	jmoller@timespicayune.com
Montz	City	DOTD	225-379-1763	cindymontz@dotd.louisiana.gov
Moore	David "Joey"	LOSCO	225-219-5812	joey.moore@la.gov
Moore	Paul K.	DHH	225-342-1491	pmoore@dhh.la.gov
Morr	Ronald	LDB7 ES2-9	225-765-2992	rmorr@gulf.long.gov
Morse	Judy	OLG/CRT	225-342-3341	jmorse@crt.state.la.us
Muhs Saizan	Gina	Governor's Office	225-219-5800	gina.saizan@la.gov

F-6

After-Action Report
Appendix F: Participant List – Baton Rouge   *Louisiana*
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

Last Name	First Name	Agency	Phone Number	E-mail
		Oil Spill		
Mule	Heidi	GOHSEP Exec. Section	225-925-7334	hmule@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Musselman	Mike	St. George FD–EBRP	225-389-2057	mwmusselman@stgeorgefire.com
Myer	Malcolm	Ag. and Forestry	225-925-3962	
Myers	Nancy	DHH OCDD	225-342-5714	nmyers@dhh.la.gov
Neglia	Sam	US DHS OPS	202-282-8103	Samuel.neglia@dhs.gov
Nelson	Gordon	DOTD	225-379-1210	gordonnelson@dotd.louisiana.gov
Newchurch	Donna	LRAA	985-513-0952	denewchurch@bellsouth.net
O'Connor	Nick	LSP	504-471-2775	
Oxley	LTC Mark	LA State Police	225-922-0803	Mark.oxley@dps.la.gov
Ozier	John	Episcopal Diocese LA	225-567-5141	jozier@stjamesbr.org
Pablo	Paz	LAN–DER	504-460-8886	ppaz@cox.net
Pafin	Gregor	Catholic Community Services	225-242-0310	gpatin@ccsbr.org
Paul	Gezette	LAARNG	504-812-2635	gee.paul@us.army.mil
Percy	Adam	LA ARNG	504-256-3336	adam.percy@us.army.mil
Pitts	Jerry	FHWA	225-757-7618	jerry.pitts@fhwa.dot.gov
Pleasant	Sgt. GJ	LSP/HQ	925-6425	gplean@dps.state.la.gov
Potter	Brendon	DHS/FAMS	281-222-4798	bryon.t.potter@secureskies.net
Powell	Kendra	LA Hos Assoc. HRSA	225-610-9115	
Prats	Rosanne	DHH	225-342-3417	rprats@dhh.la.gov
Preau	Donald	US Coast Guard	504-671-2103	donald.p.preau@uscg.mil
Prestenback	Kim	BOI/LSP	225-925-4865	
Price	Karen	LDEQ Secretary	225-219-3620	karen.g.price
Prince	Jeremy	National Guard	318-489-8618	jeremy.l.prince@us.army.mil
Reech	Marc	State Fire Marshall	225-925-4205	marc.reech@dps.la.gov
Regira	Linda	LED Research Planning	225-342-5380	regira@la.gov
Revitte	Frank	NDAA-NWS	985-649-0429	frank.revitte@ndaa.gov
Ricks	Ricks	DSS	342-0805	terriricks@dss.state.ks
Rivera	PB	LSP/CIU	225-925-1978	
Robbins	Kevin	LSU Hurricane Counter	225-578-1063	krobbins@srec.lsu.edu
Robinette	Dwayne	256 FNF BDG	504-723-4384	dwayne.robinette@us.army.mil
Robinson	Lou	NOFD	225-421-4595	
Robinson	Tony	FEMA/DITS	940-898-5309	tony.robinson@dhs.gov
Rodi	Rachel	FEMA Public Affairs	703-819-9769	rachel.rodi@dhs.gov
Rodriguez	Ashley	LDAF	225-922-1240	Ashley@ldaf.state.la.us
Rodtaning	Michael	GCRO	240-793-0616	
Ruiz de Chale	Lindsay	DOTD	225-933-3974	
Salpietra	Donald	LDWF	225-485-8593	dsalpietnra@wlf.louisiana.gov
Salvo	Di	NOPD	504-235-0261	ddisalvo@cityofno.com
Sandie	Joe	Board. of Regents	225-342-4253	commish@regents.state.la.us
Santos	Pat	GOHSEP	225-925-7500	psantos@ohsep.louisiana.gov

After-Action Report
Appendix F: Participant List – Baton Rouge   *Louisiana*
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

Last Name	First Name	Agency	Phone Number	E-mail
Santos	Will	GOHSEP/OPS	225-925-7500	wsantos@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Savaii	Errol	GOSHEP/Gov.	225-772-0577	errolsavaii@cat.net
Savoie	Jude	LA Fire Chief's	337-884-2899	
Last Name	**First Name**	**Agency**	**Phone Number**	**E-mail**
Schmidt	George	GOHSEP Internal Auditing	225-922-7479	gschmidt@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Schmidt	Melanie	GOHSEP/EMAC	225-925-1803	mschmidt@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Schneider	Pete	LAN6	318-641-3864	
Schweitzer	Rob	DHS	571-243-1775	robert.schweitzer@dhs.gov
Selbach	Kathy	GOHSEP Exec. Section	925-7331	kselbach@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Selleweski	Joe	LSP	225-658-8329	
Severance	Suzanne	Agriculture	326-6712	severances@ag.state.la.us
Shoff	Michael	DHS/TSA New Orleans	504-472-9393	michael.shuff@dhs.gov
Shoultz	Russell T.	St. Tammany FD #1	985-960-1809	Rshoultz@stfd01.one
Singleton	Kimberly	GOHSEP	225-572-9914	ksingleton@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Sirtig	Mike	DPS	225-925-6372	Mike.Sistig@dps.la.gov
Sivula	Eric	Corrections DOC	225-342-1178	esivula@corrections.state.la.us
Smith	Debby	GOHSEP/EMAC	225-925-3633	dsmith@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Smith	Evon M.	DHH/OPH Bureau of EMS	225-763-5717	esmith2@dhh.la.gov
Smith	Marke	GOHSEP/PIO	925-7427	marksmith@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Smith	Robert	DOD US Northcom	719-640-4486	robert.p.smith@northcom.mil
Smith	Robyn C.	Dept. of Social Services	225-342-4219	rsmith9@dss.state.la.us
Snellgrove	Johnny	LPSC	225-342-3330	johnny.snellgrove@la.gov
Sokol	Josopia	USA	719-492-6007	
Sonnier	Lana	LED	225-342-5406	sonnier@la.gov
Spikes	Dale	Bell South	225-295-5199	Dale.spikes@bellsouth.com
Springfield	Aprill	Governor	225-342-1321	aprill.springfield@la.gov
Stagg	Jason	LA Dept. of the Treasury	225-342-0006	jstagg@treasury.state.la.us
Stanek	Richard	LDWR	225-342-7946	richard.stanek@la.gov
Stephens	Jennifer A.	FEMA/IEM	330-704-9785	
Stevens	Cara	E&E	225-298-5080	cstevens@ene.com
Stevens	Walter	GOHSEP	225-925-7320	wstevens@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Stone	Davide	GOHSEP IT	225-925-7733	dstone@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Stricker	Owen	LPSC Utilities	225-342-5710	buddy.stricker@la.gov
Sturner	Barb	FEMA/DITS	281-743-7063	barb.sturner@dhs.gov
Sutterfield	Scott	ICE/DRO	318-335-0713	scott.sutterfield@dhs.gov
Sweeney	Keven	DEQ	225-219-3616	Kevin.sweeney@la.gov
Swift	Clay	LADOTD	225-379-1523	
Tate	Charles	Gov's OCP	225-219-4483	charles.tate@us.la.gov
Tate	Gail	FEMA	281-757-2971	gailtate@dhs.gov
Tenney	Jennifer	GOHSEP	225-925-7300	jtenney@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Thefield	Male	LDAF	225-933-3996	male@ldaf.state.la.us
Thibodeaux	Jacque	LANG	504-589-3144	jacque.thibodeaux@usdoj.gov
Thomas	Dorothy	GOHSEP/Logistics	225-572-9465	
Thomas	Dorothy	LANO	703-581-3989	dorothy@lano.org
Thompson	Shana	LSP/DPS	225-925-3608	shana.thompson@dps.la.gov

Last Name	First Name	Agency	Phone Number	E-mail
Tiernerney	Tom	Priority 5	337-344-2544	tom.tierney@priority5.com
Tjikuami	DeeAngela	LADOTD	225-242-4638	deeangelatjikuami@dotd.louisian.gov
Trapper	Dr. Fred	LSU System	225-578-2111	atrapps@lsu.edu
Last Name	First Name	Agency	Phone Number	E-mail
Travis	Trace	OSFM	225-925-3650	ttravis@dps.state.la.gov
Turner	Chris	FEMA–MERS	301-370-1950	
Turner	Hal	LA Sheriffs Assn.	225-343-8402	Hal@lsa.org
Uittoria	Cathy	GOHSEP/Logistics	572-9465	Cuittoria@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Umluh	Stan	Motorola	225-933-3125	Stan.umluh@motorola.com
Vaughan	Frank	Lousiana State Police	225-925-3682	Frank.vaughn@dps.la.gov
Veillon	JB	LANG	318-641-5800	
Veillon	Randy	LED	225-342-2418	
Verret	Willie	LSP/Intel NO	504-471-2723	willie.verret@DDs.la.gov
Vignes	Timothy	159 FW LANG	504-391-8376	timothy.vignes@lanewo.ang.af.mil
Wagner	Joey	USACE	337-316-4818	herbet.joey.wagner@mvd2-usale.army.mil
Warden	Deborah	GOHSEP Admin	225-925-7345	dwarden@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Washington	S.	GOHSEP/ESF #2	225-925-7422	swashington@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Waver	Nathanial	City of NO–Office of Homeland Sec.	504-270-6009	nweaver@mayorofno.com
Weathers	Kent	FEMA	940-368-0205	kent.weathers@dhs.gov
Webb	Jason	256INFBDE	337-322-5542	jason.webb@la.ngb.army.mil
Weber	Dennis	DPS LSP	225-925-6226	dennis.weber@la.gov
Weiser	Richard	GOHSEP	225-925-7324	rweiser@ohsep.louisiana.gov
Welborn	Tim	LAARNG	225-938-6253	Twelbor@lsu.edu
White	Georg	OYD–APSC–YS	225-287-7912	
White	Tim	DHH	225-342-3891	Tawhite@dhh.la.gov
Whitehorn	Henry	LA State Police	925-6118	henry.whitehorn@dps.la.gov
Whitehorn	Henry	LSP	225-287-7710	
Whittington	Rusty	LSP/HQ	225-925-6036	
Wiley	Jeff	LA Sherrif's Assoc.	225-621-8322	Jwiley@ascenionsheriff.com
Wiley	Thomas	Ecology & Environment Contractor	225-298-5092	twiley@ene.com
Woodruff-White	Lisa	OSS	225-342-6715	lwoodruf@dss.state.la.us
Wortman	Bob	ARC	713-628-6539	wormanb@usa.redcross.org
Wright	Jayne	LAVOAD	318-445-2773	jwfbalex@cs.com
Young	Christopher	HHC 256 BCT s-2	337-412-1784	christopher.scott.young@us.army.mil
Zabesky	TK	LANG-AV	318-613-2393	thomas.zabesky@la.ngh.army.mil
Zatham	Brecke	600s Press Office	225-342-9037	brecke.zatham@la.gov
Zeagler	Carryn	DOTD	225-379-2518	Carrynzeagler@dotd.louisiana.gov
Zuelke	Laura	DPS/LSP	225-922-2979	laura.zuelke@dps.la.gov

F-9

After-Action Report
Appendix F: Participant List – Baton Rouge   *Louisiana*
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft

This page is intentionally left blank.

APPENDIX G: PARTICIPANT LIST – NEW ORLEANS

EOC Functional/Communications FSE

New Orleans, Louisiana
May 23 and 24, 2006

ATTENDEE LIST

(Note: Not every attendee registered at the sites, so this list is not representative of total participation.)

Participants and Observers

Name	Agency	Phone Number	E-mail Address
Lower Ninth Ward Incident Command Post			
Joe Bartelme	ICTAP	619-553-5476	bartelme@spaware.navy.mil
Jim Cason	General Physics	813-426-7582	jcason@gpworldwide.com
Juan Godoy	General Physics	516-972-7673	juan.godoy@unisys.com
Gary Haydel	New Orleans Fire	504-658-4950	G.Haydel@cox.net
Ben Sharon	ICTAP	619-553-6496	sharonb@spawar.navy.mil
Mike Shelby	SPAWAR	619-884-4080	shelbymb@spawar.navy.mil
Naeem Yazdani	Unisys	803-920-8682	nyazdani98@hotmail.com
Ernest N. Morial Convention Center			
Esther Aranda	NOOHSPS	281-755-6879	esther_aranda@urscorp.com
Clarence Bradley	NO EMS	504-250-9874	ctbradley@cityofno.com
Nick Culotta	NO EMS	504-650-2883	nculotta@cityofno.com
Marlon DeFillo	NOPD	504-416-3325	madefillo@cityofno.com
Joseph Hebert	Morial Convention	504-582-3050	jhebert@mccno.com
Erica Klevers	Gulf Coast Recovery NO OHS Tech Support	727-417-5184	eklevers@hotmail.com
Lt. Frederick Morton	NO PD PIB	504-915-9578	emorton@cityofno.com
Jerry Sneed	NO OHS	504-777-7037	jwsneed@cityofno.com
Brian Swaen	USDHS	202-439-4066	brian.swaen@dhs.gov
New Orleans Union Passenger Terminal			
Sam H. Bell	Amtrak Railroad Police	504-329-4190	bellsam@amtrak.com
Jeanne Abadie	Advocacy Center	504-522-2334	jabadie@advocacyla.org

Name	Agency	Phone Number	E-mail Address
Alex Brandon	Associated Press	504-523-3931	abrandon@ap.org
Jim Cason	General Physics	813-426-7582	jwyles@aol.com
S.J. Chambers	Amtrak Railroad Police	904-219-6478	cham6023@amtrak.com
Det. Leigh Cole	Amtrak Railroad Police	817-332-2169	colel@amtrak.com
Sgt. Paul Crescioni	Amtrak Railroad Police	504-528-1636	cresp@amtrak.com
Gabriel Dayan	Intellifilms	504-756-6551	gabrieldayan@hotmail.com
Stephen F. Gall	Advocacy Center	504-522-2334	
Mike Geier	OEP/OHS/MOT	813-298-3693	mgeier@gpworldwide.com
Guy Hernandez	Fox News	214-697-5862	
Stephanie Kovac	Fox News	214-673-6387	
Frans LaBranche	Marine Corps Public Affairs	504-670-4179	Frans.Labranche@usmc.mil
Willie MacMartin	NOHDP	565-7283	
Marc Magliai	Amtrak Media Relations	312-880-5350	marcmag@amatrak.com
Donna Malvs	NO HDP	504-658-2510	dmalvs@cityofno.com
Phillip Mason	NO Fire	504-201-6970	pmason@cityofno.com
Jim McDaniel	Amtrak Transportation	919-868-1721	mcda0869@amtrak.com
Paul Murphy	WGNO–TV	504-619-6363	pmurphy@tribune.com
Stacey Plaisance	The Associated Press	504-523-3931	splaisance@ap.org
Stephen Rue	Intellifilms	504-319-9990	stephenrrue@aol.com
Bill Salmeron	American Red Cross	504-915-8229	bsalmeron@arcno.org
Frank Sullivan	Detective, Amtrak Railroad Police	919-868-1722	sull7574@amtrak.com
Troy Toups	WGNO-TV	504-619-6363	
R.L. (Butch) Williams	Amtrak Operations	504-410-2354	will5527@amtrak.com

Exercise Support Team at Each Site

Name	Agency	Phone Number	E-mail Address
Brendan Debow	DHS	814-777-3573	debow_brendan@bah.com
Jill Kautz	DHS EST	410-297-2557	kautz_jill@bah.com
David Spicer	DHS EST	573-645-1096	david.spicer@L-3com.com
Dianne Tarver	DHS EST	703-725-2928	kane_dianne@bah.com
David Walter	DHS EST	571-212-9270	david.walter@L-3com.com

After-Action Report
Appendix G: Participant List – New Orleans   *Louisiana*
2006\G&T Exercises\Louisiana\LA EOC FSE\AAR

For Official Use Only – Draft